Abstract
In the general framework which takes conditional probability functions as a primitive notion, we prove two triviality results about the possibility of defining the probability Pr(A > B,Γ) of a counterfactual as the probability of the consequent B after some revision of the probability function that puts the probability of the antecedent A to 1. The paper is divided in three parts. In the first part, we present the context in which this research takes place and provide the formal tools we will use in the two other parts. In the second part, we present our first triviality result: Any probability revision process that satisfies the identity \(\textrm{Pr}(A>B, \Gamma) = \textrm{Pr}^{A}(B,\Gamma)\) for all Pr, A, B and Γ (where \(\textrm{Pr}^{A})\) is any revision of the probability distribution Pr which sets \(\textrm{Pr}^{A}(A, \Gamma) = 1)\) is trivial in a sense that will be specified. Finally, in the third part, we prove another triviality result: Any probability revision process that satisfies the identity \(\textrm{Pr}(A>B, \Gamma) = \textrm{Pr}^{A}(B,\Gamma_{A}^{\ast})\) for all Pr, A, B and Γ (where \(\Gamma_{A}^{\ast}\) is a revision of the background Γ in the light of A) is also trivial.
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Acknowledgment
The authors would like to thank the anonymous referee for very helpful comments and suggestions.
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Appendix
Appendix
Lemma 9.1
If Γ is Pr-normal, then \(\mathrm{Pr} (A \wedge \neg A,\Gamma ) = 0\).
Proof
Suppose Γ is Pr-normal. From NP.3 and NP.8 we have:
Applying NP.5 to the right we have:
Simple arithmetic gives the desired result.
Lemma 9.2
If Γ is Pr-normal but \(\Gamma \cup {\{}A{\}}\) is Pr-abnormal, then \(\mathrm{Pr} (A,\Gamma ) = 0\).
Proof
Suppose Γ is Pr-normal but \(\Gamma \cup \{A\}\) is Pr-abnormal. From Lemma 9.1 and NP.4, we have:
Since \(\Gamma \cup \{A\}\) is Pr-abnormal, \(\mathrm{Pr} (\neg A,\Gamma \cup \{A\}) = 1\) and thus \(\mathrm{Pr} (A,\Gamma ) = 0\).
Lemma 9.3
\(\mathrm{Pr} (A \supset B,\Gamma ) = 1 - \mathrm{Pr} (A,\Gamma ) + \mathrm{Pr} (A \wedge B,\Gamma )\).
Proof
If Γ is Pr-abnormal, the result is immediate, so suppose that Γ is Pr-normal. By the definition of ⊃ and applying NP.3, we have:
Applying NP.6 and NP.4 yields:
Since Γ is Pr-normal, we can apply NP.5 to obtain:
On one hand, suppose that \(\Gamma \cup \{B\}\) is Pr-abnormal. Then applying Lemma 9.2 to (9.1) yields:
But Lemma 9.2 and NP.6 and NP.4 ensure that \(\mathrm{Pr} (A \wedge B,\Gamma ) = 0\). So we have:
On the other hand, suppose that \(\Gamma \cup \{B\}\) is Pr-normal. Then applying NP.5 to (9.1) gives:
So, in either case, the result follows.
Lemma 9.4
\(\mathrm{If \ Pr} (A \supset B,\Gamma ) = 1\), then \(\mathrm{Pr} (A,\Gamma ) \le \mathrm{Pr} (B,\Gamma )\).
Proof
Suppose \(\mathrm{Pr} (A \supset B,\Gamma ) = 1\). Then from Lemma 9.3 we have:
So by elementary arithmetic we have:
But by NP.1 and NP.4 and NP.6, we know:
Hence the desired result follows.
Lemma 9.5
If \(\mathrm{Pr} (A,\Delta ) \le \mathrm{Pr} (B,\Delta )\) for all Δ, then \(\mathrm{Pr} (A \supset B,\Gamma ) = 1\) for all Γ.
Proof
Suppose \(\mathrm{Pr} (A,\Delta ) \le \mathrm{Pr} (B,\Delta )\) for all Δ. Let Γ be arbitrary. Then by NP.1 and NP.2 we have:
But by Lemma 9.3 and NP.4 we have:
The desired result follows immediately from these two equations.
Lemma 9.6
Disjunction is the least upper bound, in the following sense:
-
(A)
\(\mathrm{Pr} (A,\Gamma ) \le \mathrm{Pr} (A \vee B,\Gamma )\) for all Γ.
-
(B)
\(\mathrm{Pr} (B,\Gamma ) \le \mathrm{Pr} (A \vee B,\Gamma )\) for all Γ.
-
(C)
Let C be any sentence such that:
-
(i)
\(\mathrm{Pr} (A,\Delta ) \le \mathrm{Pr} (C,\Delta )\) for all Δ, and
-
(ii)
\(\mathrm{Pr} (B,\Delta ) \le \mathrm{Pr} (C,\Delta )\) for all Δ.
-
(i)
Then for all Γ, \(\mathrm{Pr} (A \vee B,\Delta ) \le \mathrm{Pr} (C,\Delta )\).
Proof
For the (B) part, by NP.1 we know the maximum value for \(\mathrm{Pr} (B,\Gamma \cup \{A\})\) is 1, so by NP.3 and NP.4 we have:
and the right hand side just reduces to \(\mathrm{Pr} (B,\Gamma )\), as desired. Part (A) follows in a similar fashion by first applying NP.6 to the conjunction. For the (C) part of the Lemma, suppose both of the following hold:
Taking Δ to be of the form \(\Gamma \cup {\{}A{\}}\) for arbitrary Γ, and using NP.1 and NP.2, we then obtain the following:
Next we multiply \(\mathrm{Pr} (A \vee B,\Gamma \cup \{C\})\) by \(\mathrm{Pr} (C,\Gamma )\) and apply NP.3 and NP.4:
Then applying NP.4 and NP.6 to the right hand side of (9.7), we obtain:
But then using (9.5) and (9.6) on the right of (9.8) we have:
Hence from (9.9), NP.1 and NP.3 we have:
Finally the desired result follows by applying NP.3 and NP.4 to the left hand side of (9.10)
Lemma 9.7
If \(\mathrm{Pr} (A,\Gamma ) = 1\), then \(\mathrm{Pr} (A \wedge B,\Gamma ) = \mathrm{Pr} (B,\Gamma )\).
Lemma 9.8
Suppose \(\mathrm{Pr} (A,\Gamma ) = 1\). Then by Thm 1.8, \(\mathrm{Pr} (A \vee B,\Gamma ) = 1\). So, by NP.3, we have:
Hence it follows that:
The desired result then follows by elementary arithmetic.
Lemma 9.8
If \(\mathrm{Pr} (A,\Gamma ) = 1\), then \(\mathrm{Pr} (B,\Gamma ) = \mathrm{Pr} (B,\Gamma \cup \{A\})\)
Proof
Suppose \(\mathrm{Pr} (A,\Gamma ) = 1\). From NP.4, we have:
The desired result then follows immediately by Lemma 9.7.
Lemma 9.9
\(\mathrm{Pr} (A > B,\Gamma ) \le \mathrm{Pr} (A \supset B,\Gamma )\), for all Γ.
Proof
By (3). and soundness, we have:
The desired result then follows by Lemma 9.4.
Lemma 9.10
\(\mathrm{Pr} (B,\Gamma ) \le \mathrm{Pr} (A > B,\Gamma )\), for all Γ.
Proof
This result follows immediately from Lemma 9.4, Lemma 9.9, and Proposition 9.1.
Lemma 9.11
\(\Gamma \cup \{\neg A\} \ \mathrm{is \ Pr} ^A\)-abnormal.
Proof
By elementary arithmetic, we have:
For proof by contradiction, suppose \(\Gamma \cup \{\neg A\}\) is \(\mathrm{Pr} _A \)-normal. Then applying NP.5 to the right hand side, we obtain:
Applying NP.2 to the right hand side yields:
But we know by (1)
Thus the supposition is in error, and it must be the case that \(\Gamma \cup \{\neg A\}\) is PrA-abnormal.
Lemma 9.12
\(\mathrm{Pr} (\neg A > (A > B),\Gamma ) = 1\), for all Γ.
Proof
Applying (2), we have:
But then applying Lemma 9.8 and (1) on the right hand side gives:
Another application of (2) to the right hand side gives:
But then by Lemma 9.11, the right hand side must be 1.
Lemma 9.13
\(\mathrm{Pr} (\neg A,\Gamma ) \le \mathrm{Pr} (A > B,\Gamma )\), for all Γ.
Proof
This result follows immediately from Lemma 9.4, Lemma 9.9, and Lemma 9.12
Lemma 9.14
\(\mathrm{Pr} (\neg A \vee B,\Gamma ) \le \mathrm{Pr} (A > B,\Gamma )\), for all Γ.
Proof
The desired result is an immediate result of the part (C) of Lemma 9.6, along with Lemma 9.10 and Lemma 9.13.
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Lepage, F., Morgan, C. (2011). Revision with Conditional Probability Functions: Two Impossibility Results. In: Girard, P., Roy, O., Marion, M. (eds) Dynamic Formal Epistemology. Synthese Library, vol 351. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0074-1_9
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