Truth Values and the Slingshot Argument

  • Yaroslav ShramkoEmail author
  • Heinrich Wansing
Part of the Trends in Logic book series (TREN, volume 36)


The famous “slingshot argument” developed by Church, Gödel, Quine, and Davidson is often considered to be a formally strict proof of the Fregean conception that all true sentences, as well as all false ones, have one and the same denotation, namely their corresponding truth value: the True or the False. In this chapter, we present several versions of the slingshot argument and examine some possible ways of analyzing the argument by means of Roman Suszko’s non-Fregean logic. We show that the language of non-Fregean logic can serve as a useful tool for reconstructing the slingshot argument and formulate several embodiments of the argument in non-Fregean logics. In particular, a new version of the slingshot argument is presented, which can be circumvented neither by an appeal to a Russellian theory of definite descriptions nor by resorting to an analogous “Russellian” theory of λ-terms.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyState Pedagogical UniversityKryvyi RihUkraine
  2. 2.Department of Philosophy IIRuhr-University BochumBochumGermany

Personalised recommendations