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American Needle Inc v NFL 130 S Ct 2201 (2010)

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Leading Cases in Sports Law

Part of the book series: ASSER International Sports Law Series ((ASSER))

Abstract

The National Football League (“NFL”) is an unincorporated association of 32 separately owned professional football teams. The teams each own their name, colours, logos, trademarks and associated intellectual property. The teams formed National Football League Properties (NFLP) to exploit this intellectual property. Initially, NFLP granted non-exclusive licences to various sports manufactures (including American Needle) to manufacture and sell NFL team labelled sportswear. In December 2000, the teams authorised NFLP to grant exclusive licences, one of which was granted to Reebok International Ltd to produce and sell trademarked head wear for all 32 teams. American Needle Inc, whose licence had not been renewed at the material time, challenged the NFLP’s use of an exclusive licence as contrary to section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890 which makes “every contract, combination…or, conspiracy, in restraint of trade” illegal. The respondents argued that the nature of section 1 of the Sherman Act is that it requires two or more parties to participate in the stated manner and thus, given that the NFLP was a “single entity” a claim of anti-competitive activity could not be brought, save under section 2 of the Sherman Act (which addressed monopolisation or conspiracy to monopolise). American Needle Inc countered that the NFLP was not in form a “single entity”—noting that the courts have long been alert to sports leagues’ efforts to label various collective commercial arrangements as single entity; but rather it was in substance an arrangement that sought to veil ongoing concerted actions by separate and multiple parties with different corporate and economic interests. Guided by its decision in Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube Corp 467 US 752 (1984), the US Supreme Court held against the single entity argument and remitted the matter to the lower courts to determine whether a section 1 violation had occurred. Importantly, the US Supreme Court also acknowledged, as guided by NCAA v Board of Regents 468 US 85 (1984, that in order to have and maintain a sports league many forms of coordination and cooperation between and among competitors would have to take place. Whether such “coordination” might necessarily entail a violation of the Sherman Act would have to be assessed in light of the Rule of Reason i.e., only contracts or combinations that unreasonably restrain trade should be subject to antitrust law.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    15 USC § 1.

  2. 2.

    There is a rich body of scholarly commentary debating the merits of the single-entity defence. See, for example, Feldman 2009; Goldman 1989; Grauer 1983; Jacobs 1991; Lazaroff 1988; McCann 2010; Piraino 1999; Roberts 1984; Waxman 2001.

  3. 3.

    American Needle Inc v NFL 130 S Ct 2201 (2010).

  4. 4.

    With the exception of professional baseball, the business activities of other U.S. professional sports leagues generally are subject to the federal antitrust laws. For a detailed discussion of the origins and scope of professional baseball’s common law antitrust exemption, see Chap. 2 of this volume.

  5. 5.

    American Needle Inc v NFL 130 S Ct 2201, 2216 (2010).

  6. 6.

    In the US there is no government body that directly regulates professional sports. Unlike the prevailing hierarchical model of sports governance prevalent in Europe, there is no national federation that exercises plenary governing authority over all levels of professional and amateur competition for each sport within the US.

  7. 7.

    Harry 2002, C1.

  8. 8.

    Currently, the NFL has 32 member clubs; the NBA, NHL and MLB each have 30 clubs.

  9. 9.

    This has been particularly important for the financial stability of Canadian MLB, NBA and NHL clubs that earn local revenues in Canadian dollars while paying player salaries in relatively more valuable US dollars, based on historical exchange rates for these currencies.

  10. 10.

    See Hoffman 1997, 262.

  11. 11.

    Mid-South Grizzlies v NFL 720 F 2d 772 (3d Cir 1983) (“In this case there is no dispute about the requisite concert of action among the defendants.”).

  12. 12.

    Boston Professional Hockey Association Inc v Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing Inc 360 F Supp 459 (ND Tex 1973). The defendant did not appeal the district court’s ruling on its antitrust defence, so this issue was not considered by the Fifth Circuit in 510 F 2d 1014.

  13. 13.

    San Francisco Seals Ltd v National Hockey League 379 F Supp 966 (CD Cal 1974).

  14. 14.

    North American Soccer League v National Football League 670 F 2d 1249 (2d Cir 1981), cert denied, 459 US 1074 (1982).

  15. 15.

    North American Soccer League v National Football League 459 US 1074, 1077 (1982).

  16. 16.

    Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v NFL 726 F 2d 1381 (9th Cir), cert denied, 469 US 990 (1984).

  17. 17.

    Even if courts accepted the single entity defence, US professional sports leagues (with the exception of professional baseball) would be subject to section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolisation, attempted monopolisation, and conspiracies to monopolise interstate trade or commerce.

  18. 18.

    Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube Corp 467 US 752 (1984).

  19. 19.

    In Brown v Pro Football Inc 518 US 231 (1996), the Supreme Court observed “that the clubs that make up a professional sports league are not completely independent economic competitors, as they depend upon a degree of cooperation for economic survival.” But its resolution of the dispositive issue in Brown, the scope of the non-statutory labour exemption’s bar to the use of antitrust law to resolve labour disputes, did not require the Court to determine how Copperweld applied to a professional sports league’s internal governance. Thus, Brown, one of the Supreme Court’s few cases considering the application of antitrust law to professional sports, did not provide any definitive guidance to lower courts regarding the applicability of the single entity defence.

  20. 20.

    Sullivan v NFL 34 F 3d 1091 (1st Cir 1994).

  21. 21.

    Fraser v Major League Soccer LLC 284 F 3d 47, 56 (1st Cir 2002), cert denied, 537 US 885 (2002).

  22. 22.

    Courts have ruled that agreements among league clubs to reduce competition for player services (for example, restrictions on the ability of a player whose contract with his current club has expired to agree to play for other league clubs) are subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Chicago Professional Sports Ltd Partnership v. NBA, 95 F 3d 593, 599 (7th Cir 1996) (‘‘[From the perspective of college basketball players who seek to sell their skills, the teams are distinct, and because the human capital of players is not readily transferable to other sports (as even Michael Jordan learned) the league looks more like a group of firms acting as a monopoly’’). See also McNeil v. NFL 790 F Supp 871 (D Minn 1992) where there is a recognition that some player restraints may be necessary to ensure on-field competitive balance among league clubs and to produce close, exciting games attractive to consumers, courts have held that the need for intraleague competitive balance is a relevant factor in assessing the reasonableness of particular player restraint rather than a justification for providing blanket immunity from section 1.

  23. 23.

    Fraser v Major League Soccer LLC 284 F 3d 47, 57 (1st Cir 2002).

  24. 24.

    Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. NBA 95 F 3d 593 (7th Cir 1996).

  25. 25.

    Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. NBA 95 F 3d 593, 599 (7th Cir 1996).

  26. 26.

    Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. NBA 95 F 3d 593, 606 (7th Cir 1996).

  27. 27.

    American Needle Inc v New Orleans Louisiana Saints 496 F Supp 2d 941, 943 (ND Ill 2007).

  28. 28.

    American Needle Inc v NFL 538 F3d 736, 744 (7th Cir 2008). Contrary to the Seventh Circuit, other federal courts appeared unwilling to accept the single entity defence in antitrust litigation challenging centralised league licensing or sale of its clubs’ intellectual property rights. See for instance: Madison Square Garden LP v NHL US Dist LEXIS 80475, 38–42 (SDNY 2008) (observing, at 40, that most courts have concluded that a professional sports league is not a separate economic entity, but declining “to resolve the question at this juncture” because “arguments advanced by the NHL in favor of single entity status require examining facts outside the pleadings.”); Pecover v. Electronic Arts Inc 633 F Supp 976, 982 (ND Cal 2009) (even if the single entity defence is “persuasive in the context of [the] NFL's role as a competitor in the entertainment business” because “[an] individual team can offer no entertainment value without the other teams in the league,” it is “somewhat less persuasive (to the undersigned, at least) when it comes to licensing NFL team logos on headwear (after all, individual teams could make their own license agreements).”; Shaw v Dallas Cowboys Football Club Ltd 1998 US Dist LEXIS 9896, 1–2 (ED Pa 1998), aff’d on other grounds, 172 F 3d 299 (3d Cir 1999) (allegation that NFL Sunday Ticket satellite television package of all weekly games broadcast nationwide constitutes an agreement among the NFL’s member clubs sufficiently alleges concerted action under section 1 of the Sherman Act).

  29. 29.

    American Needle Inc v NFL 130 S Ct 2201, 2212 (2010).

  30. 30.

    American Needle Inc v NFL 130 S Ct 2201, 2212 (2010).

  31. 31.

    NFLP is a separate corporation that is independently managed and most of its revenues are distributed to NFL clubs on a pro rata basis.

  32. 32.

    American Needle Inc v NFL 130 S Ct 2201, 2213 (2010).

  33. 33.

    American Needle Inc v NFL 130 S Ct 2201, 2213 (2010).

  34. 34.

    American Needle Inc v NFL 130 S Ct 2201, 2214 (2010).

  35. 35.

    American Needle Inc v NFL 130 S Ct 2201, 2207 (2010).

  36. 36.

    American Needle Inc v NFL 130 S Ct 2201, 2217 (2010).

  37. 37.

    American Needle Inc v NFL 130 S Ct 2201, 2217 (2010).

  38. 38.

    American Needle Inc v NFL 130 S Ct 2201, 2216 (2010).

  39. 39.

    See, by analogy, Texaco Inc v Dagher 547 US 1 (2006).

  40. 40.

    Fraser v Major League SoccerLLC 284 F 3d 47, 56 (1st Cir 2002): (“…if ordinary investors decided to set up a company that would own and manage all of the teams in a league, it is hard to see why this arrangement would fall outside Copperweld’s safe harbor.’’). See also Werden 2011, 403: (“A professional sports league entirely owned and operated by a single person undoubtedly would be treated as a single economic entity, even though the teams compete on the field of play, and even though the teams have separate identities and fan loyalties.”).

  41. 41.

    See generally Szymanski and Ross 2008, 70–107. However, American Needle suggests that affiliated companies such as NASCAR, which sanctions stock car races, and International Speedway Corporation, a partially owned affiliate that owns race tracks, may be capable of conspiring for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act, which was an issue raised but not judicially resolved in Ky Speedway LLC v. NASCAR 588 F 3d 908 (6th Cir 2009) because of the Sixth Circuit’s ruling that section 1 was not violated because the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendants had reduced competition in the relevant market.

  42. 42.

    Deutscher Tennis Bund v ATP Tour Inc 610 F 3d 820, 835–837 (3d Cir 2010).

  43. 43.

    Minnesota Made Hockey Inc v Minnesota Hockey Inc 789 F. Supp 2d 1133 (D Minn 2011).

  44. 44.

    Washington v. National Football League Civil No. 11-3354 (PAM/AJB) (D Minn, 13 June 2012) (unpublished opinion).

  45. 45.

    Grow 2011, 497.

  46. 46.

    Werden 2011, 404–406.

  47. 47.

    Keyte 2010, 51–52.

  48. 48.

    Feder 2011, 428.

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Correspondence to Matthew J. Mitten .

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Mitten, M.J. (2013). American Needle Inc v NFL 130 S Ct 2201 (2010). In: Anderson, J. (eds) Leading Cases in Sports Law. ASSER International Sports Law Series. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-909-2_15

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