Abstract
The first edition of the Essay was published in the December of 1689. Locke was not content to leave the Essay as it was, for he actively sought out suggestions which could be incorporated into a second edition. From his correspondence it is clear that he was particularly interested in securing comments from William Molyneux. In one of his many letters to Molyneux in this regard, Locke asked if he could suggest any additional topics under the headings of logic or metaphysics (no. 1592, iv:627). Molyneux responded by suggesting that Locke “insist more particularly and at Large on Æternce Veritates and the Principium Individuationis” (no. 1609, iv:650).1 By his own admission, Locke’s now famous chapter “Of Identity and Diversity” was written solely in response to the latter half of this suggestion. In the penultimate paragraph of his reply to Molyneux on 23 August 1693, he writes:
You will herewith receive a new chapter Of Identity and Diversity, which, having writ only at your instance, ‘tis fit you should see and judge of before it goes to press. Pray send me your opinion of every part of it. (no. 1655, iv:722)
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Notes
Thus Bennett (1971, 336).
Thus C. D. Broad (1951, 59); Robert Coburn (1971, 52); J. L. Mackie (1976, 141); Paul Helm (1979, 175); Edwin McCann (1987, 59); Gary Wedeking (1987, 22f); and Michael Ayers (1991, 2:2081).
Thus Joshua Hoffman (1980,107-9) and Martha Brandt Bolton (1994, 127n.21).
This has been noted by Margaret Atherton (1984b, 284), Edwin McCann (1987, 74), Vere Chappell (1990, 30) and Jonathan Bennett (1994, 114).
Thus Alston and Bennett (1988, 32f) and Bolton (1994, 112).
Thus Anthony Flew (1951, 53f), Henry Allison (1966, 42f), J. L. Mackie (1976, 141), David Behan (1979, 59f), and Christopher Fox (1988, 30).
Thus Paul Helm (1979, 317); Margaret Atherton (1983, 94); Edwin McCann (1987, 68f); William Uzgalis (1990, 292); and Michael Ayers (1991, 2:221).
Thus Anthony Flew (1951, 65).
See Wiggins (1967, 1) and Geach (1967, 3).
Thus Peter Geach (1967, 11); Douglas Odegard (1972, 38); E. J. Borowski (1975, 277); Bruce Langtry (1975, 402); J. L. Mackie (1976, 160); David Wiggins (1976, 142n.23); Nicholas Griffin (1977, 131); Edwin Curley (1982, 312); Udo Thiel (1983, 40-42); Christopher Fox (1985, 37); C. J. F. Williams (1989, 83); and Gary Wedeking (1990, 179-81).
Only recently has this interpretation been subject to serious challenge, for example, by Alston and Bennett (1988), Vere Chappell (1989), William Uzgalis (1990), and Mark Thornton (1991).
Quotations from De Corpore are taken from the edition by Mary Calkins (1989).
Quoted from the edition of Boyle’s works by M. A. Stewart (1979, 45f).
Here I follow Uzgalis (1990, 296n.6).
A similar point is made by Nicholas Griffin (1977, 17).
Versions of this argument are presented by both Chappell (1989) and Uzgalis (1990).
Thus Peter Geach (1979, 70f); David Wiggins (1980, 25n.l2); Lawrence Lombard (1986, 127-31); Michael Ayers (1991, 2:102-8, 319n.l5); and David Oderberg (1993, 125f).
Thus, for example, Quine writes that “physical objects, conceived thus four-dimensionally in space-time, are not to be distinguished from events or, in the concrete sense of the term, processes. Each comprises simply the content, however heterogeneous, of some portion of space-time, however disconnected and gerrymandered” (1960, 171). Similarly, Nelson Goodman writes that “tables, steam yachts, and potatoes are events of comparatively small spatial and large temporal dimensions (1966, 128), and C. D. Broad writes that the only difference between a flash of lightening and the cliffs at Dover “is that the former last for a short time and the latter for a long time”(1923, 54). See also Richard Taylor (1955, 600). I must add, however, that I am reluctant to attribute this thesis to Broad, the above statement notwithstanding. For later in the same chapter Broad concludes that “changes of events cannot be treated like the changes of things” (1923, 64).
Thus Paulo Dau (1986, 472n.6).
See Lewis (1986, 202).
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Conn, C.H. (2003). Locke’s Theory of Identity. In: Locke on Essence and Identity. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 98. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1005-4_3
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