Abstract
The aim of the paper is to discuss the cogency of Derridian critique of Husserl’s analyses of time consciousness, as well as to inquire about the possible contribution of such a critique to profounder understanding of phenomenology. Deconstruction of Husserlian theory of time is here scrutinised in the context of Derrida’s own assumptions and in confrontation with Husserl’s writings themselves. Analysing Derridian deconstruction of Husserl’s notions of presence, perception, originarity and absolute certainty, the paper attempts to show that these metaphysical categories are, in fact, “deconstructed” and “displaced” already by Husserl himself and that Derridian deconstruction reveals phenomenology itself as factual deconstruction of metaphysics.
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Lipka, D. (2011). Derrida, Husserl’s Disciple: How We Should Understand Deconstruction of Transcendental Philosophy. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Transcendentalism Overturned. Analecta Husserliana, vol 108. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0624-8_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0624-8_17
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