But not everyone agrees that there are such links to be found between Aristotle’s metaphysics and his logic. Anscombe, plainly does not. She tells us that ‘Aristotle’s doctrine of substance is integral to most of his philosophical work, not, however, to his strictly formal logic – a discipline which he inaugurated.’ (Anscombe 1961, p. vi) Whether or not Anscombe is correct it certainly seems clear that Aristotle thought that there could be no scientific syllogizing about what could be otherwise.
KeywordsModal Conversion Essential Nature Subject Term Necessity Qualifier Aristotelian Philosophy
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