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International Courts and the Development of International Law pp 137–148Cite as

Evidence Before the International Court of Justice: Issues of Fact and Questions of Law in the Determination of International Custom

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Abstract

Evidence directly serves the purposes of international adjudication, which is the settlement of a dispute. However, the rules on evidence play a more fundamental role before an international court, since an international court, by way of its activity, might be seen to be contributing actively to the elaboration process of the applicable rules having a customary nature. In that respect, the examination of the rules which are applicable before the ICJ shows that the Court has a great deal of power to direct the parties’ activities in the presentation of evidence and is allowed an active role in the taking of evidence. This power can be used, according to the iura novit curia principle, chiefly when the determination of the factual element comprised in a customary rule is at issue. This line is to be followed especially with respect to the peremptory norms of international law.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    International adjudication has indeed been the subject of important studies conducted by Professor Treves, also based on his important practical experience at the international level: Treves 1999, p. 3; Treves 2005, p. 601; Treves 2008, p. 169.

  2. 2.

    The right to an effective judicial remedy and the related fundamental principle of “fair trial” is recognized inter alia by the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4 November 1950), entered into force on 3 September 1953, Article 6. See ECtHR: Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain, 12952/87, Judgment (26 June 1993), para 63, for an indication of the principles of equality of arms and of the right to adversarial proceedings as elements of a fair trial.

  3. 3.

    The identification of the purposes of international adjudication has been much debated in legal doctrine: see, e.g. Pellet 1989, p. 539; Santulli 2005, pp. 23, 500. On this point see also Cannizzaro 2011, p. 421. The link between the overall purpose of adjudication and the definition of evidentiary rules is highlighted, for instance, by some statements which can be found in the international case law, where it was underlined that, when the procedural rules are silent, a gap-filling function can be exercised having in mind the “proper administration of justice” (of which the equality of the parties is a constituent element) as a guiding principle. See for instance PCIJ: Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. United Kingdom), Judgment (30 August 1924), p. 16, stating that in such circumstances “the Court (…) is at liberty to adopt the principle which it considers best calculated to ensure the administration of justice, most suited to procedure before an international tribunal and most in conformity with the fundamental principles of international law”. For a corresponding discussion with respect to international commercial arbitration see the contributions in Wirth et al. 2011.

  4. 4.

    ICJ: Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States), Judgment (6 November 2003), Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, para 47.

  5. 5.

    See on this point Barile 1953, p. 162. Decisions of international courts and tribunals are therefore more important than Article 38.1.d of the ICJ Statute might suggest.

  6. 6.

    The ICJ is indeed taken as a paradigm of international adjudication, also bearing in mind that the rules on evidence applied before other international tribunals have a very similar content. See the Rules of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Treves 1998, p. 565; Chandrasekhara Rao and Gautier (eds) 2006. More in general Brower 1994, p. 47

  7. 7.

    In general terms see Riddel and Plant 2009, p. 11; Rivier 2007, p. 9; Rosenne 2003, p. 67; Fitzmaurice 1986, p. 575; Sandifer 1975, p. 34; Dubisson 1964, p. 220.

  8. 8.

    Zimmermann et al. (eds) 2006, pp. 977–1038, 1099–1108, 1109–1118.

  9. 9.

    As adopted on 14 April 1978, in force since 1 July 1978, and subsequently amended, pursuant to Article 30.1 of the Statute, under which “The Court shall frame rules for carrying out its functions. In particular, it shall lay down rules of procedure”. Rosenne 1983, p. 11.

  10. 10.

    Watts 2002, p. 247.

  11. 11.

    ICJ: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment (27 June 1986), para 31.

  12. 12.

    In advisory proceedings, in fact, different principles apply, in light of their peculiar structure, where no parties are technically involved. As it has been remarked (Riddell and Plant 2009, pp. 369, 391–393), therefore, the ICJ itself bears the responsibility of verifying the factual basis on which the opinion rests: States and organizations which participate in advisory proceedings do so on a voluntary basis and cannot therefore be held to be subject to a burden of proof. On the proceedings for advisory opinions see Luzzatto 1975, p. 479; Guyomar 1983, p. 641; Benvenuti 1984, p. 215.

  13. 13.

    Wolfrum 2010, p. 3.

  14. 14.

    Article 67.1 of the Rules on this point specifies that “If the Court considers it necessary to arrange for an enquiry or an expert opinion, it shall, after hearing the parties, issue an order to this effect, defining the subject of the enquiry or expert opinion, stating the number and mode of appointment of the persons to hold the enquiry or of the experts, and laying down the procedure to be followed (…)”. Guyomar 1983, p. 429; White 1965, p. 43.

  15. 15.

    That is to say an international organization of States: Article 69.4. Rosenne 1983, p. 142.

  16. 16.

    Niyungeko 2005, p. 239, who underlines the liberal attitude toward the admissibility of evidence.

  17. 17.

    On these issues: Kazazi 1996, pp. 221–235, 323–365.

  18. 18.

    Grossen 1954, p. 53. More in general, Cansacchi 1939, p. 110.

  19. 19.

    ICJ: Pulp Mills case on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment (20 April 2010), paras 162, 163, and 168.

  20. 20.

    Nicaragua, supra n. 11, para 60.

  21. 21.

    Ferrari Bravo 1958, p. 49.

  22. 22.

    Benzing 2010, p. 356; Riddel and Plant 2009, p. 144; Brown 2007, p. 89; Venturini 1975, p. 969; Lalive 1950, p. 81; Witenberg 1936, p. 37.

  23. 23.

    The need to prove international treaty law is however also discussed—chiefly by those authors who underline the contractual nature of an international agreement and therefore submit that the existence, scope, and (to some extent) interpretation of a treaty must be argued and proved by the parties.

  24. 24.

    Treves 2006, p. 65.

  25. 25.

    Pursuant to Article 38.1.b of the Statute. International courts, and chiefly the PCIJ and the ICJ, consistently held that two elements are required in order to determine that an international customary rule has come into existence. See: ICJ: North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/the Netherlands), Judgment (20 February 1969), para 77 and ICJ: Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. United States), Chamber, Judgment (12 October 1984), para 111.

  26. 26.

    An issue is indeed the actual determination of the facts that need to be considered in order to come to the conclusion that a customary rule exists. Treves 2006, p. 73, indicates in this respect that practice in a broad notion is to be taken into account: the relevant practice is not only that of States, taken singularly or in groups, but also that of non-subjects of international law.

  27. 27.

    As noted by Riddel and Plant 2009, p. 146, it is in any case normal for the parties to make submissions on the matter of the existence of customary rules—and therefore on international practice—as they are unlikely to be willing to leave the matter only to the court’s determination.

  28. 28.

    As a matter of principle, the above principle applies also to any international tribunal. However, specific consideration must be given by the tribunal to the powers it has been specifically granted by the parties. The parties, in fact, may limit the tribunal’s scope of jurisdiction in many directions, including the power to determine the facts and the law relevant to its decision. Morelli 1940, p. 109.

  29. 29.

    PCIJ: S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), Judgment (7 September 1927), p. 31.

  30. 30.

    PCIJ: Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France (France/United States), Judgment (12 July 1929), p. 124.

  31. 31.

    ICJ: Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Judgment (25 July 1974), para 18.

  32. 32.

    Ibidem, Separate Opinion Judge De Castro, pp. 78–79.

  33. 33.

    Nicaragua, supra n. 11, para 60.

  34. 34.

    The actual “customary” nature of regional custom is however disputed. Also as a result of the Court’s holding as to the need for party adduced evidence to find its existence, doctrine suggests that it might be preferably characterized as a “tacit agreement”: Cassese 2006, p. 223.

  35. 35.

    ICJ: Asylum case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment (20 November 1950), p. 14.

  36. 36.

    This “domestic” origin of the principle, and the fact that the function it performs is specifically linked to the peculiar relation between the law and the court at the domestic level, has been underlined by Ferrari Bravo 1959, p. 54.

  37. 37.

    On the point Barile 1953, p. 190.

  38. 38.

    Entered into force on 27 January 1980.

  39. 39.

    The need for a consensual basis to the ICJ’s jurisdiction is not affected by the fact that peremptory norms of international law are at stake: the point has been confirmed by the ICJ in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment (3 February 2006), paras 64 and 125.

  40. 40.

    Venturini 1975, p. 977.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Professor of International Law, University of Milan, Milan, Italy

    Luigi Fumagalli

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  1. Luigi Fumagalli
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Correspondence to Luigi Fumagalli .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. , Dipartimento di diritto pubblico, University of Milan - Statale University, Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milan, 20122, Italy

    Nerina Boschiero

  2. Bicocca University, Dipartimento giuridico, University of Milan, Piazza dell’Ateneo Nuovo 1, Milan, 20126, Italy

    Tullio Scovazzi

  3. , Dipartimento di Diritto,, University of Parma, Via Università 12, Parma, 43121, Italy

    Cesare Pitea

  4. , Dipartimento di diritto pubblico, University of Milan - Statale University, Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milan, 20122, Italy

    Chiara Ragni

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Fumagalli, L. (2013). Evidence Before the International Court of Justice: Issues of Fact and Questions of Law in the Determination of International Custom. In: Boschiero, N., Scovazzi, T., Pitea, C., Ragni, C. (eds) International Courts and the Development of International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-894-1_11

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