Advertisement

Scientific Reasonableness and the Pragmatic Approach to the Unity of Science

  • Andrés RivadullaEmail author
Chapter
  • 575 Downloads
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 18)

Abstract

The question of the unity of science is one of the most important issues that has concerned the modern philosophy of science from the beginning. The idea of Unified Science was so important for the Viennese neo-positivists that, from 1933 until its dissolution in 1938, the Vienna Circle edited a collection called Einheitswissenschaft with publications of several of the most significant members of the neo-positivist stream.

Keywords

Natural Science Newtonian Mechanic Vienna Circle Deterministic Theory Epistemic Goal 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Ampère, A.-M. (1834). Essai sur la Philosophie des Sciences, ou exposition analytique d’une classification naturelle de toutes les connaissances humaines, Paris: Bachelier.Google Scholar
  2. Carnap, R. (1928). Der logische Aufbau der Welt, Berlin: Weltkreisverlag, Third unmodified edition, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1966.Google Scholar
  3. Carnap, R. (1931). Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft, Erkenntnis 2, 432–465.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Carnap, R. (1932). Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache, Erkenntnis 3, 107–142.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Carnap, R. (1934). Logische Syntax der Sprache, Wien: Springer, Second, unmodified edition, 1968.Google Scholar
  6. Carnap, R. (1938). Logical foundations of the unity of science, International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science 1(1), 42–62.Google Scholar
  7. Carnap, R. (1963). The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. In Schilpp, A. (ed), La Salle, IL: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  8. Comte, A. (1825). Considérations philosophiques sur les sciences et les savants, 1825. Reprinted in Auguste Comte, Système de politique positive, tome IV, Paris 1854, 137–176.Google Scholar
  9. Fleck, L. (1935). Über die wissenschaftliche Beobachtung und die Wahrnehmung im allgemeinen. In Fleck, L. (ed), Erfahrung und Tatsache. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983.Google Scholar
  10. Joergensen, J. (1951). The development of logical empiricism, International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science 2(9), 1–91.Google Scholar
  11. Kitcher, P. (1993). The Advancement of Science. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Lottin, J. (1912). Quetelet. Statisticien et Sociologue. New York, NY: Burt Franklin, Reprinted 1969.Google Scholar
  13. Neurath, O. (1931). Soziologie im Physikalismus, Erkenntnis 2, 393–431.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Neurath, O. (1935a). Einheit der Wissenschaft als Aufgabe, Erkenntnis 5, 16–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Neurath, O. (1935b). Le développement du Cercle de Vienne et l’avenir de l’empirisme logique. Actualités scientifiques et industrielles. Paris: Hermann.Google Scholar
  16. Neurath, O. (1938). Unified science as encyclopedic integration, International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science 1(1), 1–27.Google Scholar
  17. Popper, K. R. (1982a). The Open Universe. An Argument for Indeterminism. London: Hutchinson.Google Scholar
  18. Popper, K. R. (1983). Realism and the Aim of Science. London: Hutchinson.Google Scholar
  19. Rahman, S., Symons, J. (2004). Logic, epistemology and the unity of science: An encyclopedic project in the spirit of Neurath and Diderot. In Rahman, S. et al. (ed), Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Rivadulla, A. (1991). Apriorismo y base empírica en los orígenes de la estadística matemática, Llull 14, 187–219.Google Scholar
  21. Rivadulla, A. (1995). Historia y epistemología de los cambios de significado de probabilidad, Á gora – Papeles de filosofía- 14(1), 53–75.Google Scholar
  22. Rivadulla, A. (2004a). The newtonian limit of relativity theory and the rationality of theory change, Synthese 141, 417–429.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Rivadulla, A. (2004b), Éxito, Razón y Cambio en Física. Un enfoque instrumental en teoría de la ciencia, Ed. Trotta, MadridGoogle Scholar
  24. Rivadulla, A. (2008). Discovery practices in natural sciences: From analogy to preduction, Revista de Filosofía 33(1), 117–137.Google Scholar
  25. Rivadulla, A. (2009). Anticipative preduction, sophisticated abduction and theoretical explanations in the methodology of physics. In González Recio, J. L. (ed), Philosophical Essays on Physics and Biology. Hildesheim, New York, NY: Georg Olms Verlag.Google Scholar
  26. Rorty, R. (1980). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Second printing with corrections.Google Scholar
  27. Rorty, R. (1991). Objectivity, Relativism and Truth. Philosophical Papers, vol I, Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  28. Spencer, H. (1876). The Principles of Sociology, vol I, London an Edinburgh: William and Norgate.Google Scholar
  29. Thagard, P. (2004). Rationality and science. In Mele, A., Rawlings, P. (eds), Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: University Press.Google Scholar
  30. Von Wright, G. H. (1971). Explanation and Understanding. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departamento de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Facultad de FilosofíaUniversidad ComplutenseMadridSpain

Personalised recommendations