Abstract
As the previous chapter indicates I am going to rely on modern lower predicate calculus (LPC) to represent Aristotle’s syllogistic and proof methods. This way of representing Aristotle is often regarded with suspicion. It should not be, and I want to take this chapter to explain why it should not. Developing a modern LPC representation of Aristotle’s logic is straightforward, and so the reasons that are usually offered against this approach need to be carefully examined.
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Bibliography
Patzig, G. 1968, Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism. (Translated by J. Barnes). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
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Rini, A. (2010). The Assertoric Syllogistic in LPC. In: Aristotle's Modal Proofs. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 68. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0050-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0050-5_2
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