Abstract
Fichte’s philosophy finds its inspiration in the transcendental condition of the spontaneity of consciousness as uncovered by Kant. Only on the basis of a spontaneous act of synthesis can we understand the possibility of experience. For Fichte such a spontaneous act that is both irreducible and original meant that spontaneity as freedom now is the first principle of our philosophy. The programme for a philosophy of freedom consists in demonstrating how this philosophy is able to show more than its opponent determinism. It does this by claiming to show the reality of both freedom and the material world. This takes the form of clarifying the relations between such a free or spontaneous act and the experience that is said to result from it. This entails clarifying precisely the relations between the transcendental and the empirical. Understanding what this programme sets out to show allows us to see how Fichte’s philosophy is not only non-foundationalist, and a continuation of Kant’s original insight, but also lets us start to understand a formulation of freedom no longer in opposition to material determinacy but a form of freedom always already implicated in the material world.
Leibniz mentions two difficulties that have disturbed man: the relation of freedom and necessity, and the continuity of matter and its separate parts.
(Kierkegaard)
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsAbbreviations
- Attempt :
-
= An Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre in Fichte 1994, pp. 1–118/Fichte 1965, I, pp. 419–534.
- CPR :
-
= Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 1997.
- Ethics :
- Foundations :
-
= Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge in Fichte 1970, pp. 89–287/Fichte 1965, I, pp 86–328.
- SW :
-
= Sämmtliche Werke, Fichte 1965.
References
Allison, H.E. 1983. Kant’s transcendental idealism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Bergson, H. 2007. Creative evolution, eds. Keith Ansell Pearson, Michael Kolkman and Michael Vaughan. Introduction by Keith Ansell Pearson (trans: Mitchell, A.). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Breazeale, D. 1994. Editor’s introduction. In Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and other writings (1797–1800), ed. J.G. Fichte, vii–xxxii. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Breazeale, D. 1998. Fichte’s nova methodo phenomenologica: On the methodological role of “intellectual intuition” in the later Jena Wissenschafslehre. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 52(4): 587–618.
Dennett, D.C. 2003. Freedom evolves. New York, NY: Viking press.
Fichte, J.G. 1965. Sämmtliche Werke, vol. I–VII. In Unveränderter Nachdruk, ed. Fichte, I.H. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Fichte, J.G. 1970. Science of knowledge: With the first and second introductions, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fichte, J.G. 1992 [1796/99]. Foundations of transcendental philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) novo methodo (1796/99), ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Fichte, J.G. 2005. The system of ethics, ed. and trans. by D. Breazeale and G. Zöller. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Goddard, J.-C. (ed.). 2002. Fichte: le moi et la liberté. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Jackson, F. April, 1982. Epiphenomenal Qualia. The Philosophical Quarterly 32(127): 127–136.
Jacobi, F.H. 1994a. David hume on faith, or idealism and realism. In The main philosophical writing and the novel Allwill, 253–338. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Jacobi, F.H. 1994b. Jacobi to Fichte. In The main philosophical writing and the novel Allwill, 497–536. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Jackson, F. 1995. Postscript on “What Mary didn’t know”. In Contemporary materialism: A reader, eds. P. Moser, and J. Trout, 184–189. New York, NY: Routledge.
Kant, I. 1997. Critique of pure reason, ed. And trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Martin, W. From Kant to Fichte. In The Cambridge Companion to Fichte. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~wmartin.
Neuhouser, F. 1990. Fichte’s theory of subjectivity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Philonenko, A. 1982. Die Intellektuelle Anschauung bei Fichte. In Études kantiennes, 197–212. Paris: Vrin.
Pippin, R. 1987. Kant on the spontaneity of mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17(2): 449–475.
Schopenhauer, A. 1999. Prize essay on the freedom of the will. (trans. Payne, E.F.J.). Based on the 2nd edition from 1860. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sgarbi, M. 2006. Spontaneity from Leibniz to Kant: Sources and studies. In Einheit in der Vielheit: XII. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, eds. Herbert Berger, Jürgen Herbst, and Sven Erdner, 989–996. Hannover: Leibniz Gesellschaft.
Sgarbi, M. 2009. The spontaneity of mind in Kant’s transcendental logic, eds. Marco Sgarbi and Riccardo Pozzo. Kant e Hegel. Forthcoming. Fenomenologia e società, vol. 2.
Thomas Fogiel, I. 2000. Critique de la representation: Étude sur Fichte. Paris: Vrin.
Walker, R.C.S. 2008. Kant and transcendental arguments. In The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer, 238–268. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kolkman, M. (2011). Fichte’s Programme for a Philosophy of Freedom. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Transcendentalism Overturned. Analecta Husserliana, vol 108. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0624-8_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0624-8_11
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-0623-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-0624-8
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)