Abstract
Corruption in Swat , Pakistan is impairing the sustainable management of forest. In this study, we focus on the factors leading to corruption in forest management in Swat : we analyse corruption in a case study setting against the backdrop of the reform options that are most often cited as possible solutions. As we highlight in this study, the “crime and punishment ” approach (Becker 1968), is not feasibly implemented if the overall institutional environment is weak. Since countrywide overhaul of corruption through sweeping reform programs, the other reform approach which we call the “holistic approach ”, is a difficult and lengthy task, which is seldom accomplished (Kaufmann et al. 2005), we find that there is a need for alternative/complementary kind of reform. In this study, we argue for reforms that are limited in geographical and institutional scope, and which can accompany or precede more sweeping reform programs. In the case of a corruption ridden centralized forest management regime, institutional reform should move away from enforcement of existing institutions and promote communal management of natural resources by locals. That is not to say that more comprehensive reforms should not be pursued: their implementation could go hand in hand with local reforms. We believe that the lack of implementation of wider reforms cannot be an excuse for inaction.
The research is part of the Poverty Reduction and Environmental Management (PREM) program. An early version of this chapter was published as Pellegrini (2007). Since the fieldwork was conducted and the data gathered, the Taliban insurgency has reached the area and the Swat valley has witnessed confrontations between the Pakistani army and militant Islamic groups. The ensuing anomy has rendered the institutional setting volatile and this will have an impact on the situation described here, especially in terms of the engagement of state authority and state agents in forest management. While this change in the area makes the analysis somewhat obsolete, it also highlight its importance since the failures in forest management and the related problems can have contributed to the discontent fuelling the insurgency.
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Notes
- 1.
We need to be cautious in this claims since the linkages between deforestation and many of the problems attributed to it are actually rather complex. Clarifying whether the hydrology of the region is really linking deforestation to phenomena such as local climate change, flooding, or siltation goes beyond the scope of this chapter, but these impacts need to be understood as “perceived” impacts and their connection with deforestation as “likely” rather than “certain” (see Rao and Marwat 2003; Chomitz and Buys 2007).
- 2.
These corruption issues were confirmed during our fieldwork by the employees of the Forest Department and of the Forest Development Corporation themselves.
- 3.
Existing studies serve, for example, the purpose of highlighting cases of officials and individuals involved in illegal logging in order to push authorities to intervene (e.g. Environmental Investigation Agency and Telapak 2001). The lack of case studies can be caused by the difficulties of getting information on illegal operations. Already Myrdal (1968) mentioned that corruption is “almost taboo as a research topic […], revealing a general bias that we have characterized as diplomacy in research”. Even though research on corruption has largely expanded in recent years, case studies involving fieldwork can still be affected by diplomacy in research; for instance, Perry (1997) still finds corruption to be taboo in geography.
- 4.
Forest guards need wood for heating purposes, but they are not given allowances to purchase it legally. This makes them dependent at least in part on the wood that is being logged illegally.
- 5.
For a detailed account of the theoretical framework adopted during the research see Pellegrini and Kruseman (2005).
- 6.
Transaction costs can be imputed in a variety of ways to different agents. Bromley (1989) has shown that the distribution of transaction costs influences distributional and environmental outcomes.
- 7.
For a comprehensive overview of bundles of rights associated with property right regimes see Schlager and Ostrom (1992).
- 8.
The North West Frontier Province has a set up that was instituted during the British colonial rule. The Province is divided in divisions, themselves divided into districts. The Malakand division contains the Malakand, Swat , Dir, and Citral districts. Apart from the districts, The North West Frontier Province also contains Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where federal and provincial government have very limited powers (mostly limited to military incursions related to terrorism and drug activities).
- 9.
For an account of Swat ’s resistance to outsiders occupation and interference see Lindholm (1990).
- 10.
For a detailed historical account of the autocratic rule of the Wali of Swat , the strictness of the application of the law to the commoners, the importance that forestry had under his rule, and the illegal cutting and favours for his allies (the Khans) see Sultan-i-Rome (2005). For an altogether different version of the Wali’s rule see his autobiography (Barth 1985).
- 11.
Pakistan was not the only state that tried to control the forest sector without the necessary resources to implement its own rules on the face of high transaction costs. For comparison see Ostrom (1990) on Nepal.
- 12.
A third category of forests are the guzara forests. They are those whose property was left to the communities, even though relevant management responsibilities were taken over by the Forest Department . Guzara forest is an institutional setup that characterized almost no forest in our study area.
- 13.
For a detailed description of legal status and management provisions in the forest of the whole of the North West Frontier Province see Steimann (2004).
- 14.
Property rights over the forest are contested and contention over property rights is a source of endless litigation that is dealt with by Pakistan’s corrupt and inefficient judiciary system.
- 15.
Dismantling existing institutions for the management of natural resources without succeeding in creating working alternatives has been a common procedure in many developed and developing countries over the last few decades (Ostrom 1990).
- 16.
Customs and de facto regimes can differ because the former borrows legitimacy from the tradition, while the former is simply the current state of affairs.
- 17.
We collected information through focus group discussions and interviews during the fieldwork. Different sources, including employees of the Forest Department itself, confirmed the dismal state of the Forest Department operations.
- 18.
This was confirmed by numerous interviews and by our own witnessing the ease of movement of truckloads of illegal logs in thorough the valley.
- 19.
- 20.
The rightholders are the former landowners, because with the accession of Swat to Pakistan the formal property of forests passed to the state and the former owner enjoyed the right to a share of the revenues from logs extraction.
- 21.
Sources of information on illegal operations are: crosschecked confidential interviews with people belonging to different stakeholders groups (i.e. Forest Department , law scholars, members of the elders’ council), group discussions, and household surveys.
- 22.
The regulatory framework that should guide the operations of forest officials is so confused that different officials interpret their duties differently. As a result, often the difference between a fine and a bribe becomes fuzzy. For example, when interviewed, different forest officials answer differently on whether fines should be paid on the spot, or fines should be reported first, and then paid at the office of the range officer; also the amount of the fine to be levied varies markedly depending on the respondent and it is unclear what should be done with confiscated timber (reportedly some forest officers keep it in order to smuggle it, or for their own benefit). For a detailed exposition, see Steimann (2004).
- 23.
During our meetings, members of the community repeatedly asserted that they were not interested in the management of the forest, that they wanted these tasks to be supplied by the Forest Department and that all they want are shares of the revenues when marking and extraction takes place.
- 24.
The committees are the Village Development Committee (composed of men) and the Women Organization (composed of women).
- 25.
The final result is similar to what Holling (2000) describes as a common pathology: “the ecological system loses resilience, the industries become dependent and inflexible, the management agencies become rigid and myopic, and the public loses trust in governance”.
- 26.
See http://www.ttjonline.com/story.asp?sc = 35057. Accessed 1 Jan 2005.
- 27.
The expected cost of equipping such a force would be 60 million Pakistani Rupees (or around 825,000 EUR). See http://www.dawn.com/2004/06/16/local23.htm.
- 28.
For an analysis of how social action coalitions can produce and sustain anti corruption efforts see Johnston and Kpundeh (2005).
- 29.
The National Integrity System (NIS) has also been applied specifically to the forest sector (Rosenbaum 2005), but its application in Pakistan seems doubtful. Some of the most important tools of NIS involve the partnership of commercial forest interests and the public sector (e.g. forest integrity pacts and business principles for the forest sector). In Pakistan commercial logging is formally inexistent (because of the ban), therefore there is no legal basis for a partnership between the commercial sector and the state.
- 30.
At least the forest guards should be aware of it, on the contrary of what happened with previous efforts (as we have seen above). Going a step further, and actually involving the Forest Department in the reform process would give to its members a sense of ownership and the necessary information to increase compliance.
- 31.
Such NGOs are, for example, IUCN, Sungi, or the WWF.
- 32.
Opening the Pakistani borders to timber trade would imply increasing pressure on international markets and, possibly, also increasing illegally harvested timber in neighbouring countries. While we recognize issues related to unsustainable and illegal logging in worlds markets, reforms and interventions at the global level (which we strongly support) are beyond the scope of this study.
- 33.
Pakistani and International NGOs operating in Pakistan have experiences with such programs and could be instrumental in implementing them within the forestry sector reform (e.g. see World Health Organization 2005).
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Appendix: Sources of Information in the Study
Appendix: Sources of Information in the Study
This study is a part of the Poverty Reduction and Environmental Management (PREM) research program (http://www.prem-online.org/). During our study, we collected information from secondary sources, from individual interviews, from group discussions and from a household survey, we held during the fieldwork. The interviewees were informed agents: forest officials, a conservator, international donors, national and international NGOs, lawyers, students of history, councils of the elders, and landowners. Interviews were in some cases individual and in others in the form of focused group discussions. Further information was collected from 400 household surveys in the Swat district and from meetings in villages. Household information on economic and social conditions, as well as income dependence on natural resources was gathered. Village socio-economic profiles were drawn up after the visits. The fieldwork took place between January and August 2005. A summary of the findings and the methodology applied in the project is available in Rafi Khan et al. 2006 and an outline of the conceptual framework used in the analysis is available in Pellegrini and Kruseman 2005.
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Pellegrini, L. (2011). The Rule of the Jungle in Pakistan: A Case Study on Corruption and Forest Management in Swat . In: Corruption, Development and the Environment. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0599-9_7
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