Abstract
The so-called Precautionary Principle (PP) has come to be a standard notion in environmental policy and debate. It appears frequently in important policy documents and international agreements, as well as in the environmental legislation of various countries. In pair with its sister notion of ‘sustainable development ’, it has become the default piece of rhetoric and argumentation embraced by almost all sides in public discussions about environmental policy issues and controversies regarding the use of technology.
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Notes
- 1.
For a brief overview of different views on this matter, see Sandin (2004, pp. 3–5).
- 2.
Sandin (2004, pp. 4–5).
- 3.
The Earth Summit.
- 4.
See O’Riordan et al. (2001a, chapters 5–10); and Trouwborst (2002).
- 5.
Cf. Graham (2000).
- 6.
All of these unclarities, as well as several others, will be addressed throughout this book.
- 7.
For example, PP has been referred to in debates about the proper treatment of animals (Bradshaw 1998), abortion (Ford 1990, Mahoney 1984) and embryo research (Ford 1990) as well as general research ethics (Kuhlau et al. 2011). According to Sunstein (2005, p. 4), the basic ideas of PP can be detected in the US responses to the threats of global terrorism . In my own country, Sweden , PP has also figured in a rather fierce public debate on the issue of the possibility of homosexual couples to adopt children .
- 8.
Sandin (1999). This paper also provides an informative exposition of formulations of PP available in the literature. An analysis along similar lines as Sandin’s has later been presented in Manson (2002). See Bodansky (1991), and O’Riordan and Jordan (1995) for earlier observations of PP’s unclarity. For comprehensive overviews of formulations of PP in different political contexts, see O’Riordan et al. (2001a) and Trouwborst (2002).
- 9.
Harris and Holm (2002) tries to use this fact as a general argument against PP and Sunstein (2005) seems to be of a similar bent. However, as observed in Sandin (2006), it is not the case that all versions of PP are necessarily unable to deal with these types of considerations. In fact, the theory subsequently developed in this book is explicitly constructed to prescribe a proper price of precaution .
- 10.
This principle as well as the standard arguments in its favour are explained and critically discussed in Chapter 3 below.
- 11.
- 12.
This is one of the main themes in Sunstein (2005).
- 13.
This is clear in the Rio Declaration , as well as other similar policy statements and political agreements, since, in direct connection to PP, explicit reference is made to a requirement of cost-effectiveness – a concept derived from the same body of theoretical assumptions and conceptions of rationality as the traditional models of risk analysis and rational policy making. For arguments based on the assumption that PP does not constitute a break with the ideal of scientifically informed policy making, see Buhl-Mortensen and Welin (1998), Hansson (1997), and Resnik (2003).
- 14.
Hansson (1999).
- 15.
- 16.
O’Riordan and Cameron (1994, p. 292).
- 17.
- 18.
Cf. the analysis made by O’Riordan and Cameron (1994, pp. 262–293).
- 19.
This analysis could equally well be applied to the sister notion of PP – that of ‘sustainable development ’. Since, in international environmental politics, PP is so strongly related to this latter notion, this of course adds to the problems involved in reaching agreement on some clearer version of PP.
- 20.
This is not to deny the claim of O’Riordan and Cameron (1994, p. 263) that lack of clarity seems to have been a powerful tool in reaching acceptance on PP. However, since this acceptance can be interpreted in as many ways as may PP, it does not imply that any specific claim regarding precaution has thereby been shown to be acceptable.
- 21.
In addition, it will probably also be more difficult to achieve wide acceptance of such a version of PP.
- 22.
This may explain Sandin ’s (2004, p. 23) sceptical conclusions regarding the prospect of finding an ‘authoritative’ formulation of PP. Since he does not consider what normative reasons there are to prefer one version of PP over another he simply lacks access to the type of arguments needed. However, at the same time, one particular aspect of Sandin’s doubts is indeed shared also by me. See the Section 6.3 in Chapter 6 for more about this.
- 23.
- 24.
- 25.
Klint Jensen (2002).
- 26.
- 27.
Morris (2000b).
- 28.
Cf. Sunstein (2005, pp. 18–20), among others.
- 29.
Oddly enough, a few critics of PP have perceived this rather obvious fact to be a serious problem. See Sandin et al. (2001) for a clear presentation as well as convincing dismissal of this argument.
- 30.
- 31.
Sandin (2004, pp. 15–16) makes a similar observation in terms of a distinction between “argumentative” and “prescriptive” versions of PP , where the former denotes ideas in line with the proof requirement of justifiable policy claim .
- 32.
- 33.
As demonstrated by Klint Jensen (2002), the primary pull of this particular aspect of PP seems to be that it is easily accommodated into a liberal democratic political scheme . This, however, to the price of abstaining from any specific recommendation regarding the taking of measures, and, therefore, of passing over in silence all of the unclarities regarding the formulation of a more precise version of PP capable of guiding action as well as decision- and policy making (cf. Morris 2000b, pp. 13–15). After all, in the liberal context, the formulation does not really say anything more than suggesting that the proof -standards of science need not be the proof-standards of liberal politics.
- 34.
- 35.
In spite of this, it is my own personal experience that many people – not least environmental activists and those with similar stakes in the debate on how to understand PP – actually believe this claim for a reversed burden of proof to express the very essence of what PP has to say.
- 36.
Sandin (1999). Sandin uses the term “strength” and equates this with “degree of precaution ” (p. 898). However, he also states that the strength of a version of PP determines its precision (p. 898). Moreover, it is clear from the construction of his theoretical setup that what he primarily wants to be able to do is to compare semantic precision. What he calls “degree of precaution” should therefore not be confused with my own use of this notion (see below).
- 37.
In particular, he has added the idea of comparing how “extensive” and “demanding” different versions of PP may be (Sandin 2004, p. 16).
- 38.
Sandin and Hansson (2002).
- 39.
I am thus rejecting as evident assumptions the requirements of completeness, determinism, predictability and uniqueness for the operationalisation of PP held out by Sandin and Hansson (2002, pp. 465–466). Whether or not (and to what extent) such factors should be given weight in the assessment of competing versions of PP depends on what weight they can be argued to have from the normative basis of precaution pursued in this book.
- 40.
For some readers, this notion may be confusing, since it may be understood in terms of how small threats that must be in place in order for the requirement of precauti on to prescribe us to take precautionary measures. According to this understanding, the smaller or less serious such threats need to be, the more cautious we will be if abiding by these prescriptions and, thus, the more of precaution is prescribed by them. As will be seen in Chapter 2, this factor does come into play as one of several others influencing the degree of precaution (in my sense).
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Munthe, C. (2011). Introduction. In: The Price of Precaution and the Ethics of Risk. The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1330-7_1
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