Abstract
Much ado has been made in criminal punishment theory over the past several decades over the plausibility status of retributivism, especially in philosophical circles. Indeed, there are about as many construals of retributivism as there are defenders and opponents of the view, or cluster of views, rightly called “retributivism.” Whether pure or mixed versions of the theory, what all punishment theories worthy of the name “retributivism” share with one another is that the justification of both the institution and particular forms of punishment are primarily matters of deservedness, however “desert” and its cognates (desert words) are understood by the various retributivists themselves. According to the standard retributivist line of thinking, those who are responsible for a harmful wrongdoing deserve to be punished (positive retributivism). The innocent are never to be punished for any reason whatsoever (negative retributivism). And the guilty ought to be punished in, albeit approximate, proportion to the kind and degree of their harms wrongfully caused to others. Strong versions of retributivism (deemed as such by many theorists), such as Immanuel Kant’s which is covered in the next chapter of this book, hold that the state has a perfect moral duty to punish all offenders, while weak retributivists hold that the state has an imperfect duty to punish them. While some retributivist theories also admit (consonant with certain statements made by Kant) that considerations of social utility (deterrence, rehabilitation, etc.) might serve as secondary justifications of the institution and particular forms of punishment, all retributivisms hold that the notion of desert is central to why, if ever, punishment is morally justified.
All passages cited herein are taken from the translations in John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, Editors, Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997).
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- 1.
See, for example, Chap. 6 of this book.
- 2.
See the next chapter of this book.
- 3.
Contrast M. M. Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).
- 4.
The only philosophical work that has even hinted at this view of Socrates on punishment is Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, “Socrates on How Wrongdoing Damages the Soul,” The Journal of Ethics, 11 (2007), pp. 337–356.
- 5.
I write “theory” here in that it is hardly obvious that what Socrates states in Plato’s dialogues concerning punishment amounts to a theory in light of the criteria for a theory of punishment found in Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?” Columbia Law Review, 87 (1987), pp. 509–532. Using Murphy’s criteria as a starting point, one might argue plausibly that a theory of punishment requires at least the following: (a) a definition of “punishment;” (b) a statement of the moral and legal justifications of punishment; (c) a distinction between the justification of punishment as an institution and particular forms of punishment; and (d) an account of proportionate punishment. While Socrates’ words on punishment seem to satisfy (a) and perhaps to a lesser extent (d), it seems implausible to think that they satisfy (b)–(c). However, this is not to say that a Socratic basis for a theory of punishment so construed cannot be pieced together by what Socrates says of punishment and other Socratic statements made that might relate indirectly to punishment. Hence, it might be possible to piece together a Socratic theory of punishment, one that, it is cautioned, ought not to be confused with that of Socrates’ given what he says in Plato’s dialogues. Thus while the texts of Plato on punishment do not amount to a theory of punishment, especially regarding the words placed therein in Socrates’ mouth, rational reconstruction might possibly provide something of a Socratically-based theory of punishment.
- 6.
Jean Hampton, “The Moral Education Theory of Punishment,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13 (1984), pp. 208–238; Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, “The Problem of Punishment in Socratic Philosophy,” Apeiron, 30 (2002), pp. 95–107. I write, “‘punishment,’” because it is unclear whether such a view amounts to a belief about punishment if by “punishment” is meant “hard treatment” (Joel Feinberg) and treatment normally considered to be unpleasant (Rawls) (See the preceding chapter of this book). For if Laws 728c is correct, then punishment is “suffering that follows a wrongdoing,” just as capital punishment ensures the safety of others in society. It is quite unclear how moral education amounts to punishment in any sense of the term, “punishment.” This confusion of moral education or curing wrongdoers with punishment as hard and unpleasant treatment is replete among philosophers.
- 7.
A. D. Woozley, Law and Obedience: The Arguments in Plato’s Crito (London: Duckworth, 1979), p. 130.
- 8.
A globally unitarian approach to Plato sees the entire body of Plato’s works as setting forth a consistent set of beliefs, doctrines or theories about a select group of subjects throughout Plato’s works, while a globally developmentalist approach construes the ideas in Plato’s works as evolving from one dialogue to the next. There are, of course, moderate and local versions of these views.
- 9.
J. Angelo Corlett, Interpreting Plato’s Dialogues (Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2005).
- 10.
Cooper and Hutchinson, Editors, Plato: Complete Works, pp. xii–xviii.
- 11.
“Secondary,” because it is unclear on precisely what legitimate (non-ideologically driven) grounds such writings are to be denied canonical or primary textual status.
- 12.
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York: Hafner, 1948).
- 13.
Joel Feinberg, “The Classic Debate,” in Joel Feinberg and Hyman Gross, Editors, Philosophy of Law, 5th Edition (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995), pp. 613–618; Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 366–368.
- 14.
For example, see Joel Feinberg, Problems at the Roots of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Chapter 4. For a discussion of Feinberg’s views on failed criminal attempts, see J. Angelo Corlett, “The Philosophy of Joel Feinberg,” The Journal of Ethics, 10 (2006), pp. 146–151.
- 15.
As opposed to lex talionis.
- 16.
Including as punishment for the fourth crime of perjury (Laws 937c) and for frivolous law suits (Laws 938c)!
- 17.
Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, Chapter 11.
- 18.
Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, p. 181.
- 19.
Corlett, Interpreting Plato’s Dialogues, Chapter 1.
- 20.
Hampton, “The Moral Education Theory of Punishment.”
- 21.
Brickhouse and Smith, “The Problem of Punishment in Socratic Philosophy.”
- 22.
John Rawls, Collected Works (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), Chapter 2.
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Corlett, J.A. (2013). The Socratic Roots of Retributivism. In: Responsibility and Punishment. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 34. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0776-4_4
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