Abstract
This chapter sketches the historical evolution of the concept of national sovereignty. It traces in particular the emergence of non-state actors in the international system as full members of a community for systemic management that had been previously open only to states and international organizations. The emergence of unconventional threats, such as terrorism, has required a substantial rethinking of the international agenda and of the security risks that threaten the national and international systems. There have been attempts to implement some universal principles relating to human rights standards. This chapter’s conclusion points to a need to re-think the nation-state and its functions. The Cold War witnessed the first attempts to surpass Westphalian constraints, in the context of nuclear weapons and certain human rights which came to the fore toward the end of the communist bloc. The processes of regional integration that sublimate the classical political order based on nation-states are also a modality to surpass these constraints. The post-Cold War security environment is characterized by fluidity and unpredictibility. The optimism associated with the end of the Cold War led to the vision of a moral and legal international order, with no military violence involved but states eventually resorted to armed force in various situations vaguely described as “self-defense”.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Parker 1997, p. 192.
- 2.
Ibidem, pp. 16–17. See also Pages 1970, p. 37.
- 3.
Blaney 2000, p. 35.
- 4.
Oţetea 1968, p. 256 and next.
- 5.
Furet 1985. See also Badie 1999, p. 93.
- 6.
Schroeder 1994, pp. 575–582.
- 7.
The literature available on the Congress of Vienna and its consequences is truly impressive. See, in this respect, two recent works of historiographical production: Schroeder 1994, pp. 517–575; Gildea 2003, pp. 57–66.
- 8.
Kissinger 1998, pp. 55–56. According to him, the Holy Alliance is an original result of the Congress of Vienna, because it introduced a “brake” in the major powers’ interaction, namely the moral dimension.
- 9.
For the conferences of Paris and Berlin, see Bernstein 1992.
- 10.
Involving compliance with the principle of monarchical legitimacy and defence of the rule of law, the intervention is not only justified but imperative. For a discussion on the implications of the principles that led to the creation of the Holy Alliance and their impact on the exercise of national sovereignty, see Badie 1999, pp. 90–93.
- 11.
Duroselle 1967.
- 12.
It is not about a supranational institution, but an international institution—an institution of nations which is required to prevent the recurrence of a world war disaster.
- 13.
Santamaria 1996.
- 14.
Goldstein 2002, pp. 101–106.
- 15.
Halperin 1971, pp. 107–112.
- 16.
According to Michael Burns, Burns 1996, p. 42, quoting Secretary of State Robert Lansing speaking about the impact of the document on the international relations system.
- 17.
Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia whose last chapter is the crisis in Kosovo—all developments in this space and its fragmentation are an example to support this assertion.
- 18.
Steven Wheatley 2005.
- 19.
Knipping and Dietl 1997, p. 560 and next.
- 20.
Also known as the Paris Pact, the document signed on 27 August 1928 established the waiver by its signatories to promote war as an instrument of national policy. Colombos 1928, pp. 87–101. The pact has been applied in advance by a protocol signed between the Soviet Union and neighboring states in Moscow in 1929. Iacobescu 1988, pp. 212–220.
- 21.
Campus 1975, pp. 56–57.
- 22.
Steiner 2005, p. 45 and next.
- 23.
1926 (Germany) and 1934 (USSR).
- 24.
Calvocoressi 1989; Gilbert and Gott 1966; for this issue, seen from the Romanian perspective, Moisiuc 1991.
- 25.
During the war, there was organized a series of international conferences intended to the coordination of the Allies’ action in the war, but also to shape the defining frameworks of the post-war international relations system. The most important, from the point of view of the consequences for the political map and the post-war shape of the international relations systems, are the Atlantic Conference (1941), Teheran (1943), Moscow (1944), Yalta (1944) and Potsdam (1945). For a large presentation of these conferences, see Loghin 1989.
- 26.
For the context and manner in which the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights was adopted, see Waltz 2002, pp. 437–448.
- 27.
On the international trials for war crimes at the end of the Second World War and the international jurisdiction applicable to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide as well as their consequent evolution see Meron 1995.
- 28.
Quétel 2008, pp. 23–24.
- 29.
The names of the US nuclear weapons doctrines. For the detailed subject see Ryavec 1989. Calvocoressi 2000.
- 30.
Quetel 2008, pp. 57–68.
- 31.
On the issue of the nuclear equilibrium and the stages that this equilibrium went through during the Cold War, from doctrinary and material points of view see Gaddis et al. 1999.
- 32.
Calvocoressi 1989, pp. 25–30.
- 33.
Nye 2005, pp. 107–110.
- 34.
Djilas 1980, p. 437.
- 35.
Gaddis 1998, pp. 1–25.
- 36.
Leffler 1996, p. 122.
- 37.
N’Dimina-Mougala 2007, pp. 121–131.
- 38.
According to Koenig 2007, pp. 673–694.
- 39.
For the manner in which they constitute and the mechanisms by which these NGOs impose themselves, see two studies on one of the most known and influential non-governmental organisms in the field of human rights—Amnesty International: Thakur 1994 and Buchanan 2002, pp. 575–597.
- 40.
International Migration Review, Special Issue UNCHR at 50. Past, Present and Future of Refugee Assistance, vol. 35, no. 1, 2001.
- 41.
Siekmann 1985.
- 42.
Ionescu 2005, p. 17.
- 43.
The case of Brejnev doctrine that connects the free exercise of national sovereignty of member states of the socialist gulag to the obeisance of the marxist-leninist doctrinary orthodoxy. For the analysis of this doctrine and its implications in the field of relations within the socialist gulag see Meissner 1970.
- 44.
Brett 1996, pp. 668–693.
- 45.
In support of this assertion there are numerous studies. Among them, we quote one of the analyses on the role and place that the issue of human rights’ obeisance had in shaping, structuring and founding of the contestatary and vindictive movement in the East-European communist states, belonging to Molnar 1990.
- 46.
Koenig 2007.
- 47.
On this veritable "diplomacy of human rights”, see Badie 2002.
- 48.
For a presentation of the conceptual evolution of the intervention mechanisms at the disposal of the international community in the post-Cold War period, from a practical point of view, see Lebovic 2004, pp. 910–936.
- 49.
For a debate on this issue from the human rights perspective, see Duke 1994, pp. 25–48.
- 50.
About the year 1989 and the events that marked European history and that of the world, about the fall of the Communist regimes and the disintegration of the Soviet political-military bloc, an important literature exists whose survey and review may constitute the subject of a large analysis demarche. The dimension and consequences of the transformations, in regard to what had been the bipolar political-military order of the Cold War, justified from the very beginning the utilization of the conceptual term of revolution. Ash 1990; Banac 1992; Dahrendorf 1997; Kenney 2002.
- 51.
One of the first attempts to analyze this phenomenon, as well as to evaluate the coherence and validity of this perception in relation to the new security environment emerging during the post-Cold War period, belongs to Kegley and Raymond 1992, pp. 573–585. For a reiteration of the discussion at a higher level, a decade after the events, see Wohlforth 1999, pp. 5–41. The conclusions of the quoted authors indicate the existence of a reality contrary to the perceived one, the determining factors of such a perception being situated at the level of relative predictability and particularly simple conditions of an analysis/estimate of the security environment in the Cold War period, particularity deriving from the specific conditions of its structuring and evolution.
- 52.
For an analysis of significant evolutions of the security environment and system of international relations during the Cold War and later, analysis having as a central interest point the European continent see Judt 2008.
- 53.
One of the first undertakings envisaging the analysis of this evolution of the post-Cold War security environment, at the level of the European continent, belongs to the Institute for Security Studies (at that time operating under the aegis of the Western Europe Union). We can quote, from the Chaillot Papers series, edited by this institute, Mahncke 1993, and Gnesotto 1993.
- 54.
For the debate on the phenomenon of weak states and the consequences that the proliferation of the phenomenon entails on the security environment and on the stability and coherence of the international relations system emerging during the post-Cold War period, see Sorensen 2007; Ehrenreich Brooks 2005, pp. 1159–1196.
- 55.
The importance that the issue of human rights’ obeisance receives in the context of the post-Cold War security environment is huge, alike to the actional dimension developed in tight relation with it. For a debate on the issue see Duke 1994, pp. 25–48; Kofi Abiew 1998, pp. 61–90.
- 56.
For the problem of instrumentalization of humanitarian intervention as a war pretext see Goodman 2006, pp. 107–141.
- 57.
Badie 2004, pp. 191–215; Lebovic 2004, pp. 910–936.
- 58.
For an analysis of the way in which this practice has developed from NATO’s perspective and the undertaking by the Alliance of certain peacekeeping or peace enforcing missions under UN mandate, see Shimizu and Sandler 2002, pp. 651–668.
- 59.
For a survey of the evolutionary transformations of NATO, see d’Aboville 2008, pp. 91–104.
- 60.
Schake 1998, pp. 379–407.
- 61.
Jacoby 2004.
- 62.
Hofmann 2008, pp. 105–118.
- 63.
McAllister 2010, p. 15 and following.
- 64.
Kupchan 2009, pp. 73–85.
- 65.
An illustrative point of view for this issue and for the way that Russian federation managed to instrumentalize OSCE for promoting its own foreign policy and security interests: Mackinlay and Cross 2003.
- 66.
Fukuyama 1994.
- 67.
Waltz 1993, pp. 44–79.
- 68.
Huntington 2007.
- 69.
Barber 1995.
- 70.
Kaplan 2000.
- 71.
For a discussion on these theoretical visions, see Sorensen 2006, pp. 343–363.
- 72.
Kegley and Raymond 1992.
- 73.
Krasner 1995, pp. 115–151.
- 74.
Ikenberry 1998–1999, pp. 43–78.
- 75.
In relation to the pre-emptive action doctrine a whole specialty literature has been developed that might constitute the subject of a standalone analysis undertaking. See Reisman and Armstrong 2006, pp. 525–550.
- 76.
On the issue relating to the preemptive action doctrine and the exceptionalism induced within the domestic and foreign policy of western states by the vision on terrorism, as a main risk factor in the post September 2001 years, see Camus 2006, pp. 9–24. Mythen and Walklate 2008, pp. 221–242.
- 77.
Buzan and Waever 2003.
- 78.
Bilgin 2003, pp. 203–222.
- 79.
For a discussion on the evolution of environmental factors in the dynamics of security risks and threats in the immediate period after the end of the Cold War, see Levy 1995, pp. 35–62.
- 80.
Buzan 2007.
- 81.
Koehler and Zurcher 2003.
- 82.
For an analysis on the issue of post-communist transition and the associated risks, see Holmes 2004.
- 83.
Berger 2006, pp. 5–25.
- 84.
Haerpfer et al. 1999, pp. 989–1011.
- 85.
For an analysis on East-European post-communist transition and the associated vulnerabilities and risks, see Colas 2003.
- 86.
One of the most famous undertakings having at its core the issue of security risks in this category belongs to Huntington 2003.
- 87.
The specialty literature of the last two decades on this subject is an extremely vast one. We shall limit ourselves to quoting here a classical study applying this grid of reading and analysis of the European security belonging to Politi 1997, and a work extending this grid to the entire system of post-Cold War international relations by Robert Mandel, Mandel 1999.
- 88.
One of the works cataloging these risk factors under the label of new risk factors is the work of Elke Krahman, Krahman 2005.
- 89.
For an analysis on terrorism and the evolution of its role in the contemporary security balance, see Enders and Sandler 1999, pp. 147–167.
- 90.
To exemplify these interpretative grids we shall refer to the NATO Strategic Concept adopted in 1991 with the occasion of the Alliance’s Summit in Rome, as well as to two studies by the Institute for Security Studies of the Western Europe Union of 1993: Mahncke 1993; Gnesotto 1993.
- 91.
Enders and Sandler 1999; Mythen and Walklate 2008; Camus 2006.
- 92.
Buzan et al. 1998.
- 93.
Rosenau 1990.
- 94.
There are, of course, other important non-state actors such as the transnational religious groups, the transnational economic societies, trans-border organized crime groups, etc. See Strange 1996.
- 95.
See Nye 2009.
- 96.
Since the NGOs are associations created without the involvement of governments, it is clear that those established behind the scene by elements of the political power are not really what they claim to be.
- 97.
In the specialized literature, there is a difference between legal non-state actors and the illegal ones (terrorists, organized crime, and so on) is made. A highly raised question, for which no clear answer is given yet, is whether we can name such a group with criminal intentions as a “criminal ONG”. Through its way of formation and interests which it defends, the group has the majority of the elements of an ONG. See Derek Lutterbeck, “The New Security Agenda. Transnational Organized Crime and International Security”, GCSP, http://se2.dcaf.ch/…/ev_geneva_051030114_lutterbeck.ppt.
- 98.
Corum 2007.
- 99.
Butiri and Roşu 2010.
- 100.
Hersh 2006.
- 101.
A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
- 102.
Colloquial name for the National Security Strategy of the United States promoted by the George W. Bush administration.
- 103.
By the concepts of “soft” and “hard” power, it is intended both the explanation of the complex approach of international relations as well as the understanding of the domestic politics.
- 104.
The assertion “Pre-emptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future…” will be replaced in the final text of the EU Security Strategy with “Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future…”—see Yost 2003.
- 105.
Duncan 2003; Shah 2007; Schmitt 2003.
- 106.
See correspondence between the American State Secretary Dan Webster and Lord Ashburton [Enclosure 1-Extract from note of April 24, 1841] in Miller 1934.
- 107.
Grinspan 2006; Ford 2004.
- 108.
The three volumes of the European Commission report on the causes of the Russian-Georgian war are available online since the 30th of September 2009: www.ceiig.ch/Report.html.
- 109.
See the provisions of Article 2, para 4 of the UN Charter, later developed through the adoption of more General Assembly Resolutions (e.g.: Resolution 3314 of 14th of December 1974 with the definition of aggression annexed to it). According to international law norms, states do not have the right to resort to armed force with an aggressive purpose, this being an imperative erga omnes norm of jus cogens type considered as being superior to the sovereign capacity of states to make their own justice.
- 110.
The strategists at Moscow use the phrases “close proximity” or “near neighbourhood” meaning a part of Russia’s sphere of influence wished to be maintained in the new world order.
- 111.
Asmus 2009. More details on the Russian-Georgian war are contained in the work of the same author Asmus 2010.
- 112.
The text of the new doctrine of the Kremlin administration is available online: http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461.
- 113.
See the analysis of Sokov 2010.
- 114.
According to the interview granted in October 2009 by Nikolai Patrushev, chief of the Security Council of the Russian Federation; see Sokov 2010.
- 115.
- 116.
See Nye 2006.
- 117.
Wolfers 1968, p. 268.
- 118.
Snyder 1997, p. 36.
- 119.
Anastasios Valvis, “NATO: From collective defence to collective security. And the debate goes on.” http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/special/anastasios14153.pdf.
- 120.
Hans Morgenthau is a representative of this approach. See Morgenthau 1967.
- 121.
Walt 1990.
- 122.
Schweller 1998.
- 123.
Snyder 1991, p. 130.
- 124.
Nye 2009, pp. 71–72.
- 125.
Galtung 1970, p. 37.
- 126.
See Morgenthau 2007, p. 582.
- 127.
Ibidem, p. 585.
- 128.
Ibidem, p. 586.
- 129.
Ibidem, p. 588.
- 130.
Ibidem, p. 595.
- 131.
Menon 2003.
- 132.
See Section III Advancing our Interests—Ensure Strong Alliances; http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
- 133.
Section III Advancing our Interests—Ensure Strong Alliances, [“We are committed to ensuring that NATO is able to address the full range of 21st century challenges, while serving as a foundation of European security.”].
- 134.
Etzioni 1995.
- 135.
Etzioni 2004.
- 136.
Etzioni 1969, p. 348.
- 137.
Levy et al. 2005, p. 31.
- 138.
The representatives of the Copenhagen School—Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde—are adepts of the enlargement of the sphere for defining security. In response to the accusations brought by traditionalists, who stated that this new model is incoherent, the representatives of the School offer a constructivist operational method, that implies, on one hand the incorporation of traditionalist principles and, on the other hand, the elimination of the artificial frontier between security and economy and the proposal of some new modes of studying the inter-relations of the domains of social life. Security is defined depending on the perception of threat to the existence of a reference object that is strongly valorised. It is part of a vast assemblage that may include: non-state actors, abstract principles and even nature itself. Also, the source of the threat can be identified in aggressive states, negative social tendencies or in cultural diversity. As a consequence, within the conception of the Copenhagen School, threats can manifest in a variety of political contexts or domains of life: political, economical, military, cultural, demographic, ecological, etc. See Weaver et al. 1993.
- 139.
See “The Strategic Environment—The World as it is”; http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
- 140.
Petrescu 2008.
- 141.
In the specialized literature the phrase “neo-trusteeship” is used to designate these protectorates of the West: see Fearon and Laitin 2004, pp. 5–43.
- 142.
Evans and Sahnoun 2002, p. 103.
- 143.
European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, http://europa-en-un.org/articles/en/article-3085-en.htm.
- 144.
Feinstein and Slaughter 2004, p. 26.
- 145.
From a post-Westphalian perspective, the bombing of Yugoslavia (of Serbia) does not represent a violation of sovereignty but an aerial attack to impose a certain behavior, as it happens in any war. But no one interfered within the internal affairs of Serbia, no one took over the attributes of Serbian state leadership, even though, in the end, this intervention led to the detachment of the Kosovo province from Serbia. To impose behavior is one thing and the deprivation of a state from its own sovereignty is a totally different thing.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 T.M.C. ASSER PRESS, The Hague, The Netherlands, and the author
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ţuţuianu, S. (2013). Redefining Sovereignty: From Post-Cold War to Post-Westphalia. In: Towards Global Justice: Sovereignty in an Interdependent World. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-891-0_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-891-0_2
Published:
Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands
Print ISBN: 978-90-6704-890-3
Online ISBN: 978-90-6704-891-0
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawLaw and Criminology (R0)
