Abstract
The view that knowledge can usefully be interpreted as justified true belief has fallen into disfavor in recent times. David Lewis observes that the use of such a definition seems to require an apparently impossible choice between the rock of fallibilism and the whirlpool of skepticism, but that we can—just barely—escape both perils by steering with care (Lewis, 1996). This paper offers a more radical defense of the same conclusion.
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Note that possibility in Section 3 is taken to be the failure to get a no when the justification machine is asked whether something is possible. But this is not the same as getting a yes to the same question.
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Binmore, K. (2011). Can Knowledge Be Justified True Belief?. In: DeVidi, D., Hallett, M., Clarke, P. (eds) Logic, Mathematics, Philosophy, Vintage Enthusiasms. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 75. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0214-1_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0214-1_21
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