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The Role of Economic Instruments in Eco-Crime Prevention

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Part of the book series: NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security ((NAPSC,volume 2))

Abstract

The chapter deals with economic policy instruments for environmental policy with an emphasis on the instruments’ potential to prevent eco-criminal activities. Certain types of economic instruments, frequently used in environmental policy, can serve as prevention tools in a struggle against organized eco-crime. The purpose of the chapter is to put forward a proposal for an adequate instrument design, and is aimed to help policy-makers to set up not only efficient public policy tools, but to create an economic support for the functioning of the legal system. The chapter is based upon the rational polluter model (Spence 2001; Emery and Watson 2004). The Emery–Watson model is elaborated and extended in a dynamic context, introducing discount rates and present value calculations. It is used to analyze the economic impacts of environmental policy instruments on polluters’ behaviour. Finally, a set of policy recommendations obtained from the extended model is confronted with the lessons learned from the Republic of Serbia environmental policy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Amongst the mentioned commercial offences are: (1) natural resources used without the Ministry consent, (2) failure to implement preventive measures, (3) not undertaking recultivation or rehabilitation of degraded environments, (4) collecting and selling of certain types of wild flora and fauna, (5) importing and exporting of endangered and protected species of wild flora and fauna, (6) if dealing with dangerous substances, not undertaking all the necessary protective and safety measures, (7) not making risk assessments from a potential accident, (8) releasing polluting and dangerous substances into the air, water or soil in a way and in quantities that are exceeding those prescribed, (9) producing and selling vehicles that do not fulfil conditions regarding emissions for mobile sources of pollution, (10) using devices for pollution elimination for which no domestic standards have been prescribed, (11) producing, importing and exporting substances that are depleting the ozone layer, (12) importing hazardous waste, (13) importing, exporting or transferring waste without a Ministry permit, (14) not insuring against damage made to third parties in an accident.

  2. 2.

    According to a high executive of the Environmental Protection Ministry, in 2007 from over 600 accusations made by the National Environmental Inspection Office, only 18 were brought to court and prosecuted in the same year. Most of the others exceeded the deadline for court proceedings, and so were dropped. In 2008 and 2009 some improvements of the judicial system efficacy were made.

  3. 3.

    In the Eco-Charge Directive industrial waste charges plus SO2, NO2 and particle matter charges are envisaged (Pravilnik o utvrđivanju usklađenih iznosa naknade za zagađivanje životne sredine 2009).

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Acknowledgments

The author is grateful to Professor Steve A. Quarrie, from the Newcastle University for a peer review and English language interventions.

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Correspondence to Radmilo V. Pešić .

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Pešić, R.V. (2011). The Role of Economic Instruments in Eco-Crime Prevention. In: Meško, G., Dimitrijević, D., Fields, C. (eds) Understanding and Managing Threats to the Environment in South Eastern Europe. NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0611-8_4

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