Rationality and Judgment

Abstract

Philosophical/epistemic theories of rationality differ over the role of judgment in rational argumentation. According to what (1988) calls the ‘classical model’ of rationality, rational justification is a matter of conformity with explicit rules or principles. On this view, a given belief, action or decision is rational only in so far as it is rendered so by a relevant rule or principle. These rules or principles must themselves be justified by appeal to other rules or principles. According to the classical model, judgment plays no role in the determination of rationality; whether a belief or action is rational is a matter, not of judgment, but of its relation to the appropriate rules.¹ Critics of the classical model, e.g. (1999), argue that the model is subject to insuperable difficulties. They propose, instead, that rationality be understood in terms of judgment rather than (or in addition to) rules. Govier criticizes some of my previous work on the subject for being overly committed to the classical model, and for equivocating on ‘judgment.’