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Preference from Priorities: Dynamic Logic

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Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 354))

Abstract

In the preceding two chapters, a rich notion of priority-based preference has been studied in stable situations. Various ways of deriving preferences from a priority sequence have been proposed, both under complete and under incomplete information. In this chapter we take up one of the main themes of this book, and address the dynamics of changes in preferences in this richer setting. What we find is that our earlier methods for plain betterness orderings generalize in an obvious manner, with a few adaptations. Therefore, this chapter will be short, since the connection, once seen, is straightforward.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Note that priority change leads to a preference change in a way similar to “entrenchment change” in belief revision theory (see [162]). Still, we stick to the methodology of dynamic epistemic logic , now applied to belief.

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Correspondence to Fenrong Liu .

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© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

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Liu, F. (2011). Preference from Priorities: Dynamic Logic. In: Reasoning about Preference Dynamics. Synthese Library, vol 354. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1344-4_9

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