Abstract
The structure of the chapter is as follows: after a discussion of the need for a theory of technological explanation, I differentiate technological explanation from physical, teleological, psychological, and social explanation. Attention is then directed to answering questions as a means of providing technological explanations. A distinction between internal and external audiences is also introduced to provide a means for characterizing different kinds of explanations in terms of the audiences to which they are directed and the kinds of questions which when answered provide the appropriate explanation. Next the concept “system” is introduced.
Originally appeared in Handbook of Philosophy of Technology and the Engineering Sciences, Springer Academic Publishers, 2009. Reprinted with the permission of the publishers.
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Notes
- 1.
A theme that follows from this line of thought and also further develops a position laid out in the last chapter of Pitt (2000) and elsewhere in this volume is that since mature sciences are embedded in a technological infrastructure, any adequate theory of scientific explanation requires a theory of technological explanation. Unfortunately a full development of this relationship would take us far afield from the topic at hand.
- 2.
- 3.
Not everyone agrees with this claim, especially Ashley Shew. See her 2007.
- 4.
The literature on explanation is vast. It is far too large to discuss here. Fortunately, there are two major narrative histories of the debates. The first is by Wesley Salmon (1989) in his introduction to the edited volume, Scientific Explanation. The second, more recent discussion, is by Jeroen de Ridder (2007).
- 5.
Robert Cummins also alludes to this possibility in his 1975 article.
- 6.
See Pitt (1988).
- 7.
See Pitt (2000) for an argument against the technology-as-the-handmaiden-of-science view.
- 8.
See Pitt (1988).
- 9.
In some respects, this emphasis on the different scopes of the issues depending on the question asked, is reminiscent of Larry Bucciarelli’s discussion in chapter 1 of his 1994 classic when he ruminates on the question “Do you know how your phone works?” He concludes, “I conjectured that there could be no unique criterion for judging responses; there could be as many legitimate, that is to say accurate, ways to describe how the telephone works as there are respondents.” (p. 4)
- 10.
In some respects this idea that we offer an explanation in the context of a system resonates with Cummins (1975) proposal that functional explanations are offered against a set of background assumptions and tacit knowledge.
- 11.
To a certain extent I am working off of the ground breaking treatment of Thomas Hughes (1983).
- 12.
Of course individuals can be members of both internal and external audiences. Thus an electrical contractor could be satisfied by the “I flipped the switch” answer when that is really all he wanted to know at that time in that place. On the other hand, when taking a busman’s holiday he might pursue further questions just because he wants to see if the folks who wired this house did anything different from what he would have done.
- 13.
The literature on functions is almost as enormous as that for explanation. See for example, Kroes 2001, Vermaas and Garbacz 2009, Vincenti 1990 and Wimsatt 1980, 2002 for the merest sampling. I am relying here on a common sense appreciation of what a function is, recognizing that the circumstances in which we appeal to “function” may in fact change the meaning of the term. Thus, asking for the function of a turn indicator on the steering column of an automobile is not same as asking how well a device functions.
- 14.
Although the account here was developed independently of Cummins (1975), the two approaches agree strongly on this point.
- 15.
There is an air of paradox to the claim that legal systems are deliberate constructions when one considers what are often referred to as “common law” systems for these have developed over time and generally in a piecemeal fashion. However, it is enough for our purposes to point out that they can’t have developed at all if the idea of a law was not generally understood. Once in place, the society could add laws as it sees need. Granted this is different from constructing a legal system and then imposing it on a society, but common to both is the acceptance of the idea of law.
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Pitt, J.C. (2011). Technological Explanation. In: Doing Philosophy of Technology. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0820-4_11
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