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A Comprehensible World

  • Robert L. CauseyEmail author
Chapter
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Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 18)

Abstract

The world is everything there was, is, and will be. The world has particular things, kinds, attributes, states, events, processes, functions, and other stuff I do not now imagine. In order to comprehend phenomena, we need to know what facts are true and why they are true. We need knowledge and understanding.

Keywords

Dynamic Theory Causal Explanation Planetary System Defeasible Reasoning Compound Element 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgment

As always, I thank my wife, Sandy, for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of TexasAustinUSA

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