Abstract
A mutable, contingent thing can be thought in various ways. It can be thought with the mutation and without it. Both propositions contain equal truth. As regards thoughts, opposing predicates can be asserted of the same subject. A is B and A is not-B; both can be or become true, although not at the same time for the same subject. If, however, each of these propositions contain just as much ideal truth, how could they ever attain actuality? What imparts the preference now to this proposition and now to its opposite, making it into the actual truth? How can what is possible in a number of ways become actual in a determinate one?
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Notes
- 1.
From the context it is clear that Mendelssohn intends “immutable” rather than “mutable” (veränderlichen).
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Mendelssohn, M., Dahlstrom, D.O., Dyck, C. (2011). Epicureanism. – Accident. – Chance. A Series of Causes and Effects, without End, – without Beginning. Progression into Infinity, Forwards and Backwards. – The Timeless, without Beginning, without End and without Progression.. In: Dahlstrom, D., Dyck, C. (eds) Morning Hours. Studies in German Idealism, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0418-3_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0418-3_11
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