Abstract
Having been struck by the steady growth of mathematical knowledge, Duhem wondered whether a similar cumulative pattern had also been achieved in the development of physical science. In this respect, his conclusions were largely negative: as long as explanatory science relies on metaphysics and as long as the latter is and must remain unstable, progress in physics cannot possibly be viewed as cumulative. But provided physical theories be restricted to their purely representative parts, then thanks to the Correspondence Principle, the mathematical structure of scientific systems can be seen to evolve continuously: the old equations, though strictly incompatible with the new ones, constitute limiting cases of the latter (Duhem, 1954, Part 1, Ch. 3).
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Zahar, E. (2011). Falsifiability, Empirical Content and the Duhem-Quine Problem. In: DeVidi, D., Hallett, M., Clarke, P. (eds) Logic, Mathematics, Philosophy, Vintage Enthusiasms. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 75. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0214-1_20
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