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The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights pp 15–54Cite as

Fundamental Rights in the EU: Legal Pluralism and Multi-Level Protection After the Lisbon Treaty

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Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 8))

Abstract

This Chapter offers an overview of the multilevel system of fundamental rights protection in Europe. The different dimensions involved are considered with a view to single out the many criticalities which affect the present state of affairs and, subsequently, to determine the possible added value of the Lisbon Treaty. The co-existing national, supranational and international (universal and regional) systems of fundamental rights protection and the respective systems of enforcement suffer from a lack of coordination which may affect the possibility for an individual to obtain justice. Pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights has the same status as the treaties and the Union is bound to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. These two lines of action are complementary, but are analyzed separately. On the one side, the author investigates the scope of the newly binding Charter taking into account the UK and Polish Protocol. On the other hand, the consequences of accession are addressed in terms of technical arrangements and judicial interaction. It is concluded that the Reform Treaty in principle allows the creation of a more complete, coherent and consistent legal framework, but may hide thankless surprises.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    According to Art. 1 (3) TEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, the Union is founded on the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), having the same legal value. Moreover, it should be recalled that by virtue of this provision “The Union shall replace and succeed the European Community”.

  2. 2.

    On the establishment of fundamental rights catalogues in the Constitutions of the Member States, see A. Von Bogdandy, P. Cruz Villalón and P. M. Huber (eds.), Handbuch ius publicum Europaeum, Vols. I–II (Müller, 2007).

  3. 3.

    A complete list of the High Contracting parties with the date of signature and ratification of the Convention (and its Protocols) can be found at http://www.coe.int

  4. 4.

    See in general, A. Moravcsik, ‘The origins of human rights regimes: democratic delegation in post war Europe’, (2000) 54 International Organization 217; R. Blackburn and J. Polakiewicz (eds.), Fundamental rights in Europe: The European Convention on Human Rights and its member States, 1950–2000 (Oxford University Press, 2001); D. Nichol, ‘Original intent and the European Convention on Human Rights’, (2005) Public Law 152 and S. Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights (Cambridge, 2006).

  5. 5.

    Cf. Arts. 41 and 46 (1) ECHR. The latter provision has been interpreted by the Strasbourg Court as entailing the State’s duty to “put an end to the breach and reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach” (Appl. No 14556/89 Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, (1995) A/330B, para 34).

  6. 6.

    S. Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights, n. 4 above, at 173. See also J.F. Flauss, ‘La Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme est-elle une cour constitutionnelle?’ (1999) 36 Revue française de droit international 711 and L. Wildhaber, ‘A Constitutional future for the European Court of Human Rights’ (2000) 23 Human Rights Law Journal 161 and E.A. Alkema, ‘The European Convention as a Constitution and its Court as a Constitutional Court’, in P. Mahoney, F. Matscher, H. Petzold and L. Wildhaber (eds.), Protecting human rights: the European perspective (Carl Heymans, 2000) 41.

  7. 7.

    Appl. No 15318/89, Loizidou v. Turkey, (1995) Series A No 25, para 239.

  8. 8.

    On the political debate and process which lead to the elaboration and adoption of the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM treaties, see P. Gerbet, La construction de l’Europe (Impremerie Nationale, 1983); H. Von der Groeben, The European Community. The formative years. The struggle to establish the Common Market and the Political Union (The European Perspective Series, Commission of the EC, 1987); M.-T. Bitsch, Histoire de la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (Complexe, 1996).

  9. 9.

    Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR 1.

  10. 10.

    Former Art. 8 TEC.

  11. 11.

    Former Art. 119 TEC.

  12. 12.

    Case 1/58 Stork [1959] ECR 43.

  13. 13.

    Case 40/64 Sgarlata [1965] ECR 279.

  14. 14.

    Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125 and Case 4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491.

  15. 15.

    Case 36/75 Rutili [1975] ECR 1219. The Court of Justice progressively adopted the ECHR as preferential source in the field of fundamental rights protection. In this sense, legal commentators have spoken about a ‘banal usage’ of the ECHR on the part of the Court of Justice.

  16. 16.

    Cf. the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission Joint Declaration on Human Rights (5 April 1977), [1977] OJ C 103/1; the Copenhagen Summit Declaration on European Identity of 14 December 1973; the Resolution of the European Parliament adopting the Declaration of fundamental rights and freedoms (12 April 1989), [1989] OJ C 120/51 and the Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (9 December 1989) adopted in the form of a Declaration by the 11 Member States except the United Kingdom, which did not sign it until 1998. For an extensive overview of the developments which took place in the field of fundamental rights protection, see G.C. Rodriguez Iglesias, ‘La protecion de los derechos fundamentales en la Union Europea’, in Scritti in onore di F. Mancini, II (Giuffré, 1998) 831; A. Tizzano, ‘L’azione dell’Unione Europea per la promozione e protezione dei diritti umani’, (1999) 1 Il Diritto dell’Unione europea 149; F. Benoit-Rohmer, ‘Les droits de l’homme dans l’Union européenne: de Rome a Nice’, in L.S. Rossi (ed.) Carta dei diritti fondamentali e Costituzione dell’Unione europea (Giuffré, 2002) 19.

  17. 17.

    Cf. after the Nold precedent, Case 136/79 National Panasonic [1980] ECR 2033, para 18; Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, para 18; Case 85/87 Dow Benelux NV [1989] ECR 3137, para 24; Joined cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst AG [1989] ECR 2859, para 13. It is also interesting to note that a specific reference to fundamental rights protection is to be found in Art. 3 of the Treaty instituting the European Defence Community (Paris, 27 May 1952), in Art. 2 of the Draft Treaty embodying the Statute of the European Community (10 March 1953) and in Art. 4 of the 1984 Progetto Spinelli, all of which never entered into force.

  18. 18.

    See, respectively, ‘Accession of the Communities to the Convention on Human Rights’, EC Bull., Suppl. 2/79 and Commission Communication SEC (90) 2087 of 19 November 1990. See further L. Ferrari Bravo, ‘Problemi tecnici dell’adesione delle Comunità europee alla Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo’, (1979) 4 Rivista di diritto europeo 347; G. Sperduti, ‘Le rattachement des Communautés Européenne à la Convention de Rome sur la sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales’, (1980) 2 Revue du Marché Commun 170; R. Adam, ‘La prospettata adesione delle Comunità alla Convenzione di Roma: si devono anche modificare i trattati comunitari?’, (1980) Rivista di diritto internazionale 883; F. Capotorti, ‘Sull’eventuale adesione della Comunità alla Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo’, (1980) Rivista di diritto internazionale 5; J.-P. Jacqué, ‘Communauté Européenne et Convention européenne des droits de l’homme’, in Mélanges à Boulouis (Dalloz 1991) 325.

  19. 19.

    Press Release IP (90) 892, 31 October 1990.

  20. 20.

    On the affirmation of the counter-limits doctrine and its development throughout the European integration process, see E. Cannizzaro, ‘Tutela dei diritti fondamentali nell’ambito comunitario e garanzie costituzionali secondo le Corti costituzionali italiana e tedesca’, (1990) Rivista di diritto internazionale 372; A. Oppenheimer, The relationship between European Community law and National law: the cases (Cambridge, 1994) 410; J. Kokott, `German constitutional jurisprudence and European integration’, (1996) 2 European Public Law 237; B. De Witte, ‘Direct effect, supremacy, and the nature of the legal order’, in P. Craig, G. De Burca (eds.), The evolution of EU law (Oxford University Press, 1999) 177; A. Ruggeri, ‘Tradizioni cosituzionali comuni e controlimiti, tra teoria delle fonti e teoria dell’interpretazione’, in P. Falzea, A. Spadaro, L. Ventura (eds.) La Corte costituzionale e le Corti d’Europa (Giappichelli, 2003) 505.

  21. 21.

    Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759.

  22. 22.

    Ibid., para 27. The second question put forward by the Council – namely, the compatibility of the agreement with the Treaty – was declared inadmissible since the Court had not been given sufficient information as to the envisaged practical solutions submitting the Community to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR (para 21). See further, G. Gaja, ‘Court of justice opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms given on 28 march 1996, not yet reported’ (1996) 33 Common Market Law Review 973; P. Wachsmann, ‘L’avis 2/94 de la Cour de la justice relatif à l'adhésion de la Communauté européenne à la Convention de sauvegarde des droit de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales’, (1996) 2 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 467.

  23. 23.

    And this despite the requests of Austria, during the negotiations of the former treaty, and of Finland, on the occasion of the Intergovernmental conference leading to the adoption of the latter.

  24. 24.

    See Art. 6 (1) TEU. This provision can be considered to be a codification of the Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity of 14 December 1973.

  25. 25.

    Cf. former Art. 46 TEU.

  26. 26.

    Former Arts. 2, 3, 13 TEC and Art. 119 (subsequently 141) TEC. In addition, it should be recalled that Art. 136 TEC contains an explicit reference to specific international instruments for the protection of workers (such as the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 and the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers).

  27. 27.

    Former Art. 286 TEC.

  28. 28.

    See the Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council in 1978 and 1993 and the Conclusions of the Madrid European Council in 1995. Moreover, similar provisions had been introduced in Art. 96 ECSC and in Art. 204 EURATOM.

  29. 29.

    Thereby making, de facto, EU membership conditional upon accession to the ECHR and, following the adoption of Protocol No 11, to the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court. See generally P. Alston, The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 1999) 689.

  30. 30.

    Former Arts. 7 (2) and (3) TEU. The effects of such a decision will also affect the rights enjoyed by the interested Member State under the EC Treaty (see former Art. 309 TEC).

  31. 31.

    On the composition and working method of the Convention see, amongst the many which have commented the peculiar features of this organ, J.-P. Jacqué, ‘La Charte des Droits Fondamentaux de l’Union européenne: présentation générale’, in L.S. Rossi (ed), Carta dei diritti fondamentali e Costituzione dell’Unione Europea (Giuffré, 2002) 55.

  32. 32.

    After the adoption of the Charter, a number of mechanisms were put into place to ensure the respect of the rights enshrined therein. In this sense, the commitment of the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament to obey the document despite its non binding nature was strong enough to impose a ‘regulated self-restraint’. See further in this volume F. Camporesi, ‘Chapter 4’.

  33. 33.

    See further in this volume V. Bazzocchi, ‘Chapter 3’.

  34. 34.

    Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, [2004] OJ C 310/41. See also K. Lenaerts, E. De Smijter, ‘A Bill of Rights for the European Union’, (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 273.

  35. 35.

    J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe – do the new clothes have an Emperor? (Cambridge University Press, 1998). On the constitutional development of the European Communities, see further – F. Mancini, ‘The making of a Constitution for Europe’, (1989) 26 Common Market Law Review 595; J. Gerkrath, L’emergence d’un droit constitutionnel pour l’Europe (´Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1997); J.C. Piris, ‘L’Union européenne a-t-elle une Constitution? Lui en faut-il une?’ (1999) Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européenne 599; L.S. Rossi, ‘Costituzionalizzazione’ dell’U.E. e dei diritti fondamentali’, in L.S. Rossi (ed.), Carta dei diritti fondamentali e Costituzione dell’Unione Europea (Giuffré, 2002); J.-P. Jacqué, ‘Les principes constitutionnels fondamentaux dans le projet de traité établissant la Constitution européenne’, in L.S. Rossi (ed.), Vers une nouvelle architecture de l’Union européenne (Bruylant, 2004) 71; For a more critical approach to the phenomenon under examination see K. Lenaerts and M. Desomer, ‘New models of constitution-making in Europe: the quest for legitimacy’, (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 1217 at 1218.

  36. 36.

    See J. Ziller, Les nouveaux traites européens: Lisbonne et après (LGDJ, 2008); C. Craig, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: process, architecture and substance’, (2008) 33 European Law Review 137; N. Moussis, ‘Le traitè de Lisbonne: une Constitution sans en avoir le titre’, (2008) Revue du marché commun et de l’Union europèenne 161; M. Dougan M., ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: winning minds, not hearts’, (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 617; P. Ponzano, ‘Le traité de Lisbonne: l'Europe sort de sa crise institutionnelle’, (2007) Revue du droit de l'Union européenne 569.

  37. 37.

    Final Report of Working Group II, CONV 352/02.

  38. 38.

    Indeed, it should not be forgotten that, concomitantly to the expansion of supranational competences, the Member States were broadening the catalogue of fundamental rights endorsed within their respective constitutional systems (e.g. in 1983 the Dutch Constitution was amended to include, inter alia the prohibition of discrimination, the freedom of expression and demonstration and a general right to privacy; in 1992, the Spanish Constitution was reformed to extend to citizens of the European Union the right to active and passive suffrage in local elections; in 2001 Greece broadened its constitutional rights with an express reference to the protection of personal data and the access to documents). On the one side, this was certainly a consequence of the developments which occurred at the supranational level; on the other, the expansion of the domestic bill of rights indirectly imposed a ‘higher’ standard of protection on the part of the EU. This ‘cline-like-progression’ determined a virtual spiral which ultimately relied on the counter-limits doctrine.

  39. 39.

    Joined cases C-402/ and 415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat [2008] ECR I-6351. See, inter alia, J.-P. Jacqué, ‘Primauté du droit international versus protection des droits fondamentaux’ (2009) Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 161; A. Gattini, (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 213; G. Harpaz, ‘Judicial review by the European Court of Justice of UN ‘Smart Sanctions’ against terror in the Kadi dispute’, (2009) 14 European Foreign Affairs Review 65; C. Eckes, ‘Test Case for the Resilience of the EU’s Constitutional Foundations International Sanctions against Individuals: A Test Case for the Resilience of the European Union’s Constitutional Foundations, (2009) 15 European Public Law 351.

  40. 40.

    Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), Rec. 1744 (2006), para 4.

  41. 41.

    The Poirrez v. France (Appl. No 40892/98) case provides a good example of how tortuous the road to justice may be in Europe. Here a physically challenged Ivory coast national, had been adopted as an adult by a French citizen. The competent domestic authorities refused to grant him the disability allowance he had applied for on grounds of nationality. His appeal against the decision originated a preliminary reference to the ECJ but the latter was dismissed on account of the fact that the issue at stake fell outside the scope of application of EC law. Having exhausted all the available judicial remedies, Mr. Poirrez turned to the Strasbourg Court which, 13 years after the first legal plea, recognized the discrimination condemning France for a violation of Art. 14 of the ECHR together with Art. 1 of Protocol No 1 and, ruling on an equitable basis, awarded him 20,000 euro for the damages he had suffered.

  42. 42.

    See N. Kirsch, ‘The open architecture of European human rights law’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 183.

  43. 43.

    Y. Shany, The competing jurisdictions of international courts and tribunals (Oxford University Press, 2003) at 118.

  44. 44.

    At present 47 European countries have ratified the ECHR. For a detailed list of the Member States and of the single additional protocols they have ratified, see website http://www.echr.coe.int/.

  45. 45.

    For an in depth comparative analysis, see R. Blackburn and J. Polakiewicz (eds.), Fundamental rights in Europe, n. 4 above and H. Keller, A. Stone Sweet, A Europe of rights, the impact of the ECHR on National legal systems (Oxford University Press, 2008).

  46. 46.

    See, for instance, Art. 457 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended in 2002; Art. 363a of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, as introduced by the 1996 reform; Arts. 626 (paras 1–7) of the French Procedural Criminal Code, as amended in 2000 and Art. 359 (6) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, as modified in 1998. In some instances the opening of administrative and civil cases is also allowed. See, for instance, the 1985 Austrian Administrative Court Act, (Verwaltungsgerichtshofgesetz), the German Code of Administrative Procedure (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung) as amended in 2006 and the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung).

  47. 47.

    This is in particular the case of Italy (see Appl. Nos 7604/76, 7719/76, 7781/77 and 7913/77, Foti v. Italy, (1982) Series A, vol. 56; Appl. No 13023/87, Salesi v. Italy, (1993) Series A, vol. 257-E; Appl. No 34256/96, Di Mauro v. Italy, (1999) Reports 1999-V; Appl. No 31631/96, Procaccini v. Italy, (2000) unreported), but also of France (Appl. No 38212/97, F.E. v. France, (1998) Reports 1998-VIII, Appl. No 28738/02, Le Blenchennec v. France, (2006) unreported). With the so-called Legge Pinto (Law No 89 of 24 March 2001, OJ 78/2001), the Italian Legislator introduced a legal remedy which allows individuals to obtain compensation when their right to have a case heard within a reasonable time is breached. In France, compliance appears to have been achieved through judicial interpretation (See Cour de Cassation, 23 February 2001, Cts Bolle Laroche c/Agent judiciaire du trésor and Nouhaud et a. v. France [2002], Appl. No 33424/96) Conseil d’Etat, 28 June 2002, Ministre de la Justice c/M. Magiera and Broca et Texier-Micault v. France [2003], Appl. Nos. 27928//02 and 31694/02).

  48. 48.

    On the liability of the State and the right to damages, see, for instance, Art. 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code and Section 8 of the HRA.

  49. 49.

    Appl. No 7525/76, Dudgeon v. UK, (1981) 4 EHRR 149.

  50. 50.

    Appl. No 17862/91, Cantoni v. France, (1996) Reports 1996-V ECHR.

  51. 51.

    Directive EEC 65/65, [1965] OJ L 369/1.

  52. 52.

    Appl. No 24833/94, Matthews v. United Kingdom, (1999) Reports 1999-I. See further, H.G. Schemers, (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 673.

  53. 53.

    Annex to the 1976 Act concerning direct elections of the European Parliament whereby the UK had excluded that the direct elections would apply to Gibraltar.

  54. 54.

    The international nature of the act in question was confirmed by the fact that, as primary law, it fell outside the ECJ’s jurisdiction.

  55. 55.

    Appl. No 13258/87, M & C o v. FDR, (1990) 64 DR 138.

  56. 56.

    Appl. No 45036/98, Bosphorus v. Ireland, (2005) Reports 2005-VI, para 156.

  57. 57.

    Needless to say that with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty reference should be made to the EU solely.

  58. 58.

    Appl. No 51717/99, Guerin v. 15 Member States of the EU, (2000) unreported.

  59. 59.

    Appl. No 6422/02, Ségi et al. v. 15 Member States, (2002) Ser. A, 56.

  60. 60.

    Case C-299/95 Kremzow [1997] ECR I-2629; Case C-328/04 Vajnai [2005] ECR I-8577 and Case C-361/07 Polier [2008] ECR I-6.

  61. 61.

    However, individuals can indirectly contest the compatibility of national legislation with EU law through the preliminary ruling mechanism (cf. in particular Art. 234 TEC, now 267 TFEU).

  62. 62.

    Opinion of 12 September 2007 in Case C-380/05 Centro Europa 7 [2008] ECR I-349, para 20. See also, Opinion delivered on 9 December 1992 by AG Jacobs in Case C-168/91 Konstantinidis [1993] ECR I-1191, para 46.

  63. 63.

    And yet, the case law on Art. 18 EC (now 21 TEU) demonstrates that the Court is willing to demand full compliance with EU fundamental rights above and beyond the mentioned thresholds. See further E. Spaventa, ‘Seeing the woods despite the trees? On the scope of EU citizenship and its constitutional effects’, (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 13; A. Trifonidou, ‘Reverse discrimination in purely internal situations: an incongruity in a citizens’ Europe’, (2008) 35 Legal Isuues of Economic Integration 43 and Editorial Comments, ‘Two-speed European citizenship? Can the Lisbon Treaty help close the gap?’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 1. On the exclusion of the ECJ’s competence to rule on strictly internal situations, cf. a contrario, Case C-212/06 Government of Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon [2008] ECR I-1683.

  64. 64.

    See e.g. Case C-159/90 Grogan [1991] ECR I-468.

  65. 65.

    See e.g. Case 222/84 Johnston, n. 17 above.

  66. 66.

    See e.g. Case C-5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609 and Case 292/97 Karlsson [2000] ECR I-2737.

  67. 67.

    See e.g. Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925 and Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689.

  68. 68.

    P.M. Huber, ‘The unitary effect of the Community’s Fundamental rights: the ERT doctrine Needs to be revised’, (2008) 14 European Public Law 323, at 328.

  69. 69.

    Case C-285/98 Kreil [2000] ECR I-69.

  70. 70.

    Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981. Cf. A. Masson, C. Micheau, ‘The Werner Mangold case: an example of legal militancy’, (2007) 32 European Public Law 587; J.H. Jans, ‘The effects in national legal systems of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age as a general principle of Community law’, (2007) 3 Legal Issues of European Integration 53 and A. Arnull, ‘Out with the old’, (2006) European Law Review 1.

  71. 71.

    Case C-260/89 ERT, n. 67 above, para 43.

  72. 72.

    See Art. 30 TEC (now Art. 36 TFEU), Art. 46 TEC (now Art. 52 TFEU) and Art. 55 TEC (now Art. 62 TFEU).

  73. 73.

    Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609. On the balancing of fundamental rights and freedoms in the case law of the ECJ, see further in this volume S. Curzon, ‘Chapter 8’.

  74. 74.

    Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien [2008] ECR I-505, para 41.

  75. 75.

    For further considerations on the necessary (and ongoing) dialogue between national constitutional courts and the ECJ, see J.H.H. Weiler, N.J.S. Lockhart, ‘Taking rights seriously: The European Court of Justice and its fundamental rights jurisprudence’, (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review 51; F.C. Mayer, ‘The European Constitution and the Courts’, in A. Von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing, 2006) 281; T. Vandamme, ‘Prochain Arrêt: La Belgique! Explaining Recent Preliminary References of the Belgian Constitutional Court’, (2008) 4 European Constitutional Law Review 127; L.S. Rossi (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 319; M. Bobek ‘Learning to talk: preliminary rulings, the courts of the new Member States and the Court of Justice, (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 1611 and A. Tizzano, ‘Qualche riflessione sul contributo della Corte di Giustizia allo sviluppo del sistema comunitario’ (2009) 14 Il Diritto dell’Unione Europea 141, at 157 ff.

  76. 76.

    M. Poiares Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual law: Europe’s constitutional pluralism in action’, in N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford University Press, 2003) at 526. For a similar take on the juxtaposition of the national and EU legal orders, Cf. L. Besselink, A composite European Constitution (Europa Law Publishing, 2007). But, see contra I. Pernice, ‘Multilevel constitutionalism in the European Union’, (2002) 27 European Law Review 511.

  77. 77.

    Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld [2007] ECR I-3633.

  78. 78.

    Case C-275/06 Promusicae [2008] ECR I- 271, para 68.

  79. 79.

    C. Hillion, R.A. Wessel, ‘Competence distribution in EU external relations after ECOWAS: clarification or continued fuzziness?’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 551 at 556.

  80. 80.

    Joined cases C-402 and 415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation [2008] ECR I-6351, para 81.

  81. 81.

    Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659.

  82. 82.

    Case C-341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11767.

  83. 83.

    Case C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I-10779.

  84. 84.

    Case C-112/00 Schmidberger, n. 81 above, para 81.

  85. 85.

    See in particular, T. Van Peijpe, ‘Collective labour law after Viking, Laval, Ruffert and Commission v Luxembourg’, (2009) 25 International Journal of Comparative Law 81 at 95, and J. Malmberg and T. Sigeman, ‘Industrial actions and EU economic freedoms: the autonomous collective bargaining model curtailed by the European Court of Justice (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 1115 at 1130.

  86. 86.

    On the role of the Agency See Weidenfeld and Wessels, ‘The role of the new EU Fundamental Rights Agency: debating of the ‘sex of angels’ or improving Europe’s human rights performance?’ (2008) 33 European Law Review 385 and A. Von Bogdandy and J. Von Bernstorff, ‘The EU Fundamental Rights Agency within the European and International Human Rights Architecture: the Legal Framework and Some Unsettled Issues in a New Field of Administrative Law’, (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 1035. In the context of administrative supervision, its should also be recalled that the violation of general principles of law and of the Charter is considered to amount to a case of maladministration. See J. Soderman, ‘The Convention, the Charter and the remedies’, Speech delivered on the 25 of February 2003 at the European Policy Centre in Brussels.

  87. 87.

    Art. 234 TEC (now Art. 267 TFEU).

  88. 88.

    See S. Peers, ‘The ECJ’s jurisdiction over EC immigration and asylum law: time for a change?, in H. Toner, E. Guild and A. Baldaccini (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy (Hart Publishing, 2007), and Editorial Comments, ‘Preliminary rulings and the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 1.

  89. 89.

    Cf. S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford University Press, 2006); S. Douglas-Scott, ‘Rule of Law in the EU-Putting the Security in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice, (2004) 29 European Law Review 219 and S. Peers, ‘Salvation outside the Church: judicial protection in the third pillar after the Pupino and Segi judgments’, (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 883.

  90. 90.

    But cf. Protocol No 36 to the Lisbon Treaty. In particular, Art. 10 reads: “As a transitional measure, and with respect to acts of the Union in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters which have been adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the powers of the institutions shall be the following at the date of entry into force of that Treaty: the powers of the Commission under Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shall not be applicable and the powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, in the version in force before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, shall remain the same, including where they have been accepted under Article 35(2) of the said Treaty on European Union”. See further in this volume V. Bazzocchi, ‘Chapter 10’.

  91. 91.

    Art. 275 (2) TFEU.

  92. 92.

    Case C-274/99 P Connolly [2001] ECR I-1611.

  93. 93.

    Case C-185/95 Baustahlgewebe [1998], ECR I-8417. See further in this volume M. Borraccetti, ‘Chapter 5’.

  94. 94.

    Joined cases C-402 and 415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, n. 80 above, paras 368–370.

  95. 95.

    See F.G. Jacobs, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Justice. The impact of European Union accession to the European Convention on Human Rights’, online at http://www.ecln.net/elements/conferences/book_berlin/jacobs.pdf.; S. Douglas-Scott, ‘A tale of two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the growing European human rights acquis’, (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 629; G. Ress, ‘The legal relationship between the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Communities according to the European Convention on Human Rights’, in H-J. Blank, S. Mangiameli (eds.), Governing Europe under a Constitution – The hard road from the European Treaties to a European Constitutional Treaty (Springer, 2003) 279.

  96. 96.

    But see recently Appl. No 18603/03, André and Others v. France, (2008) unreported, where the ECtHR quoted Case C-305/05 Ordre des barreaux francophone et germanophone and Others [2007] ECR I-5305.

  97. 97.

    S. Douglas-Scott, n. 95 above, at 656.

  98. 98.

    J.P. Puissochet, ‘La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, la Cour de Justice des Communautées européennes et la protection des droits de l’homme’, in P. Mahoney, F. Matscher, H. Petzold, L. Wildhaber (eds.), Protection des droits de l’homme: la perspective européenne (Heymanns, 2000) 1139; G. Harpaz, ‘The European Court of Justice and its relations with the European Court of Human Rights: The quest for enhanced reliance, coherence and legitimacy’, (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 105 at 109.

  99. 99.

    In some recent cases, however, the Strasbourg Court has carried out an extensive comparative analysis. See Appl. No 54810/00, Jalloh v. Germany, (2006) Reports IX.

  100. 100.

    Appl. No 28957/95, Goodwin v. UK, (2002) 35 EHRR 447. However, it should be underlined that on this occasion the Court made reference to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (para 100).

  101. 101.

    Appl. No 28541/95, Pellegrin v. France, (2001) 31 EHRR 651.

  102. 102.

    Appl. No 18357/91, Hornsby v. Greece, (1997) 24 EHRR 250.

  103. 103.

    Appl. No 20323/92, Pafitis v. Greece, (1999) 27 ECHRR 566.

  104. 104.

    See, for instance, Appl. Nos 35673/97, 35674/97, 36082/97 and 37579/97, Schweighhofer and Others v. Austria, (2001), unreported.

  105. 105.

    Appl. Nos 17173/07 and 17180/07, Sevinger and Eman v. The Netherlands, (2007) unreported and Appl. No 13645/05, Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Kokkelvissarij v. The Netherlands, (2009) unreported.

  106. 106.

    Poirrez v. France, n. 41 above.

  107. 107.

    Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie v. The Netherlands, n. 105 above. Also cf. Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar [2000] ECR I-0675 and Appl. No 62023/00, Emesa Sugar v. the Netherlands, (2005) unreported. Although the claim was declared inadmissible rationae materiae, it has been submitted that in Emesa the ECtHR points to a right to comment on the AG’s opinion under Art. 6, paragraph 1 ECHR. See further in this volume M. Borraccetti, ‘Chapter 5’.

  108. 108.

    Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government, n. 63 above.

  109. 109.

    Case C-127/02 Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee and Others [2004] ECR I-7405.

  110. 110.

    Case C-13/94 P. v. S. [1996] ECR I-2143.

  111. 111.

    In the aftermath of the P v S judgment, see Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689 and Case C-249/96 Grant [1998] ECR I-621.

  112. 112.

    See Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279 and C-109/01 Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607.

  113. 113.

    See Case C-347/03 Friuli Venezia [2005] ECR I-378.

  114. 114.

    Case C-7/98 Krombach [2000] ECR I-1935.

  115. 115.

    Case C-60/00 Carpenter, n. 112 above.

  116. 116.

    See more recently, and in the context of an action for annulment, Case C-308/07 P Koldo Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso [2009] ECR I-1059.

  117. 117.

    On the other hand, this technique (i.e. citing by analogy) has allowed the use of the Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence in areas covered by the third pillar (Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285) thereby enhancing the operative coherence of the ECJ.

  118. 118.

    See, respectively, Joined cases C-305 to 307, 313 to 316, 318, 325, 328, 329, 335/94 Limburse Vinyl Maatschappij [1999] ECR 3283 and Case C-94/00 Roquette Freres [2002] ECR I-9011.

  119. 119.

    See, for instance, Appl. No 43/1994/490/572, Saunders v. United Kingdom, (1997) 23 EHHR 313, Appl. No 37971/97, Ste Colas Est and others v. France, (2002) 39 EHRR 17 and, more recently, Appl. No 44647/98, Peck v. UK, (2003) EHRR I.

  120. 120.

    Case C-301/04 P SGL Carbon v. Commission [2006] ECR I-5915, para 63. It should be noted that in its judgment the ECJ did not feel the need to contest this argumentation.

  121. 121.

    See Case C-450/06 Varec [2008] ECR I-581, para. 48. In particular, the Court was called upon to balance the audi et alteram partem principle with the duty to respect confidentiality of the undertakings involved in a contract award procedure.

  122. 122.

    Case C-145/04 Spain v UK [2006] ECR I- 7917, para 60.

  123. 123.

    Case C-474/04 Pergan Hifsstoffe [2007] ECR I-4225, paras 75 ff.

  124. 124.

    See Art. 48 CFR.

  125. 125.

    N. 7 above.

  126. 126.

    Joined cases C-402 and 415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, n. 80 above, para 316.

  127. 127.

    Joined cases C-399/06 P and C-403/06 P Hassan and Ayadi, still pending.

  128. 128.

    Although it cannot be excluded that future amendments to the UN listing procedure might lead the ECJ to change its stance.

  129. 129.

    Appl. Nos 71412/01 and 78166/01, Behrami and Saramati v. France, (2007) unreported, paras 121 ff. It will be remembered that in this instance the ECtHR declined its jurisdiction in relation to a pair of cases concerning military personnel from France, Germany and Norway finding that the actions in question were directly attributable to the UN. Most notably, the Grand Chamber held that to decide otherwise would jeopardise the fulfilment of the UN’s main mission, that of securing peace and security (para 149).

  130. 130.

    Art. 6 (1) TEU.

  131. 131.

    L. S. Rossi, ‘Le rapport entre Charte des droits fondamentaux et Traité de Lisbonne, online at http://www.europeanrights.eu; L. Daniele, ‘Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea e Trattato di Lisbona, (2008) 13 Il Diritto dell’Unione europea 655 at 664. For a more flexible interpretation of Art. 6 (1) cf. R. Baratta, ‘Le principali innovazioni del Trattato di Lisbona’, (2008) 13 Il Diritto dell’Unione Europea 21 at 38.

  132. 132.

    See J. Ziller, Il nuovo Trattato europeo (Il Mulino, 2007) 53 and L. Daniele, n. 131 above, 664.

  133. 133.

    L. S. Rossi, ‘Le rapport entre Charte des droits fondamentaux et Traité de Lisbonne, n. 131 above and I. Pernice, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon and Fundamental Rights’, in S. Griller, J. Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty. EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? (Sprinter, 2008) 235 at 252.

  134. 134.

    Art. 6 (1) 3rd indent TEU.

  135. 135.

    R. Baratta, n. 131 above, at 39.

  136. 136.

    L. S. Rossi, ‘Le rapport entre Charte des droits fondamentaux et Traité de Lisbonne, n. 131 above. Although the situation is unprecedented, it should be recalled that when confronted with guidelines or opinions relating to the implementation of certain acts or international agreements the Court has never felt the obligation to comply with the latter. An exemplification of how the EUCJ uses interpretative tools in performing its judicial tasks is offered by Case C-281/02 Owusu [2005] ECR I-1383 (referring to the Jenard Report on the 1968 Brussels Convention).

  137. 137.

    Cf. with the original version of the Charter, [2000] OJ C 364/1.

  138. 138.

    M. Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: winning minds, not hearts’, n. 36 above, at 663; A. Arnull, A. Dashwood, M. Dougan, M. Ross, E. Spaventa and D. Wyatt, Wyatt & Dashwood's European Union Law (Sweet & Mawwell, 2006), at para 9-023; G. Braiband, ‘La Charte des droits fondamentaux’, (2001) 12 Droit Social 69, at 73.

  139. 139.

    J.-P. Jacqué, ‘La Charte des droits fondamentaux…’, n. 31 above, at 76.

  140. 140.

    As to the former expression, see Case C-260/89 ERT, n. 67 above, para 42, and Case C-159/90 Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685, para 31 and, more recently, Case C-246/06 Velasco Navarro [2008] ECR I-105, para 31. As to the use of the latter expressions, see Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW, n. 77 above, para 45, Case C-355/04 P Segi [2007] ECR I-1657, para 51; Case C-354/04 P Gestoras Pro Amnistía [2007] ECR I-1579, para 51. It is suggested that in these instances the words “when they implement Union Law” were the most appropriate given the lack of direct effect in this area of law.

  141. 141.

    I. Pernice, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon and Fundamental Rights’, n. 133 above.

  142. 142.

    Cf. Joint dissenting Opinion of judges Costa, Ress, Turmen, Zupancic and Steiner in Hatton v UK [2003], 37 EHRR 28 where Art. 37 of the Charter was used to support the incorporation of environmental rights in the ECHR. On these aspects, see further in this volume M. Lombardo, ‘Chapter 12’.

  143. 143.

    See Title IV of the CFR on Solidarity (Arts. 27 to 38), encompassing health care, access to services of general economic interest, environmental and consumer protection, just to mention the areas in which, following the adoption of the Charter, there has been a significant development of the European normative framework. It is also interesting to observe that pursuant to the Explanations on Art. 52(5) environmental protection falls within the category of “principles”.

  144. 144.

    On the legal uncertainty resulting from the mentioned distinction, see M. Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007’, n. 138 above, at 663.

  145. 145.

    See Art. 45 (2) CFR, providing that: “Freedom of movement and residence may be granted, in accordance with the Treaties, to nationals of third countries legally resident in the territory of a member State”.

  146. 146.

    See e.g. the wording of Arts. 9, 10 (2), 25, 26, 28, 33, 34, 36 CFR. A direct reference to this provision can be found in Case C-438/05 Viking, n. 83 above, para 44 and in Case C-341/05 Laval, n. 82 above, para 91, where the the rights in question had indeed been excercised on the basis of national provisions. By contrast, Art. 30 (protection in the event of unjustified dismissal) is an example of a directly enforceable (social) right.

  147. 147.

    As noted by Jacqué, “il existe…déjà dans les politiques communautaires des objectifs qui sont juridiquement sanctionnables par la Cour, non pas sous forme de droits subjectifs que l’on peut faire valoir par un recours individuel, mais sous la forme d’obligation d’action auxquelles ne peuvent se soustraire les institutions”. In this sense, the author distinguishes between the objective of ensuring a high level of employment (Art. 2 TEC) and the treaty provisions on environmental and consumer law protection. See J.-P. Jacqué, ‘La Charte des droits fondamentaux…’, n. 31 above, at 74.

  148. 148.

    Art. 52 (1) CFR.

  149. 149.

    See Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention. This might occur, for instance, in the field of antitrust law, where the effectiveness of the Commission’s investigatory powers occasionally prevails over the rights of defence of the undertakings involved in the administrative procedure.

  150. 150.

    Cf., for instance Case C-159/90 Grogan, n. 140 above and Appl. No 14234/88 and 14235/88, Open Door and Dublin Well v. Ireland, (1992) Series A No 246, and, more recently, Ste Colas Est v. France, n. 119 above and C-94/00 Roquette Freres, n. 118 above.

  151. 151.

    See also, Final Report of Working Group II, CONV 352/02.

  152. 152.

    See in particular European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 29–30 October 2009, para 2. It should, however, be noted that the UK government itself has expressly stated that the Protocol “does not constitute an opt out” (See House of Lords, European Union Committee, The Lisbon Treaty: an impact assessment, Tenth Report if Session, 2007–2008, Vol. I, p. 102).

  153. 153.

    Protocol No 30 on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom. As to the reasons for this Protocol, suffice it here to recall that the United Kingdom was mainly concerned with the effect that the social rights protected by the Charter will have on business. The Poles decided to join the British government although it is apparent from Declaration No 61 that they were mainly concerned with those provisions that risked impinging on their family law. (e.g. Art. 9 – Right to marry and right to found a family).

  154. 154.

    Cf. Declarations No 61 and 62. Most notably the Poles were concerned that the Charter would prevent them from rejecting homosexual marriage and force them to modify their legislation on abortion.

  155. 155.

    Declaration No 53 (Czech Republic).

  156. 156.

    Cf. Art. 1 of Protocol No 30.

  157. 157.

    L.S. Rossi, ‘How Fundamental are fundamental principles?’, in G. Ventutini, S. Bariatti (eds), Individual rights and international justice (Liber Fausto Pocar), (Giuffré, 2009) 801 at 815. See also, S. Amadeo, ‘Il Protocollo n. 30 sull’applicazione della Carta a Polonia e Regno Unito e la tutela “asimmetrica” dei diritti fondamentali: molti problemi, qualche soluzione’, (2009) 14 Il Diritto dell’Unione europea 720 at 739.

  158. 158.

    This provisions should be read jointly with Art. 291 TFEU, according to which Member States must “adopt all measures of national law necessary to implement legally binding Union acts”.

  159. 159.

    Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR I-4199. See also Case C-461/03 Gaston Shul [2005] ECR I-10513.

  160. 160.

    See further in this volume L. Ficchi, ‘Chapter 6’.

  161. 161.

    Art. 6 (2) TEU (emphasis added).

  162. 162.

    See in particular paras 6, lett. a, 2nd indent, and 8. Cf. also Art. III-325 of the Constitutional Treaty.

  163. 163.

    Pursuant to Art. 218, para. 10 TFEU, the opinion may be sought by the Members, the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament.

  164. 164.

    See Protocol No 8, relating to Art. 6 (2) of the Treaty on European Union on the accession of the Union to the European Convention on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, Art. 3.

  165. 165.

    Art. 4 TFEU.

  166. 166.

    Protocol No 8, n. 164 above, Art. 2.

  167. 167.

    See Art. 17 of Protocol No 14. This choice followed the decision, on the part of the EU, to include a legal basis for accession in the Constitutional Treaty.

  168. 168.

    This second option would require signature and ratification by all the States parties to the Convention, and accession to the amended Convention by the EU. See Steering Committee for human rights, Working group on the legal and technical issues of possible EC/EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, 17 June 2002, CDDH(2002). Alternatively, a tacit acceptance clause could be envisaged whereby after a fixed period of time and in the absence of objections, the Protocol would automatically enter into force. A tacit acceptance clause has been introduced, for instance, into the Protocol amending the European Convention on Transfrontier Television providing for its automatic entry into force after a 2 year period, in the absence of any objection (Art. 35).

  169. 169.

    See, respectively, CONV 354/02, 14 and Explanatory Report to Protocol No 14 (CETS No 194), para. 101. Nonetheless, in order to allow the future negotiators ample choice of action, Art. 17 of Protocol No 14 avoids any reference to an accession treaty.

  170. 170.

    See further, P. Manin, ‘L’Adhésion de l’Union Européenne à la Convention de sauveguarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales’, in L.S. Rossi (ed.), Vers une nouvelle architecture de l’Union européenne (Bruylant, 2004) 265. Certain supplementary provisions will need to be adopted defining the position of the EU with respect to the various additional protocols, setting out possible transitional periods and clarifying the budgetary contribution of the new member (Steering Committee for human rights, Working group on the legal and technical issues of possible EC/EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, 5 March 2002, GT-DH-EU(2002)009, accessible at http://www.coe.int.) and A. Gianelli, ‘L’adesione dell’Unione europea alla CEDU secondo il trattato di Lisbona’, (2009) Dir. Un. Eur. 678.

  171. 171.

    Those ECHR provisions referring to ‘State’ or ‘States’ ‘nation’ and ‘country’ will need to be amended. See further Steering Committee for human rights, Working group on the legal and technical issues of possible EC/EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, 16 January 2002, GT-DH-EU(2002)006, accessible at http://www.coe.int; and E. Myjer, ‘Can the EU Join the ECHR – General conditions and practical arrangements’, accessible at http://www.ecln.net/elements/conferences/book_berlin/myjer.pdf.

  172. 172.

    See Steering Committee for human rights, 16 January 2002, n. 171 above, and Steering Committee for human rights, 5 March 2002, n. 170 above and Reflection Paper prepared by the Secretariat, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, 8 February 2001, DG-II(2001)002, accessible at http://www.coe.int.

  173. 173.

    Based on the current formulation of Art. 22 ECHR, the appointment of a full time judge appears to be the most consistent with the spirit of the ECHR. Under the first scenario – which could be implemented without modifying the Convention – for each new case involving the EU, the latter would indicate “a person of its choice who shall sit in the capacity of a judge” (Art. 27 (2) ECHR).

  174. 174.

    See CONV 295/02, 6.

  175. 175.

    It has been suggested that non-EU Member States could oppose this circumstance by virtue of an EU overrepresentation. Nonetheless, “à Strasbourg les juges siège à titre individuel (Art. 21, 2) et ne représentent pas la Partie contractante. La présence d’un juge siégeant au titre de l’Union à côté de juges siégeant au titre des Etats membres est donc tout à fait normale” (P. Manin, ‘L’Adhésion de l’Union Européenne à la Convention de sauveguarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales’, n. 170 above, 259).

  176. 176.

    Protocol No 8, n. 164 above, Art. 1, lett. b.

  177. 177.

    This is particularly true for the requirement of the prior exhaustion of internal remedies prescribed by Art. 35 ECHR.

  178. 178.

    In order to be invoked by the European Union, this provision need not be amended by changing the expression “national” into “citizen” as the former term already covers the “citizens of the Union” pursuant to Art. 9 TEU. Although the EU Member States would continue to enjoy the right to intervene on behalf of their nationals, and in that instance ask for the involvement of the EU under Art. 36 (2) ECHR, it would be preferable to add a third paragraph to the provision clarifying that the EU may intervene whenever issues of EU law are at stake.

  179. 179.

    Depending on the solution adopted, this could entail the need to nominate an ad hoc judge, to request that the case be referred to a special Chamber, or to demand the presence of the EU judge. With specific reference to the special Chamber option, it has been suggested that: “a system could be envisaged whereby it would be for a panel of judges – like the one provided for under Art. 43 § 2 of the Convention – to decide, at the request of the parties and/or States concerned or of its own motion, whether in view of its serious implications for Community Law a case against a EU Member State is to be referred to the special Chamber” (Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, 8 February 2001, n. 171 above). It should also be noted that in all the above mentioned scenarios referral to the Grand Chamber would always be allowed in accordance with Art. 43 (1) and (3) ECHR.

  180. 180.

    See further, Study carried out within the Council of Europe of technical and legal issues of a possible EC/EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, submitted to the European Convention, Working group II ‘Incorporation of the Charter / accession to the ECHR’, by A. Vitorino, WD 8, 19.

  181. 181.

    See further, Steering Committee for human rights, 16 January 2002, n. 171 above and European Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the implications of a legally binding EU Charter on Fundamental Rights on Human Rights protection in Europe, accessible at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2003/CDL-AD%282003%29022-e.pdf.

  182. 182.

    Although the case may never reach the ECJ by reason of an improper reliance on the acte clair doctrine (see Case 77/83 Cilfit [1984] ECR 1257).

  183. 183.

    Art. 46 ECHR.

  184. 184.

    Art. 14 of the Statute of the Council of Europe.

  185. 185.

    It remains to be seen whether Art. 14 of the Statute of the Council of Europe should also undergo amendment. In this respect it could be argued that the new version of Art. 46 (2) ECHR could be considered a (subsequent) lex specialis according to Art. 30 (3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Perhaps, as suggested by the Secretariat of the Council of Europe, a statutory resolution authorizing and defining the EU’s participation would be enough to avoid a lengthy and hefty procedure whilst preserving legal certainty and guaranteeing the overall coherence of the new system.

  186. 186.

    Protocol No 8, n. 164 above, Art. 1, lett. a.

  187. 187.

    The relations between the Council of Europe and the Community currently rest on an informal arrangement. See Exchange of letters between the Secretary General of the Council of Europe and the President of the Commission of the European Communities on 5 November 1996 supplementing the “Arrangement” between the Council of Europe and the European Community concluded on 16 June 1987, accessible at https://wcd.coe.int/ and Exchange of letters agreed upon at the 575th meeting of the Minister’s Deputies (14–17 October 1997). In this regard, see further Report by Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime minister of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 11 April 2006, Council of Europe – European Union: “A sole ambition for the European continent”, 25, accessible at http://https://wcd.coe.int/.

  188. 188.

    See Reflection Paper prepared by the Secretariat, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, 8 February 2001, n. 172 above.

  189. 189.

    In particular the EUCJ must preserve its monopoly in ensuring the uniform interpretation of EU law. Cf. Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079.

  190. 190.

    CONV 354/02, accessible at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00354en2.pdf. In this regard it should also be recalled that the ECtHR considers itself incompetent to rule on the validity of national laws, interpret international treaties which are binding for the Member States and “even less to settle a dispute between the parties to the treaty as to its correct interpretation” (Appl. No 20689/08, W. v The Netherlands, (2009) unreported).

  191. 191.

    Ibid.

  192. 192.

    The situation, however, could be different if the accession agreement foresaw the possibility for the EUCJ to suspend proceedings pending before it and submit a preliminary reference to the ECtHR.

  193. 193.

    C. Kruger, ‘Reflections concerning accession of the European Communities to the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2002–2003) 21 Penn. Int’l Law Rev., at 97.

  194. 194.

    As previously indicated the Bosphorus precedent has been recently confirmed in Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie v. The Netherlands, n. 105 above.

  195. 195.

    O. De Schutter, ‘Written contribution for the hearing in Paris on 11 September 2007’, in Committee on Legal Affairs and human rights, Accession of the European Union/European Community to the European Convention on Human Rights, accessible at http://assembly.coe.int

  196. 196.

    See Heinz v. the Contracting Parties also parties to the European Patent Convention [1994], 76-A Decisions and Reports 125; Appl. No 26083/94, Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, (1999), Reports 1999-I, para 72, and Appl. No 28934/95, Beer and Regan v. Germany, (1999) unreported, para 62.

  197. 197.

    On the one side, the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice; on the other, the Council of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly and the Strasbourg Court.

  198. 198.

    The 27 EU countries on the one hand; the 47 Member States of the Council of Europe on the other.

  199. 199.

    The early start of the accession process has frequently been advocated following the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty. See, for instance, 21st Quadripartite meeting Council of Europe / European Union, CM/Inf(2005)19, 17 March 2005, accessible at https://wcd.coe.int/. Moreover, the 46 Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe’s Member States reiterated this resolution during their meeting in Warsaw in May 2005.

  200. 200.

    See Case C-50/00P UPA [2002] ECR I-6677; Case C-263/02 Jégo Quéré [2004] ECR I-3425 where the ECJ made no reference to the latest and relevant case law on Art. 6 ECHR, Appl. No 27824/95, Posti & Rahko v. Finland, (2002) Reports 2002-VII.

  201. 201.

    See G. Cohen-Jonathan, J.-F. Flauss, La réforme du système de contrôle contentieux de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme (Bruylant, 2005); S. Greer, ‘Protocol 14 and the Future of th European Court of Human Rights’, (2005) Public Law 83; B. Nascimbene, ‘Le Protocole n. 14 à la Convention Européenne des droits de l’homme à la lumière de ses travaux préparatoires’, (2006) 67 Revue Trimestrielle de droits de l'homme 531.

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Di Federico, G. (2011). Fundamental Rights in the EU: Legal Pluralism and Multi-Level Protection After the Lisbon Treaty. In: Giacomo, D. (eds) The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0156-4_2

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