Abstract
That Catharine Cockburn, née Trotter, was enlightened there can be no doubt. Her wit, her learning and her standing in cultivated and polite society are sufficient proof of this. That her enlightenment is a paramount expression of the philosophical Enlightenment and that this may also be said with high assurance, is the thesis of this chapter. Although I will have occasion to remark on most of her philosophical writings and some of her correspondence, these remarks will be preliminary to a discussion of the main themes of her last writings, written in defence of the metaphysical and moral opinions of the theologian, metaphysician and natural philosopher Samuel Clarke (1675–1729). It is in these writings that we may discover the perfection of her enlightenment and discern most clearly its distinguishing marks. In justifying the claim of paramountcy for her, I hope to correct an injustice done to her no doubt because of her sex, which was to treat her work as that of a minor figure whose thoughts were altogether derivative, deferential, and yet not fully comprehended by her, gleaned from her reading of the work of others, who were certified great thinkers, all male; and because it seemed that, out of deference, she refashioned her thoughts to fit those of the particular author who momentarily had commanded her attention, dutifully entering one train of thought that happened to head in a direction contrary to the one along which she had previously made her way, she has been charged with inconsistency, and even worse, with unwitting inconsistency.
This is a revised version of a paper was presented on 24 March 2006 at a conference on the theme ‘Women, Metaphysics and Enlightenment’, held at the Institute of Philosophy, University of London.
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Notes
- 1.
‘It is not possible to discover any other beginning of justice or any source for it other than that from God and from the universal nature.’ Chrysippus, according to Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, ed. and tr. Harold Cherniss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), i. 432–33.
- 2.
‘But what is more divine, I will not say in man only, but in all heaven and earth, than reason? And reason, when it is full grown and perfected, is rightly called wisdom.’ Cicero, De Legibus, ed. and tr. Clinton Walker Keyes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), 320–21.
- 3.
For the biography of Catharine Trotter Cockburn, see Thomas Birch, ‘The Life of Mrs. Cockburn, in The Works of Mrs. Catharine Cockburn, in Two Volumes, ed. Thomas Birch (London 1751; facs. edn Bristol, 1992; hereafter to be cited in this chapter as Works) i. i–xiviii. All subsequent biographical accounts are based upon Birch, in particular, Leslie Stephen, in DNB and Victor Nuovo, Dictionary of Eighteenth Century British Philosophers (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1999). However, Anne Kelley’s article in the new Oxford DNB adds new details, most notable concerning the year of her birth, which nevertheless still remains in doubt. Birch gives Catharine Trotter’s birth date as 16 August 1679. Kelley has discovered a baptismal certificate among the parish records of St Andrew’s Church, Holborn certifying that Katherine Trotters, daughter of David and Sarah Trotters, was baptized on 29 August 1674. The parental given names are the same as those reported in other documentation of her life. An earlier date fits better with the years of her earliest reported writings, 1693, 1695 (Works, i. p. v). Even this earlier date may not seem early enough to begin to explain her news, related to Thomas Burnet of Kemnay in a letter dated 13 December 1707, that she had become a grandmother. ‘I believe you will be surprized to know that the lady with whom I went to the country, was Mr. Le Clerc’s sister-in-law, the youngest mistress Leti, who is married to my son, and has already made me a Grandmother’ (Works, ii. 203).
- 4.
In his DNB article, Leslie Stephen wrote that Mrs. Cockburn lacked the philosophical acuity to perceive the inconsistency of the ethical theory of ‘her old teacher Locke’, whom she defended in her earliest philosophical publication, and that of Samuel Clarke, whom she defended in her last writings.
- 5.
The distinction between originality and novelty in philosophy is one that was repeatedly invoked by my teacher, Paul Oskar Kristeller in his lectures. It is useful when interpreting the writings of so-called minor figures in the history of philosophy. To discover the originality of any philosophical author requires repeated and attentive reading of their works, as it were, rehearsing the acts that produced them, and in one’s exposition, weaving together expression and intention. Only then, can one judge originality in a philosophical author. The same applies thinking one’s own thoughts. Since Cockburn was primarily a moral philosopher, a good place to discover her originality is in her conduct of life. This approach is followed here. For the hermeneutical theory behind these remarks, see my ‘Locke’s Hermeneutics of Existence and his Representation of Reality’.
- 6.
Apropos to this is her response to the remark of Thomas Burnet of Kemnay that in Lady Masham’s philosophical letters to Leibniz one may discern ‘the hand of Joab’, that is, of Locke’. Cockburn wrote back that she was surprised that he should suspect any other hand than Lady’s Masham’s, and continued: ‘It is not to be doubted, that women are as capable of penetrating into the grounds of things, and reasoning justly, as men are, who certainly have no advantage of us, but in their opportunities of knowledge.… I pray be more equitable to her sex, than the generality of yours are; who, when any thing is written by a woman, that they cannot deny their approbation to, are sure to rob us of the glory in it, by concluding ’tis not her own; or at least, that she had some assistance, which has been said in many instances to my knowledge unjustly.’ (Mr. Burnet to Mrs Trotter, 5 December 1704; Mrs Trotter Mr. Burnet, 19 February 1705, Works, ii. 185, 190. Also noteworthy here is her Letter of advice to her Son which contains an affirmation of the equality of women, and the duties according owed to them by men (Works, ii. 119).
- 7.
[Catharine Trotter], A Defence of Mr. Locke’s Essay of Human Understanding (London: William Turner, 1702) Works, i. 45. She makes this declaration in her dedicatory epistle to Locke. There is a curious reversal of gender roles in her self-characterization as an author: she writes that she does not presume to play the role of a champion, but of ‘a rash lover, that fights in defence of a lady’s honour’; yet the lady is not Locke but truth herself, and her remarks are not rash but measured and well aimed. Locke’s letter to her employs the same conceit: ‘You have herein not only vanquished my adversary, but reduced me also absolutely under your power’. Works, i. xx; also Correspondence, vii. 731. Locke’s copy of A Defence (LL 1801) is in the Bodleian library, Locke, 8. 71.
- 8.
Martha Brandt Bolton makes this point well in ‘Some aspects of the philosophical work of Catharine Trotter’, Hypatia’s Daughters, ed. Linda Lopez McAlister (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 138–64, esp. 141: ‘…although Trotter describes herself as defending the moral theory of Clarke, she did not derive the doctrine in question from that philosopher. She anticipated the main points of Clarke’s moral theory in her first defense of Locke.’ I came across Bolton’s excellent paper after this chapter was completed; her conclusions confirm my own; where hers differs is in her assessment of Cockburn’s motives; see, Bolton, 154–56.
- 9.
John Balguy 1686–1748) was a Church of England clergyman noted for his writings on moral theology. Most relevant to the theme of this paper are his The Foundation of Moral Goodness (London: John Pemberton, 1728), The Second Part of the Foundation of Moral Goodness (London: John Pemberton, 1729) and Divine Rectitude (London: John Pemberton, 1730); these were later published in A Collection of Tracts Moral and Theological (London: John Pemberton, 1734). Cockburn’s defence focuses on primarily on Clarke.
- 10.
Thomas Burnet(t) of Kemnay (1656–1729), was a first cousin of Gilbert Burnet. He was a diplomat, known to Locke, and, having resided for a time in Hanover, became acquainted with Leibniz and, through correspondence, acted as their go-between. Correspondence, vi. 60; also vi. nos. 2228, 2575, vii. nos. 2708, 2709, 2724A. There is a disagreement between Birch and De Beer on Burnet’s correct given name. Birch calls him ‘George’ (Works, i. xxiv–v; ii. 153). De Beer seems right about the name, for in his letters to Locke, Burnet signs his name as ‘Thomas Burnett’. It is clear that they are the same person.
- 11.
Works, i. xxf.
- 12.
Mrs Trotter to Mr. Burnet, 9 December 1701, Works, ii. 155–59, esp, 157, 158. During this period, Catharine Trotter was a frequent visitor at the residences of Gilbert Burnet, who in 1689 was created Bishop of Salisbury. The Bishop was endeavouring to lure her back to the Church of England, and may also have been playing the role of matchmaker.
- 13.
Mrs Trotter to Mr. Burnet, 7 July 1705, Works, ii. 187.
- 14.
Italics mine.
- 15.
Works, ii. 186f.
- 16.
Works, ii. 187.
- 17.
Her objections to this doctrine are given in A Discourse concerning a Guide in Controversies, in two Letters (1707), Works, i. 1–42; see also Works, ii. 134–38.
- 18.
Dr. Thomas Burnet (c. 1635–1715), a divine of the Church of England, natural philosopher and Platonist; most notably, the author of Sacred Theory of the Earth, first published in Latin in 1681, translated into English and frequently reprinted.
- 19.
In the Epistola de Tolerantia (1689) and The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695).
- 20.
This is the title given on the title page (i. 43); the head title on the first page (i. 51) read, A Vindication of an Essay concerning Human Understanding.
- 21.
‘When the light of truth shines too clear and strong to be directly faced, the only shelter for those, who would not feel its force, is to seek for far fetched dangerous consequences, supposed inconsistencies with revealed truths, and mysteries of faith, deduced by a long train of arguments, which engaging in an intricate dispute shades them with some pretence, for not confessing the splendour of that truth, they cannot encounter; inconsistencies with revealed truths, when the real necessary consequence of any principles being sufficient proofs against them, how plausible soever they appear’ (Works, i. 52).
- 22.
Works, i. 71.
- 23.
Works, i. 48. Burnet, however, was not arguing from a voluntarist but from an intuitivist position. It was Locke’s voluntarism that he found fault with.
- 24.
The distinction is central to Jerome Schneewind’s account of the history of early modern moral philosophy and natural law theory: J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 8 and passim. For a theological elaboration of the distinction see Jennifer A. Herdt, ‘Affective Perfectionism: Community with God without Common Measure’, in New Essays on the History of Autonomy, ed. Natalie Brender and Larry Krasnoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 30–60.
- 25.
Works, i. 56f.
- 26.
Works, i. 53–69; also ii. 26–29, 61, fn., 62.
- 27.
Works, i. 58.
- 28.
Locke’s library lists 27 titles of Cicero’s, including eight editions of De Officiis, three separate editions, three in collections of Cicero’s works. Also notable is his manuscript, ‘Ciceronis Scripta secundum ordinem temporis digesta’, a chronological and historical summary of all of Cicero’s writings. MS Locke c. 31, fols. 139–46. This is discussed by Phillip Mitsis in his article ‘Locke’s Offices’, Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy, 45–61, and by John Marshall in John Locke, Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) Chaps. 5 and 7, passim. Neither author has much to say about Locke’s philosophical use of Cicero. Mitsis offers some useful insights in his account of Locke’s use of Cicero in Education, 52–59. For more on Locke’s Stoicism, see above, Chap. 8, where it is shown that Locke was less of a Stoic than Cockburn supposed.
- 29.
Ludwig Edelstein, The Meaning of Stoicism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 54.
- 30.
On the idea of ‘humanist’ and ‘Christian humanist’ I rely on the work of P. O. Kristeller according to whom the designation ‘humanist’ does not apply to someone with a particular philosophical outlook, e.g. Platonist, Aristotelian, Stoic or Epicurean, but to a classical scholar who was engaged in the effort to recover antiquity. The philosophical works of the great Latin stylist Cicero were influential among them, and from them flowed that unique combination of academic scepticism and Stoic moralism that marks early modern thought. Christian humanists combined the study of Cicero with the study of Christian and biblical antiquity.
- 31.
Cicero, De Officiis, ed. and tr. Walter Miller (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961). bk. i, sects 15, 18. Cicero, although himself not a Stoic, but Academic Sceptic, nonetheless based the moral theory presented in this work on that of Panaetius (180–109 BCE), sometime head of the Stoic school in Athens.
- 32.
Essay, I. iii. 6; II. xviii. 8.
- 33.
See Michael Frede, ‘Monotheism and Pagan Philosophy’, in Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity ed. Polymnia Athanassiadi and Michael Frede (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 40–67. See also Gregory Vlastos, Plato’s Universe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), 26.
- 34.
Essay, II, xxviii, 4–10.
- 35.
Her reference here is, most likely, to Grotius De Jure belli ac pacis; more about this work will follow.
- 36.
Works, i. xxi.
- 37.
Mrs. Trotter to Mr. [Patrick] Cockburn, 13 August 1707, Works, ii. 241. The argument is reminiscent of Lady Masham’s refutation of John Norris’ Malbranchian doctrine that God only is the proper object of all our affective and cognitive pursuits; see her A Treatise on the Locke of God (London: A. and J. Churchill, 1695).
- 38.
Works, ii. 129. In this respect only, she regarded Christianity to be superior to Stoicism. See Catharine Trotter to Patrick Cockburn, dated 3 June 1707, Works, ii. 212.
- 39.
Cicero, De Legibus, ed, and tr. Clinton Walter Keyes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959) 322–25; see Plutarch, On Stoic Contradictions, 322–33).
- 40.
Mrs. Cockburn to her Niece, 2 March 1733, Works, ii. 268, italics added.
- 41.
Works, ii, 269.
- 42.
Works, i. 381. I take ‘the eminent head of the opposition against [Clarke] … whose figure in the learned world has drawn many rash adventurers to engage on his side’ to mean Waterland.
- 43.
Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (London: James Knapton, 1705), 29.
- 44.
On the Law-Waterland position, as cited by Catherine Cockburn, see An Essay on the Origin of Evil. By William King, ed. and tr. Edmund Law, 2nd edn (Cambridge: W. Thurlbourn, 1741), 2 vols., esp. Law’s notes: no. 10, i. 47–53; and Remark e, i. 73–74; also Edmund Law, An Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time, Immensity, and Eternity, to which is added, A Dissertation upon the Argument a priori for proving the Existence of God (Cambridge: W. Thurlbourn, 1734). The Dissertation mentioned in the title is by Daniel Waterland.
- 45.
Works, i. 386–88. The terms de dicto and de re are not employed by Cockburn, but she nevertheless draws the distinction here.
- 46.
It has always seemed to me that the unintended consequence of proofs of the existence of God is that, if they succeed at all, they succeed only in proving, if that is the right term here, the eternity of the world or, more vaguely, of existence. Even a deflationist view of necessary existence, for example, Bede Rundel’s, who concludes that the proper answer to the question why anything exists is just that something must exist, implies more than a psychological or logical necessity, rather is calls for something more, something metaphysical. See his Why is there something rather than nothing (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004).
- 47.
See Paul Kristeller, ‘Stoic and Neoplatonic Sources of Spinoza’s Ethics’, History of European Ideas, Vol. 5/1, pp. 1-15; and Susan James, ‘Spinoza the Stoic’, The Rise of Modern Philosophy, ed. Tom Sorell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 289–314.
- 48.
Works, i. p. v.
- 49.
See above, fn. 1.
- 50.
Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, ed. P. C. Molhuysen (Lugdunum, Batavia, 1919), 11. See also the English translation of this work; Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck, 3 vols (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 2005), i. 89.
- 51.
De Jure, 7; Eng. Transl. i. 89.
- 52.
Works, ii. 35.
- 53.
Works, ii. 31.
- 54.
On the distinction between good and bad passions and the role of judgment in properly direction of the passions, see Cicero, de Finibus bonorum et malorum, ed. J. E. King (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951) 339–41.
- 55.
John Cooper, ‘Justus Lipsius and the Revival of Stoicism’, in New Essays on the History of Autonomy, ed. Natalie Brender and Larry Krasnoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 7–29., esp. 13.
- 56.
There is, I think, an interesting irony here. Most classic schools of Christian thought appropriated one or another school of ancient philosophy. Calvinism was especially imbued with Stoicism, which is not surprising given Calvin’s classical humanist education. The Stoic themes are visible in Calvinist determinism, providentialism, moral rigor, and sobriety. Yet Stoic themes are altered, perhaps distorted, in this new context by being made to fit with Calvinist notions of divine sovereignty, grace and predestination and in general theistic voluntarism. The upshot of this is that if one were to compare the two traditions, reason might be found to cast Calvinism as the evil twin of Stoicism. Consider the following brief review of some leading themes: Calvinist notions of providence have two faces, one public and reasonable, the other secret; Stoic providence is purportedly governed by universal reason and rationally discoverable laws of nature; Calvinist perfectionism is more of a demand that an achievement, demanding a perfect or punctilious obedience to a divine law, an unreasonable demand because there are virtual metaphysical obstacles preventing it; Stoic perfectionism exalts virtue, which is rare but not impossible. Other themes might also be considered: grace vs. self-governance; sin vs. human fallibility and frailty; election and limited atonement vs. the rarity of human excellence; perseverance of the saints vs. the self-sufficiency of the wise, etc.
- 57.
See above, fn. 24.
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Nuovo, V. (2011). Catharine Cockburn’s Enlightenment. In: Christianity, Antiquity, and Enlightenment. International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 203. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0274-5_11
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