Abstract
The specific aim of this Chapter is to verify whether and to what extent a newly binding Charter will influence the scope of the principles of effective judicial protection and effective access to justice with particular regard to the development of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. To that end, the author outlines the nature, scope of application and implementation of the right to an effective judicial remedy, and of the measures aimed at ensuring access to justice on the part of individuals. It is argued that the binding force of the Charter, combined with the modifications resulting from Art. 263 (4) TFEU, effectively addresses the concerns stemming from the restrictive interpretation of Art. 230 (4) TEC. Most notably, the binding Charter is capable of producing notable theoretical and practical consequences on the AFSJ, where Art. 47 is deemed to play a central role in the years to come.
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Notes
- 1.
On the Charter, reference must be made to F. Benoït-Rohmer, La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, (2001), 19 Chronique, 1483; F. Benoït-Rohmer (ed.), ‘La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européennes’, (2000) 12 Revue Universelle des droits de l’Homme, 1; G.F. Ferrari (ed.), I diritti fondamentali dopo la Carta di Nizza. Il costituzionalismo dei diritti (Giuffré, 2001); L.S. Rossi (ed.), Carta dei diritti fondamentali e costituzione europea (Giuffré, 2002); M. Wathelet, ‘La Charte des droits fondamentaux: un bon pas dans une course qui reste longue’, (2000) 5–6 Cahiers de Droit Européen 584; and S. Weatherill, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, law and policy (Oxford, 2004).
- 2.
For a similar opinion, cf. the contribution in this volume by S. Curzon, Chapter 8.
- 3.
On the distinction between positive and negative rights in Charter, cf. in this volume the contribution by O. Zetterquist, Chapter 1.
- 4.
Case C-294/83 Parti écologiste “Les Verts” [1986] ECR 1339.
- 5.
Cf. Art. 65 TEC.
- 6.
See Case C-294/83 “Les Verts”, n. 4 above; Case C-26/62 van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR 1 and Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, where the ECJ affirms that: “the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international agreement, none the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law. The Community treaties established a new legal order for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. The essential characteristics of the Community legal order which has thus been established are in particular its primacy over the law of the Member States and the direct effect of a whole series of provisions” (at para 1). On the “right to a judge”, cf. L.P. Comoglio, ‘Il “giusto processo” civile nella dimensione comparatistica’, (2002) 57 Rivista di Diritto Processuale 702; J.-P. Jacqué, ‘Charte des droits fondamentaux et droit à un recours effectif. Dialogue entre le juge et le “constituant”’, (2002) Il Diritto dell’Unione europea 1.
- 7.
Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419; Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125; Case 4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491; Case C-44/79 Hauer [1979] ECR 3727. There is a plethora of critical academic doctrine on the topic. See ex pluribus M. Avbeij, ‘The European Court of Justice and the question of value choices’ (2004) Jean Monnet Working Paper 06/04, accessible at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.; T. Ballarino, ‘Diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea’, in S. Cassese, Dizionario di diritto pubblico (Giuffré, 2006) 1892; F.G. Jacobs, ‘Human rights in the European Union: The role of the Court of Justice’, (2001) 26 European Law Review 331; A. Rizzo, ‘Il problema della tutela dei diritti fondamentali nell’Unione Europea’, (2001) Europa e diritto privato 59; G. Tesauro, ‘I diritti fondamentali nella giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia’ (1992) Rivista Internazionale dei Diritti dell’Uomo 426; A. Tizzano, ‘La protection des droits fondamentaux en Europe: la Cour de Justice et les juridictions constitutionnelles nationales’ (2006) 1 Revue du Droit de l’Union Européenne 9.
- 8.
Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651. See also Case 222/86 Unectef [1987] ECR 4097; Case C-97/91 Borelli [1992] ECR I-6313 and Case C-185/97 Coote [1998] ECR I-5199.
- 9.
Cf. Art. 51 CFR.
- 10.
See infra, para 2.
- 11.
Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271.
- 12.
Cf. M. Bulterman, ‘Case C-540/03, Parliament v. Council, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 27 June 2006, [2006] ECR I-5769’, (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review at 256, where the author observes that “the ECJ is now also willing to refer to the Charter in situations where the Community legislature has not acknowledged its relevance for the Community measure under review”.
- 13.
Ex pluribus, see Case 34/67 Lück [1968] ECR 245, 251; Case 33/76 REWE [1976] ECR 1989, para 5, Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult [1997] ECR I-4961, para 40; Joined Cases C-279, 280 and 281/96, Ansaldo [1998] ECR I-5025, para 27; Case C-111/97 Evobus [1998] ECR I-5411, para 15. See A. Barav, ‘Effectiveness of judicial protection and the role of national courts’, in Judicial protection of rights in the Community legal order (Bruylant, 1997) 259; A. Biondi, ‘The European Court of justice and certain national procedural limitations: not such a tough relationship’, (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 1271; L. Flynn, ‘When national procedural autonomy meets the effectiveness of Community law, can it survive the impact?’, (2008) 9 Era Forum scripta iuris europaei, 245; M. Hoskins, ‘Tilting the balance: supremacy and national procedural rules’, (1996) 21 European Law Review 365; C. Kakouris, ‘Do the member States possess judicial procedural autonomy?’, (1997) 34 Common Market Law Review 1389; P. Oliver, ‘Le droit communautaire et les voies de recours nationales’, (1992) 3–4 Cahiers de Droit Européen 348; A. Saggio, ‘Incidenza della giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia sulle norme processuali’, (2001) Corriere Giuridico 114; H. G. Schermers and D. F. Waeibroek, Judicial protection in the European Union (The Hague/London/New York, Kluwer Law International, 2001); E. Szyszczak, ‘Making Europe more relevant to its citizens: Effective judicial process’, (1996) 21 European Law Review 351; A. Tizzano, S. Fortunato, ‘La tutela dei diritti’, in A. Tizzano (ed.), Il diritto privato dell’Unione Europea, XXVI, II, 1271, in M. Bessone (ed.) Trattato di diritto privato (Torino, 2000).
- 14.
Cf. Case C-213/89 Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433, para 22, Case 432/05, Unibet, n. 11 above, paras 67 ff. The same holds true for the case in which the validity of a Community law is doubtful, see Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik [1991] ECR I-415 and case C-465/93 Atlanta [1995] ECR I-3761.
- 15.
Case 25/62 Plaumann [1963] ECR 95.
- 16.
Cf., amongst others, A. Arnull, ‘Private Applicants and the action for annulment under Art. 173 of the EC Treaty’, (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review 7; P. Craig, ‘Legality, standing and substantial review in Community law’, (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 507; R. Greaves, ‘Locus Standi under Art. 173 EEC when seeking annulment of a regulation’, (1986) 11 European Law Review 119; C. Harding, ‘The private interest in challenging Community action’, (1980) 5 European Law Review 345; C. Harlow, ‘Towards a theory of access for the European Court of Justice’, (1992) 12 Yearbook of European Law 213; N. Neuwahl, ‘Article 173 Paragraph 4 EC: Past, present and possible future’, (1996) 21 European Law Review 112; H. Rasmussen, ‘Why is Article 173 interpreted against private plaintiffs?’, (1980) 5 European Law Review 112. It should also be noted that some Authors (P. Craig and G. De Búrca, EU law: Text, cases and materials (Oxford University Press, 2003) at 489) have described the Plaumann test as “a mirage in the desert, ever receding and never capable of being grasped”.
- 17.
See A. Albors-Llorens, ‘The standing of private parties to challenge community measures: has the European court missed the boat?’, (2003) 62 Cambridge Law Journal 72; E. Biernat, ‘The locus standi of private applicants under Article 230 (4) EC and the principle of judicial protection in the European Community’ (2003) Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper no. 12/03, accessibile at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03/031201.html; C. Kombos, ‘The recent case law on locus standi of private applicants under Art. 230 (4) EC: A missed opportunity or a velvet revolution?’, (2005) European Integration Online Paper, accessibile at http://http;//eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-017a.htm; V. Kronenberger and P. Dejmek, ‘Locus standi of individuals before community courts under Article 230 (4) EC: Illusions and disillusions after the Jégo-Quéré (T-177/01) and Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (C-50/00) judgments’, (2002) 5 European Legal Forum 257; F. Ragolle, ‘Access to justice for private applicants in the community legal order: Recent (r)evolutions’, (2003) 28 European Law Review 90.
- 18.
Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré [2002] ECR II-2365.
- 19.
Ibid., para 47.
- 20.
Case C-50/00 Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council [2002] ECR I-6677, AG Jacobs.
- 21.
See F.G. Jacobs, ‘Effective judicial protection of individuals in the European Union, now and in the future’, (2002) Il Diritto dell’Unione europea 203. In his opinion in UPA AG Jacobs found that Art. 234 TEC is not an effective alternative to Art. 230 (4) TEC. In particular, while pursuant to the latter provision the institution responsible for adopting the relevant act will be a party to the proceedings, under the former norm that would not necessarily be the case. Moreover, the national court: (a) may lack the expertise that the ECJ has in specific areas covered by the contested measure; (b) is prevented from declaring the measure as invalid (cf. Case 314/87 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199) and (c) may encounter more difficulties in granting the interim relief available to the ECJ pursuant to Arts. 242 and 243 TEC. As to the latter aspect, it should be recalled that: (i) not always domestic legislation provides for the necessary remedies; (ii) the substantial delays and increased costs related to preliminary references are not present to the same extent in direct actions for annulment; (iii) the action for annulment allows for a more intense scrutiny of the contested measure since the applicants autonomously put forward their pleas and invoke the relevant grounds of invalidity whereas under Art. 234 TEC they can (only) intervene submitting written observations and presenting oral arguments before the ECJ and (iv) Art. 234 TEC is subject to the CILFIT jurisprudence (Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 3415) on the doctrine of ‘acte claire et eclairé’ and, in any case, always depends on the willingness of the national Court to make the reference.
- 22.
C-50/00 Unión de Pequeños Agricultores [2002] ECR I-6677.
- 23.
Ibid., para 45. In doing so the Court appears to acknowledge that, although “complete”, the system of protection is not perfect.
- 24.
Case C-263/02 P Jégo-Quèrè [2004] ECR I-3425.
- 25.
In particular, in his opinion concerning the Jégo-Quéré case, Jacobs argued that the CFI erred in law when it departed from the traditional interpretation of individual concern, in breach of the fourth paragraph of Art. 230. He found the strict standing test highly problematic because capable of jeopardizing the individual’s right to challenge the validity of secondary legislation. Moreover, the only way to bring a case before a national court and obtain judicial review through a preliminary reference might be to infringe the law, which is not admissible. In addition, the alternative remedy of Arts. 235 and 288 (2) TEC are inadequate, but the situation is an unavoidable consequence of the limitations stemming from the wording of Art. 230 (4) TEC. Interestingly, unlike the Opinion in UPA and perhaps as a consequence of the ECJ’s decision in that case, there is no express reference to the right to effective judicial protection nor reference to the inadequacy of Art. 234 TEC as an alternative remedy.
- 26.
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, [2004] OJ C 130/1.
- 27.
Cf. Art. 263 TFEU. The provision removes the “individual concern” requirement only when individuals seek to challenge the validity of “a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures”. However, it should be noted that no definition of “regulatory act” has been provided leaving the question open to speculation. On the possible notion of “regulatory act”, see J. Usher, ‘Direct and individual concern – An effective remedy or a conventional solution’, (2003) 28 European Law Review 575; A. Dashwood and A. Johnston, ‘The institutions of the enlarged EU under the regime of the Constitutional Treaty’, (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 1481; J. Rideau, ‘Présentation des actes juridiques dans la Constitution’, in E. Álvarez Conde and V. Garrido Mayol (eds.), Comentarios a la Constitución Europea, Vol. I (Tirant lo Blanch, 2004) at 333; R. Bray (ed.), Procedural law of the European Union (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) at 327. Now that the Lisbon Treaty has entered into force, the ECJ will be soon called upon to clarify this point.
- 28.
Cf. Case 187/87 Land de Sarre [1988] ECR 5013, para 19; Case C-223/98 Adidas [1999] ECR I-7081, para 21; Case C-440/00 Kühne & Nagel [2004] ECR I-787, para 59. On the principle of ‘effet utile’ see M. Cartabia, Princìpi inviolabili e integrazione europea (Giuffré, 1995); R. Monaco, ‘Les principes d’interprétation suivis par la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes’, in author? Mélanges offerts à Henri Rolin (Pedone, 1964); M. Pechstein and C. Drechler, in K. Reisenhuber (eds.), Europäische Methodenlehre. Handbuch für Ausbildung und Praxis (De Gruyter Recht, 2006) 172; P. Pescatore, ‘Monisme, dualisme et effet utile» dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice de la Communauté européenne’, in N. von Colneric, D. Edward, J. Puissochet and D. R. Colomer (eds.), Une communauté de droit. Festschrift für Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias (Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2003) 329.
- 29.
Reference is made to the amendments introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty. Cf., in particular, Arts. 61, 65 TEC.
- 30.
Amongst the many acts adopted in this field, cf. EC Regulation 1346/2000, [2000] OJ L 160/1; EC Regulation 1348/2000, [2000] OJ L 160/37; EC Regulation 44/2001, [2001] OJ L 12/1 (Brussels I, on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters), and EC Regulation 2201/2003 (Brussels II bis, on matrimonial matters), [2003] OJ L 338/1. In the field of conflict of laws, cf. EC Regulation 864/2007 (Rome II, on the extra-contractual obligations), [2007] OJ L 199/40 and Regulation 593/2008 (Rome I, on contractual obligations, amending the 1980 Rome Convention), [2008] OJ L 177/6, see also http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/civil/acquis/doc_civil_acquis_en.htm
- 31.
Opinion 1/03 2006 ECR 1145 according to which the conclusion of the new Lugano convention falls entirely within the sphere of exclusive competence of the European Community.
- 32.
Art. 81, lett. e TFUE.
- 33.
See Chapter III of Regulation 44/2001, n. 30 above, dealing with recognition and enforcement.
- 34.
Cf. Arts. 33 and 36 of Regulation 44/2001, n. 30 above, respectively.
- 35.
It is nonetheless true that the common foreign and security policy will maintain its specificity. Cf. in this volume the contribution by L. Paladini, Chapter 14.
- 36.
In addition, it should be recalled that the Protocol on the Statute of the ECJ has recently been amended by Council Decision 2008/79/EC/Euratom, [2008] OJ L 24/42, which allows for a fast-track procedure. The Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice have been amended accordingly ([2008] OJ L 24/39) by inserting a new Art. 104b that sets out the new procedure. The referring national court may request that the speedy procedure be applied or the ECJ may decide to apply it ex officio in exceptional cases. The parties to the national proceedings, the member State of the referring court (but not all member States) and the EU institutions may submit written observations within a short deadline set by the Court.
- 37.
For further details, see Commission Green Paper of 9 February 2000: Legal aid in civil matters: The problems confronting the cross-border litigant (COM (2000) 51 final).
- 38.
In that respect it can be useful to draw a parallelism between the concept of “access to justice” and the (far-reaching) notion of “access to market” elaborated by ECJ in the most recent case law on the freedom of establishment (Case C-442/02 Caixa-Bank France [2004] ECR I-8961, para 12). On the free movement of capital, see, in particular, the golden-share saga, considered an obstacles to access (even if only potential) to the financial market of another member State, cf. Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal [2002] ECR I-4731; case C-483/99 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-4781; Case C-503/99 Commission v Belgium [2002] ECR I-4809; Case C-463/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-4581 and Case C-98/01, Commission v United Kingdom [2003] ECR I-4641.
- 39.
Respectively, EC Regulation 861/2007, [2007] OJ L 199/1 and EC Regulation 1896/2006, [2006] OJ L 399/1.
- 40.
See Recital No 7 of EC Regulation 861/2007 (n. 39 above) and Recital No. 8 of EC Regulation 1896/2006 (n. 39 above).
- 41.
In practice, this is done by abolishing all formalities required in the national legal systems in order to enforce the judgments rendered in other Member States and by prohibiting any substantive review of the latter, without any ordre public clause. Cf. Regulation 805/2004, [2004] OJ L 143/15. See N. Boschiero, ‘The forthcoming European enforcement order. Towards an European law-enforcement area’, (2003) 86 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 688.
- 42.
Case C-7/98 Krombach [2000] ECR I-1935, para 37. See also H. Muir Watt, ‘Evidence of an emergent European legal culture: Public policy requirements of procedural fairness under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions’, (2001) 36 Texas International Law Journal 539. In this regard, cf. Cour de Cassation, Judgment 16 March 1999, no. 17598 (for a comment see. G.A.L. Droz, ‘Variations Pordea (à propos de l’arrêt de la Cour de Cassation; 1er Chambre civile du 16 mars 1999)’, (2000) 89 Revue Critique du Droit International Privé 181 ff.). Nevertheless, even before the Krombach judgment, some Authors pointed out the link between the notion of ordre public and the protection of fundamental rights, cf. T. Ballarino, Costituzione e diritto internazionale privato (CEDAM, 1974); G. Beitzke, Grundgesetz und international privatrecht (Berlin, 1961); P. Hammje, ‘Droits fondamentaux et ordre public’, (1997) 86 Revue Critique du Droit International Privé 1.
- 43.
Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China [1999] ECR I-3092. The case acknowledged the existence of an ordre public international of European source. See S. Poillot Peruzzetto, ‘L’ordre public international en droit communautaire. A propos de l’arrêt de la Cour de Justice des Communautés du 1er juin 1999 (affaire Eco Swiss China Tima Ltd)’, (2000) 2 Journal de Droit International 299. For a different view, cf. M.R. Moura Ramos, ‘Public policy in the framework of the Brussels Convention. Remarks on two recent decisions by the European Court of Justice’, in M.R. Moura Ramos (ed.), Estudios de derecho international privado e de derecho processual civil internacional (Coimbra, 2002) 283.
- 44.
The elaboration of the notion of ordre public cannot be left to the national judicial authorities without hindering the uniform application of EC law (cf. Case C-7/98, Krombach, n. 42 above).
- 45.
Case C-443/03 Leffler [2005] ECR I-961. It is well known that in this instance, the ECJ (following AG Stix-Hackl’s opinion) considered inter alia that “the principle of effectiveness must lead the national court to apply the detailed procedural rules laid down by domestic law only in so far as they do not compromise the raison d’être and objective of the Regulation” (para 50).
- 46.
Suffice it here to recall the domicile determination or the registered office of a company (Arts. 59 and 22, No. of EC Regulation 44/2001), the grant of precautionary measures (Art. 31 of EC Regulation 44/2001) or the determination of the certain date of the beginning of a legal proceeding (Art. 9 (2) of EC Regulation 1348/2000 or Art. 30 of the Brussels I Regulation).
- 47.
For an example of the possible impact of EU principles on the Italian domestic rules of civil procedure concerning the quaestio iurisdictionis, see P. Franzina, ‘Il coordinamento fra lex fori e norme uniformi nell’accertamento del titolo di giurisdizione secondo il regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001’, (2004) 2 Rivista di diritto internazionale 384.
- 48.
See Section 2 above.
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Sanna, G. (2011). Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Its Impact on Judicial Cooperation in Civil and Commercial Matters. In: Giacomo, D. (eds) The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0156-4_9
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