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Introduction

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Corruption, Development and the Environment

Abstract

The purpose of this book is to explore, in a broad perspective, how corruption affects economic growth and environmental protection. Other aspects of development, such as education and inequality in entitlements to natural resources, will also be considered within the context of the main objectives. The introductory chapter provides an overview of economic approaches to corruption, of the relationship of corruption with environmental policies, the research questions and the book’s outline.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    From Deuteronomy (5:14–21) we know that the King received his powers from God with the purpose of serving the Israeli Nation, and was himself subject to the law: [the King may] “not consider himself better than his brothers and turn from the law to the right or to the left” (Deuteronomy 5:20). It is apparent that a distinction between the public and the private sphere of rulers was already present in the Old Testament and that the use of power by the ruler was subject to restraints. Therefore, we can interpret this story as a case of corruption; see the discussion below on the definition of corruption.

  2. 2.

    See the definition given at http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq, 3 November 2009.

  3. 3.

    Public rent seeking also includes activities that are not corruption strictu sensu, for example lobbying (Murphy et al. 1993).

  4. 4.

    For a discussion of corruption in light of the rent-seeking literature, see Lambsdorff (2002).

  5. 5.

    Bhagwati (1982) highlighted how diversion of resources from productive activities reduces social welfare, but also that in already distorted economies such activities might have an ambiguous effect. Some of the arguments put forward to substantiate the benefits of corruption (i.e. that in economies where corruption is common additional corruption can be beneficial) can be linked to this line of reasoning.

  6. 6.

    For supporting experimental evidence on intrinsic motivations (moral costs) and corruption, see Schulze and Frank (2003).

  7. 7.

    The point was made by several authors, e.g. Alam (1989); Lambsdorff (2002).

  8. 8.

    For an example applied to forestry , see Robbins (2000, p. 435), for a general discussion, see Bardhan (1997, p. 1322).

  9. 9.

    Some authors are also putting forward an institutional economics perspective on corruption that is based on the “traditional” institutionalist approach (see, Hodgson and Jiang 2007).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), Kortenaerkade 12, 2518 AX, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Dr. Lorenzo Pellegrini

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  1. Dr. Lorenzo Pellegrini
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Correspondence to Lorenzo Pellegrini .

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Pellegrini, L. (2011). Introduction. In: Corruption, Development and the Environment. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0599-9_1

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