Abstract
This chapter shows why the dismissal of a person’s sincere moral objections to the way he is treated is always to be regarded as a matter of moral concern, by showing how such a dismissal implies an affront to his dignity. This result is shown to hold independently of the validity or reasonableness of these objections. This result is derived by means of a careful analysis of Kant’s third formulation of the Categorical Imperative, which connects the dignity of individuals to their ability to regard themselves as lawgivers in a Commonwealth of Ends. A detailed analysis of the notion of moral lawgiving and its different aspects of legislation, adjudication and imposition shows that a person who complies with interference to which he cannot assent is unable to continue to regard himself as an autonomous lawgiver. This explains the morally problematic nature of coercion, as it means that coercing a person necessarily causes affront to his dignity. The chapter goes on to show how the notion of moral agents as lawgivers in a Commonwealth of Ends can be usefully applied to offer guidance in situations where coercion – and hence tarnishing a person’s dignity – is unavoidable, drawing an analogy between the notion of a Commonwealth of Ends and that of Perpetual Peace. Lastly, a number of the most prominent features and implications of the propounded interpretation of the third formulation of the Categorical Imperative are discussed in detail, including the question whether wronging a person must, in a Kantian perspective, always involve violations of duties of right or whether one can also wrong a person through breaches of duties of virtue.
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- 1.
Some authors distinguish more formulations of the Categorical Imperative. Paton, for instance, distinguishes five (Paton 1947, 129): the three formulae mentioned, as well as the Formula of the Law of Nature (‘act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature’ (G 4:421)), and the Formula of Autonomy (‘act only so that the will could regard itself as at the same time giving universal law through its maxim’ (G 4:434)). However, these two formulae are so closely related to respectively the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of the Commonwealth of Ends that they are usually taken to be identical for all intents and purposes. Kant himself speaks of three different representations of the Categorical Imperative (G 4:436).
- 2.
Another possibility is ‘Realm of Ends’.
- 3.
A case can be made, however, that the basic notions of equality and fairness that are expressed by the requirement of universalisibility, as well as the demand that we respect the status of others in our actions in the second formula, both display a distinctly social approach to individual ethics as well.
- 4.
When A and B agree on the wrongfulness of the interference, the question of which of them is correct is moot.
- 5.
Obviously there are more possibilities; for instance where both A’s and B’s judgments are equally mistaken, or where neither of them are completely correct but one of the two judgments is clearly superior to the other. These intermediate possibilities are, however, not of particular interest to the structure of the argumentation that follows in the rest of this chapter.
- 6.
It is important to distinguish between the coercer’s ‘sec’ judgment that the coerced’s objections are misplaced, and the coercer’s judgment that she is justified in coercing B. The former, which is at issue here, is a moral judgment by A on her own interference that does not take account of the bare fact that B objects. The judgment that she is justified in coercing B however, means she holds herself justified to maintain her interference even though B objects. To the matter of justified coercion we shall turn later (Section 5.4.4.2), but that issue can only be addressed after we have ascertained the moral importance of coercion as such.
- 7.
Which does not deny, of course, that the fact that they are interfered with in a wrongful way is itself also a matter of moral concern.
- 8.
For a more detailed description of Rawls’s notion of reasonableness, see e.g. Rawls (2005, 47–66, 488).
- 9.
E.g. Rawls (2005, 488): ‘We simply say that such a doctrine is politically unreasonable. Within political liberalism nothing more need be said.’
- 10.
The impossibility of privileged access to the moral law follows from the fact that every moral agent has the capacity to be autonomous.
- 11.
For an overview of more specific causes of why sincere moral judgments of persons may differ (even among reasonable persons) see e.g. Rawls’s discussion of ‘the burdens of judgment’ (Rawls 2005, 54–58).
- 12.
This, however, should come as no surprise, as Kantians themselves often disagree on specific moral matters (Sullivan, for instance, provides a clear example of a practical issue where Kantians can vehemently disagree about its permissibility in the issue of abortion (Sullivan 1994, 111–113)); let alone when non-Kantian positions are taken into account as well (see also Sullivan 1989).
- 13.
A clear example of this is that Kant, his advocacy of the continuous exercise of public reason and his optimistic belief in the moral progress that would result from this notwithstanding, was quite adamant that public authorities were entitled to make practical decisions without any agreement being reached and that these decisions had to be obeyed virtually unconditionally (see e.g. DR 6:319–322, CS 8:298–299). He also held that the state is authorised to enforce these decisions through coercive means if anyone is inclined to resist them. In fact, one of the more notorious of Kant’s positions is that one generally has to submit to the decisions of the state authorities, even if one correctly judges oneself to be wronged by them (cf. DR 6:319). (It must also be mentioned, though, that Kant’s position on the possibility of a citizen being wronged by the state is somewhat ambivalent; many passages show that he held this to be a genuine possibility, e.g. CS 303–304, DR 6:319-6:322, DV 6:424, but at the same time he states in DR 6:321 that a sovereign can do no wrong).
- 14.
For a short overview of the most important of these problems see for instance Hill (1992, 62–63).
- 15.
Although she too seems to take the Formula of Universal Law as the most substantial part, not only dedicating a whole book nearly exclusively to this formula (Nell 1975), but also claiming in later work that ‘Kant’s question is always fundamentally the agent’s question, “What ought I to do?”, not the recipient’s question, “What am I owed?”’ (O’Neill 1989, 142). This emphasis may hold for the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, but given Kant’s emphasis on standing up for oneself and refusing to let others treat one as mere means in the Metaphysics of Morals (see e.g. DV 6:435–437), and the fundamental importance of respect for the humanity in one’s own person in his work in general, this claim can be challenged.
- 16.
Another author who claims the Formula of the End-in-Itself is the most important one is Cummiskey (1996). Wood, too, claims that the Formula of Universal Law is less important than the other two formulae, and emphasises the central importance of the Formula of the End-in-Itself in Kant’s thought (Wood 1999, xiii, 141).
- 17.
Nonetheless, Donagan claims that the Formula of the Commonwealth of Ends provides the fundament on which the Doctrine of Right is built, whereas the Doctrine of Virtue is developed from the Formula of the End-in-Itself.
- 18.
This is not the only argument O’Neill presents with respect to the moral unacceptability of coercion, as she also claims coercion cannot be universalized because it undercuts the agency and willing of the agent, which means the victim of coercion cannot assent to being coerced so that a principle of coercion cannot be universally acted upon (O’Neill 1989, 215, see also 113). This explanation of the problematic nature of coercion relies not only on the Formula of Universal Law, but also on that of the End-in-Itself. As I argue in the next section, the Formula of the End-in-Itself does indicate why coercion is problematic, but this does not go beyond the general intuition we started with: that respecting moral agents implies their moral judgments (their willing) are relevant as well.
- 19.
O’Neill (deliberately) does not provide a detailed account of exactly what cases constitute coercion and which do not (O’Neill 1991, 180; see also O’Neill 1989, 113). In the following, my discussion is limited to the universalizability of coercion as conceptualized in Section 3.1.
- 20.
This would also imply justified coercion would be an impossibility.
- 21.
This disputability mainly concerns very young children and infants; the view that children only become Ends-in-Themselves the moment they reach adulthood is not very plausible.
- 22.
- 23.
What makes children so distinct is that, though they lack this ability at present, they are (as far as we know) the only beings that can develop it.
- 24.
It is no coincidence that Shapiro’s analysis of the position of children is largely based on the Formulation of the Commonwealth of Ends.
- 25.
Though the concept of dignity is an important one in both moral theory and practice, it is also a quite elusive notion. Both its theoretical contours and its practical implications are matters of intense debate. In this book, I do not seek to provide a full account of it, but focus only on those aspects of dignity that are directly affected by coercion (and, in Part III, domination). For further analyses of various aspects of a person’s dignity – both in Kantian and non-Kantian contexts – see e.g. Darwall (2006); Griffin (2008); Hill (1991, 1992); Margalit (1996); Meyer (1989); Meyer and Parent (1992); Kolnai (1995); Kretzmer and Klein (2002); Pritchard (1972); Sensen (2009); Waldron (2007).
- 26.
In fact, as argued in the next sections, my interpretation takes the similarities between the Commonwealth of Ends and the Kingdom of God to be limited in important respects.
- 27.
Provided that ‘sense’ in ‘sense of justice’ is taken sufficiently broadly and not reduced to a moral sense as that term is commonly used by moral sentimentalists. In particular, it must encompass the use of reason as outlined in Section 4.2.
- 28.
The Commonwealth of Ends, as I interpret it, is the idea of a republic governed by ‘the most perfect political constitution’ (a notion of which Kant, according to his colleague Johann Schultz, was very fond (see Wood 1999, 208)).
- 29.
For more on the idealisation of the legislators in a Commonwealth of Ends, see e.g. Hill (1991, 59–61) (I must add, however, that my interpretation of a Commonwealth of Ends does not encompass all the features Hill describes; for more on the distinction between his interpretation of a Commonwealth of Ends and mine, see Section 5.4.4.1).
- 30.
It is fairly standard in Kantian literature to emphasise the fact that one thus imposes the moral law on oneself, and downplay the importance of the fact that as a legislator one also imposes the moral law on others. As will be shown in the remainder of this chapter, however, this latter aspect too has important implications.
- 31.
I am only looking at this problem from a Kantian perspective, and therefore framing the issue in Kantian terms. This specific issue is, however, not dissimilar from, for example, a Millian style disagreement about the proper boundaries of a person’s private sphere, or a libertarian who wants to ascertain what rights we have towards others, and which rights others have towards us.
- 32.
Strictly speaking, however, moral disagreement is a conflict between A and B as lawgivers; this can be a matter of their roles as moral legislators, but this is not necessarily the case. For a more detailed discussed of this point see Section 5.4.2.2.
- 33.
The fact that one cannot alter one’s sincere judgments by an act of choice (see p. 57–58) thus is an important contributing factor to the occurrence of sincere moral conflicts.
- 34.
This should not be taken to imply that moral disagreement cannot cause a problem in itself. If one party, for instance, is committed to moral views that deny the moral status of the other person altogether, then the latter party may well take gross offence purely on these abstract views. The point here, however, is that mere disagreement need not imply such a denial and is compatible with the view that the other party indeed has the status of a legislator in the Commonwealth of Ends.
- 35.
In the Doctrine of Right Kant makes a distinction between citizens and underlings of the commonwealth. The difference between the two is that the first are fit to vote and hence able to partake in the government of the commonwealth, whereas the latter are not ‘because they have to be under the direction or protection of other individuals, and so do not possess civil independence’ (DR 6:315). Transposing this to the Commonwealth of Ends, we could say that when A dismisses B’s objections and declares herself to be bound only by the moral law as she would legislate it, thereby (implicitly or explicitly) denying she is bound by the moral law as B would legislate it, she treats B (at best) as an underling of the Commonwealth of Ends, not as a full member.
- 36.
Here I restrict myself to the moral conflict between A and B; it may be that the moral views that A propounds are not ‘hers alone’ in the sense that her views are shared by other persons C, D, E, et cetera, but that does not affect the central issue here, which focuses on the fact that the laws that govern the interaction between A and B are imposed by A and not shared by B.
- 37.
For a more detailed discussion of the relation between self-control and autonomy see e.g. Feinberg (1986, 27–51); for an account that deals with this issue but also addresses the difference between self-control and continence, see Hill (1991, 118–137); for a discussion of the relation between dignity and self-control, see e.g. Meyer (1989).
- 38.
She also warns that there are difficulties in translating into English the German terms used by Kant.
- 39.
It is a matter of interpretation, which I shall leave open for now, whether these forcible measures which back up its legal system would ever have to be used. The ability of its members to act irrationally is in itself sufficient to explain the use of legislation and forcible measures to back it up, but it is possible to interpret the Commonwealth of Ends in such a way that all members will always abide by the laws (possibly because of the forcible threats that back up its laws), even though they are capable of transgressing them. If this is the case, the threats inherent to its legal system would never be put into practice. Possibly, however, an interpretation that uses the notion of just punishment can be used to provide an alternative interpretation of the Commonwealth of Ends that is not committed to perfect compliance with the law (see also Section 7.5).
- 40.
- 41.
Note that, strictly speaking, this does not mean we necessarily have to come to a mutual agreement with respect to the moral law; all that is required is that the act is in compliance with both views of morality. In my interpretation of the Formula of the Commonwealth of Ends, letting our actions be guided by the idea of such a commonwealth that is ruled by common laws, only requires that these laws are binding on all members (and a law only demands your compliance, not your agreement). It does not require that these laws are also commonly agreed upon (though, as rational beings, each person must of course sincerely believe that the laws he thinks ought to be enacted could be accepted by all).
- 42.
All this argument shows is the possibility of justified coercion, even though coercion implies an affront to the dignity of the coerced; the argument does not imply that coercion is justified whenever there is sincere moral conflict. It merely shows that when there is sincere moral conflict which cannot be avoided or solved by other means, the decision to coerce another person can sometimes be justified as the demands of one’s own dignity are not inferior to the demands of the dignity of another (see also Section 5.4.4.2).
- 43.
On Perpetual Peace being feasible see e.g. CS 8:313 and PP 8:368; on Perpetual Peace being based on a systematic union of states, see e.g. PP 8:356–357, 8:385.
- 44.
Here it is important to note Kant grounds our dignity in our ability to be (self-)legislating, not in our actually being (self-)legislating (see also Kant’s comments on the dignity of criminals (e.g. DR 6:333)); accordingly, the prime focus when it comes to treating others respectfully is also the ability to be self-legislating, not the exercise of that ability.
- 45.
See, for instance, Kant’s comments on servility (e.g. DV 6:434-6, 6:464); see also Hill (1991, 4–24).
- 46.
Whether such sincerity is in itself sufficient ground for holding that she must be excused is an issue that falls outside of the scope of this book.
- 47.
On enforcing duties of right, see DR 6:231; on duties of virtue not being enforceable, see DV 6:381–383.
- 48.
Of course, a particular beggar may disagree with this and claim he is wronged by your withholding alms. This, however, the Kantian framework can easily accommodate as the beggar (mistakenly) claiming he is entitled to your money, or even that he has a right to it, which he holds you to have violated.
- 49.
It is important to stress that malice will only constitute a violation of duty if it is actually acted upon. Much of the following argument also applies to the mere feeling of malice on A’s part toward B. However, given that control over feelings is limited to our deciding to act on them or not, not to whether or not we experience them, the ought-implies-can principle implies that feelings as such are outside of the bounds of morality; we do not have duties to have or not have certain feelings towards others (DV 6:401; see also Gregor (1963, 182)).
- 50.
There is also textual evidence that Kant held it possible to judge the maxims of others with sufficient certitude to base a response on such judgment. In DR 6:349, for instance, he claims that a maxim can be revealed ‘by word or deed’.
- 51.
- 52.
Just as one should be affected by one’s feelings and inclinations in a Kantian account, but may never be governed by them. (Kant explicitly rejects the point of view that one should extinguish one’s inclinations (e.g. REL 6:58)).
- 53.
This limitation is important: being an autonomous moral agent does not require one gets to lay down the moral law in general, but merely when it directly concerns oneself. This does not mean we have to accept injustices as long as they do not concern ourselves and may never act to correct them, but it does mean we should be rather reserved in this respect. Generally, one should not interfere in such matters unless one is, for instance, sufficiently sure one’s interference is also willed (at least) by the injured party.
- 54.
There are of course strands in political philosophy that deny or are at great pains to accommodate the notion of the dignity of the individual. Nihilism and many forms of utilitarianism may be examples. This, however, provides a strong (if not the strongest) argument against such theories, rather than being a point of critique here.
- 55.
Happy slaves are an example.
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van der Rijt, JW. (2011). Moral Objections and the Categorical Imperative. In: The Importance of Assent. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 25. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0766-5_5
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