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Social Services of General Interest and the EU Public Procurement Rules

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Social Services of General Interest in the EU

Part of the book series: Legal Issues of Services of General Interest ((LEGAL))

Abstract

Social services of general interest are typically services which are not simply ‘purchased’ by public authorities from third parties against remuneration. Public authorities always retain the prerogative to decide whether they wish to provide a service themselves, either by using their own resources, through an in-house construction or in cooperation with other public authorities. It is also possible to distribute licenses or (limited) authorisations to private parties, award a service concession or grant an exclusive right for the performance of social services. This means that public authorities have extensive possibilities to provide social services in such a way that the Public Procurement Directive 2004/18/EC is not applicable, although they might have to take into account certain competitive obligations formulated by the European Court of Justice. The result is a fragmented legal framework, which is not conducive to compliance. This chapter discusses this legal framework in the context of the renewed interest in the public procurement market caused by a number of changes contained in the Lisbon Treaty as well as by the economic and sovereign debt crisis. In addition, the latest Commission proposals for the revision of the current public procurement directives, which form part of the Commission’s initiative to relaunch the single market, will be discussed briefly. The proposals emphasise that Member States can specify that the choice of providers of social services may not be based on price considerations alone but should also include specific quality criteria. This is a good step in the direction of a public procurement regime which is not so much based on price competition but focuses more on competition based on quality. Finally, the authors argue that an objective test should be introduced to assess the decision of a public authority to perform an activity itself or to externalise it to a third party. Such a test would force public authorities to take this decision on objective, transparent, proportionate grounds resulting in enhanced predictability, which is in the interest of public authorities themselves, as well as in the interest of citizens and service providers.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, OJ 2004 L 134/114.

  2. 2.

    Manunza 2001, Sect. 14.3.

  3. 3.

    Note that the term ‘public contract’ in this context is used in a broader sense than in the Directive to cover all kinds of purchasing transactions between public authorities and third parties used to entrust the provision of general interest tasks to such a third party.

  4. 4.

    It is beyond the scope of this contribution to explain the various possibilities public authorities have under the European Public Procurement Directives and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union to take social criteria into account in their decisions to award a specific public contract. See in this context the Commission document Buying social, A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations in Public Procurement (2010) and Arrowsmith and Kunzlik 2009.

  5. 5.

    The consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union (OJ 2008 C 115/13) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2008 C 115/47) constitute the current legal basis of the European Union.

  6. 6.

    Monti 2010, p. 76.

  7. 7.

    See also Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, Concerning the application of EU public procurement law to relations between contracting authorities (public–public cooperation), SEC (2011) 1169 final, 4 October 2011.

  8. 8.

    See the Belgian Coditel judgment of 13 November 2008 (CJEU, Case C-324/07 Coditel Brabant SA v. Communne d’Uccle and Region de Bruxelles- Capitale [2008] ECR I-8475, and the Hamburg Judgment of 9 June 2009 (CJEU, Case C-480/06 Commission v. Germany [2009] ECR I-4747). (see further Sect. 14.3) as well as the following cases: CJEU, Case C-573/07 Sea Srl v. Comune di Ponte Nossa [2009] ECR I-8127 and CJEU, Case C-196/08 Acoset SpA v. Conferenza Sindaci e Presidenza Prov. Reg. ATO Idrico Ragusa and Others [2009] ECR I-9913; cf., the facts and decision in CJEU, Joined Cases C-145/08 and C-149/08 Club Hotel Loutraki AE v. Ethnico Symvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ypourgos Epikrateias and Aktor Anonymi Techniki Etaireia (Aktor ATE) v. Ethnico Symvoulio Radiotileorasis [2010] ECR I-4165.

  9. 9.

    See on the public procurement market and the economic crisis: Manunza 2009 and Manunza 2010c.

  10. 10.

    See the Mission letter from the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso to Mario Monti dated 20 October 2009, Pres (2009) D/2250.

  11. 11.

    However, only 2 % of public contracts concerns direct cross-border procurement, Monti 2010, p. 76.

  12. 12.

    Ibid. p. 76; the Evaluation Report: Impact and Effectiveness of EU Public Procurement Legislation, SEC (2011) 853 final part (1) and part (2) mentions cost savings of around 4–5 %. Available at: www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/modernising_rules/evaluation/index_en.htm.

  13. 13.

    Monti 2010, p. 78.

  14. 14.

    Commission, Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth COM (2010) 2020 final, 3 March 2010.

  15. 15.

    Commission, Commission Working Document, Consultation on the Future “EU 2020” Strategy COM (2009) 647 final, 24 November 2009.

  16. 16.

    Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a Single Market Act. For a highly, competitive social market economy. 50 proposals for improving our work, business, exchanges with one another, COM (2010) 608 final, 27 October 2010.

  17. 17.

    Commission, EU Citizenship Report 2010, Dismantling the Obstacles to EU Citizens’ Rights, COM (2010) 603 final, 27 October 2010.

  18. 18.

    EP Resolution of 12 May 2011 on Equal Access to Public Sector Markets in the EU and in Third Countries and on the Revision of the Legal Framework of Public Procurement Including Concessions, P7_TA (2011) 0233.

  19. 19.

    Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Single Market Act, Twelve Levers to Boost Growth and Strengthen Confidence "Working Together to Create New Growth" COM (2011) 206 final, 13 April 2011.

  20. 20.

    Commission, Green Paper on the Modernisation of EU Public Procurement Policy, Towards a More Efficient European Procurement Market, COM (2011) 15 final, 27 January 2011.

  21. 21.

    Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Procurement by Entities Operating in the Water, Energy, Transport and Postal Services Sectors, COM (2011) 895 final, 20 December 2011 and Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Public Procurement, COM (2011) 896 final, 20 December 2011.

  22. 22.

    Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Award of Concession Contracts, COM (2011) 897 final, 20 December 2011.

  23. 23.

    COM (2011) 896, Article 11.

  24. 24.

    Manunza 2011a, b.

  25. 25.

    Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact Amsterdam, 17 June 1997, OJ 1997 C 236/1; Council Regulation 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ 1997 L 209/1 and Council Regulation 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ 1997 L 209/6. Under the 1997 Regulations the Member States are obliged to submit annually updated macro-economic and budgetary prognoses to the European Commission and the Council. In the case of excessive deficits the Pact provides for sanctions and corrective procedures. The Stability and Growth Pact is translated into stability and convergence programmes. The stability programmes are prepared by euro zone Member States, convergence programmes by the other EU Member States.

  26. 26.

    Article 2 of ‘Protocol (No. 12) on the excessive deficit procedure’ attached to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union defines the term ‘government’ in Article 126 TFEU as the: ‘general government, that is central government, regional or local government and social security funds, to the exclusion of commercial operations, as defined in the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts’. ‘Deficit’ is defined as the ‘net borrowing as defined in the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts’.

  27. 27.

    Article 2 of Protocol No. 12 defines the term ‘debt’ used in Article 126 TFEU as the: ‘total gross debt at nominal value outstanding at the end of the year and consolidated between and within the sectors of general government as defined in the first indent’.

  28. 28.

    Boullart and Depré 2005.

  29. 29.

    Evaluation of Public Procurement Directives, Markt/2004/10/D Final Report, 15 September 2006; Commission, Working Document Prepared by the Commission Services, Public Procurement Indicators 2008, 27 April 2010; Monti 2010 and Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, Evaluation Report: Impact and Effectiveness of EU Public Procurement Legislation, 27 June 2011 SEC (2011) 853 final part 1 and part 2.

  30. 30.

    Commission, Communication from the Commission, Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme: Social Services of General Interest in the European Union, COM (2006) 177 final, 26 April 2006.

  31. 31.

    See the document for the complete list.

  32. 32.

    Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Accompanying the Communcation ‘A Single Market for twenty-first Century Europe’, Services of General Interest, Including Social Services of General Interest: A New European Commitment, COM (2007) 725 final, 20 November 2007.

  33. 33.

    Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, Guide to the Application of the European Union Rules on State Aid, Public Procurement and the Internal Market to Services of General Economic Interest, and in Particular to Social Services of General Interest SEC (2010) 1545 final, 7 December 2010.

  34. 34.

    CJEU, Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavel Pavlov and Others v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten [2000] ECR I-6451, para 118; CJEU, Case C-218/00 Cisal di Battistello Venanzio & C. Sas v. Istituto nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro (INAIL) [2002] ECR I-691, para. 37; CJEU, Case C-355/00 Freskot AE v. Elliniko Dimosio [2003] ECR I-5263.

  35. 35.

    SEC (2010) 1545 final, pp. 16–17.

  36. 36.

    SEC (2010) 1545, p. 17.

  37. 37.

    As we can deduce for example from the reasoning of the Court in the BFI case: see paras 44–46 in CJEU, Case C-360/96 Gemeente Arnhem and Gemeente Rheden v. BFI Holding BV [1998] ECR I-6821.

  38. 38.

    The Court stated in the (Dutch) BFI case that an activity in the general interest, not having an industrial or commercial character involves activities which, for reasons associated with the general interest, the State itself chooses to provide or over which it wishes to retain a decisive influence [emphasis added]. Paras 50 and 51.

  39. 39.

    See Chap. 12 in this volume, by Baquero Cruz.

  40. 40.

    As specified in the introduction, it is beyond the scope of this contribution to discuss the circumstances in which licenses such as limited authorisations should be distributed within a market by using competitive procedures. It is important to realise that the distribution of such authorisations does not always involve payment. In 2011, the CJEU confirmed its previous case law in the (Dutch) Betfair case (CJEU, Case C–203/08 Sporting Exchange Ltd, trading as ‘Betfair’ v. Minister van Justitie, [2010] ECR I-4695) with regard to the requirement that competitive tendering should be used to award limited authorisations. See for licenses and limited authorisations: Wolswinkel 2009a, b and Van Ommeren et al. 2011a, b. See for the Betfair case: Stergiou 2011, and Manunza 2010b in which she inter alia touched upon the problem that it is incomprehensible for private parties that certain contracts concluded by public authorities with private parties are subject to competitive tendering while others are not. As a consequence, compliance with the current rules is insufficient and the positive effects of a good organisation of the public procurement market are not fully realised.

  41. 41.

    In accordance to Art 1 of the Dir: see 14.3.3.

  42. 42.

    See for example for the principle of equality the following cases: CJEU, Case C-275/98 Unitron Scandinavia A/S and 3-S A/S, Danske Svineproducenters Serviceselskab v. Ministeriet for Fødevarer, Landbrug og Fiskeri [1999] ECR I-8291; CJEU, Case C-324/98 Telaustria [2000] ECR I-10745; CJEU, Case C-231/03 Coname v. Comune di Cingia de' Botti [2005] ECR I-7287, CJEU, Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen GmbH v. Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-8585. Manunza and Senden 2005; Pijnacker Hordijk 2005; Drijber 2005; see also for the principle of transparency Stergiou 2011.

  43. 43.

    See also Manunza 2003a; Manunza and Bleeker 2008 and Manunza and Kühler 2011.

  44. 44.

    CJEU, Case C-373/00 Adolf Truley GmbH v. Bestattung Wien GmbH [2003] ECR I-1931, para 40.

  45. 45.

    See cases Mannesmann, BFI, Ente Fiera and Truley as well as Korhonen and Aigner. CJEU, Case C-44/96 Mannesmann Anlagenbau Austria AG and Others v. Strohal Rotationsdruck GmbH, [1998] ECR I-73; CJEU, Case C-360/96 Gemeente Arnhem and Gemeente Rheden v. BFI Holding BV [1998] ECR I-6821; CJEU, Joined Cases C-223/99 and C-260/99 Agorà Srl and Excelsior Snc di Pedrotti Bruna & C. v. Ente Autonomo Fiera Internazionale di Milano en Ciftat Soc. coop. arl. [2001] ECR I-3605; CJEU, Case C-373/00 Adolf Truley GmbH v. Bestattung Wien GmbH [2003] ECR I-1931; CJEU, Case C-18/01 Arkkitehtuuritoimisto Riitta Korhonen Oy, Arkkitehtitoimisto Pentti Toivanen Oy and Rakennuttajatoimisto Vilho Tervomaa v. Varkauden Taitotalo Oy [2003] ECR I-5321 and CJEU, Case C-393/06 Ing. Aigner, Wasser-Wärme-Umwelt, GmbH v. Fernwärme Wien GmbH [2008] ECR I-2339.

  46. 46.

    Note that this does not automatically mean that those indications can be read a contrario to determine when there is a need in the general which does have an industrial or commercial character since the first condition concerns three categories of needs: two of them relate to the general interest while the third relates to needs which are not in the general interest.

  47. 47.

    According to the appellant in the BFI case.

  48. 48.

    Para 44.

  49. 49.

    Para 47: ‘It follows that Article 1(b) of Directive 92/50 may apply to a particular body even if private undertakings meet, or may meet, the same needs as it and that the absence of competition is not a condition necessarily to be taken into account in defining a body governed by public law’.

  50. 50.

    Para 49.

  51. 51.

    Para 61.

  52. 52.

    Para 51.

  53. 53.

    CJEU, Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes BV v. State of the Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635.

  54. 54.

    Beentjes case, paras 11 and 12.

  55. 55.

    Manunza 2003a; Manunza and Kühler 2011.

  56. 56.

    In Beentjes because the entity concerned lacked legal personality (second condition) and in Connemara (CJEU, Case C-306/97 Connemara Machine Turf Co.Ltd v. Coillte Teoranta [1998] ECR I-8761 because the FB was performing tasks which were not in the general interest, not having an industrial or commercial character. Nevertheless, the FB was classified as a contracting authority.

  57. 57.

    Drijber and Stergiou refer to an ‘anti-circumvention provision’ in Drijber and Stergiou 2009, p. 832.

  58. 58.

    In accordance with Teckal : CJEU, Case C-107/9 Teckal Srl v. Comune di Viano and Azienda Gas-Acqua Consorziale (AGAC) di Reggio Emilia [1999] ECR I-8121. See also Manunza 2001.

  59. 59.

    Note that in the vast majority of cases dealt with by the CJEU concerning public service concessions (including the question whether an in-house construction was allowed) the Court answered questions referred to it by Italian courts pursuant to the preliminary ruling procedure (starting with the RI.SAN case in 1999, CJEU, Case C-108/98 Ri.San. Srl v. Comune di Ischia and Other [1999] ECR I-5219). In Italy, the way in which local and regional authorities shall manage local services of general interest is governed by legislation.

  60. 60.

    CJEU, Case C-480/06 Commission v. Germany [2009] ECR I-4747.

  61. 61.

    For a discussion of the Teckal doctrine and an overview of national rules on in-house constructions in Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark and the United Kingdom see Comba and Treumer 2010. See also Weltzien 2005; Avarkioti 2007; Kaarresalo 2008; Cavallo Perin and Casalini 2009; Frenz and Schleissing 2009.

  62. 62.

    CJEU, Case C-324/07 Coditel Brabant SA v. Communne d’Uccle and Region de Bruxelles- Capitale [2008] ECR I-8475.

  63. 63.

    CJEU, Case C-340/04 Carbotermo SpA and Consorzio Alisei v. Comune di Busto Arsizio and AGESP SpA [2006] ECR I-4137 and CJEU, Case C-295/05 Asociacion Nacional de Empresas Forestales (Asemfo) v. Transformacion Agraria SA (Tragsa) and Administracion del Estado [2007] ECR I-2999.

  64. 64.

    CJEU, C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v. Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH [2003] ECR I-7747 paras 89–93.

  65. 65.

    See on Altmark Chap. 12 in this volume, by Baquero Cruz and Chap. 13 by Szyszczak.

  66. 66.

    CJEU, Case C-480/06 Commission v. Germany [2009] ECR I-4747.

  67. 67.

    Karayigit calls this exemption ‘in thy neighbour’s house’ provision in Karayigit 2010, pp. 183–197; see also Pedersen and Olsson 2010.

  68. 68.

    Case C-480/06 Commission v. Germany [2009] ECR I-4747, paras 45 and 47.

  69. 69.

    Ibid. para 47.

  70. 70.

    See extensively on this subject: Manunza 2001, Sect. 14.5. See also Manunza and Kühler 2011.

  71. 71.

    Art 20 and 21 of Dir 2004/18/EC.

  72. 72.

    The codes mentioned in the Annex, as well as the CPV codes, can be found on the de website of DG Internal market, under www.simap.europa.eu; see also n. 86 infra.

  73. 73.

    Article 23 on technical specifications and Article 35 on the obligation to send a notice of the results of the award procedure.

  74. 74.

    See for a recent discussion of the concept of contract and public–public cooperation Wiggen 2011, pp. 157–172.

  75. 75.

    See for the latest developments with regard to the interpretation of the term ‘pecuniary interest’ the following cases: CJEU, Case C-399/98 Scala [2001], ECR I-5409, paras 76–86, CJEU, Case C-220/05 Auroux [2007] ECR I–385, para 45; CJEU, Case C-451/08 Helmut Müller [2010] ECR I-2673 and CJEU, Case C-306/08 Commission v. Spain [decided on 26 May 2011, nyr].

  76. 76.

    The BFI case concerned Article 6 of Directive 92/50/EEC, the predecessor of Article 18 Directive 2004/18/EC; see also CJEU, Case C-323/07 Termoraggi SpA v. Comune di Monza [2008] ECR I-57. Cf., CJEU, Case C-220/06 Asociación Profesional de Empresas de Reparto y Manipulado de Correspondencia v. Administración General del Estado [2007] ECR I-12175.

  77. 77.

    CJEU, Case C-202/88 French Republic v. Commission of the European Communities [1991] ECR I-1223 on telecommunications terminals equipment concerns the difference between exclusive and special rights.

  78. 78.

    Letter of the European Commission dated 7 December 1995, para 2.3, p. 3 (unpub).

  79. 79.

    The current Art 18 of Directive 2004/18/EC.

  80. 80.

    Gilliams 1998, p. 41.

  81. 81.

    CJEU, C-360/96 BFI, paras 44 and 46.

  82. 82.

    HR 18 November 2011, LJN: BU4900.

  83. 83.

    The thresholds are established by regulation for a period of 2 years. The last Reg on the thresholds is Commission Reg 1251/2011 of 30 November 2011 amending Dir 2004/17/EC, 2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council in respect of their application thresholds for the procedures for the award of contracts, OJ 2011 L 319/43.

  84. 84.

    The technical specifications (Art 21 read in conjunction with Art 23 of Dir 2004/18/EC) shall be laid down before the start of the public procurement procedure and a notice of the results of the award procedure shall be sent (Art 21 read in conjunction with Art 35(4) of Dir 2004/18/EC).

  85. 85.

    This follows from Article 21 of the Directive. An extensive description of the procurement regime for health care services under Directive 2004/18 EC can be found in Hatzopoulos and Stergiou 2011, pp. 413–452.

  86. 86.

    See for the services listed in Annex II A and those listed in II B, articles 20 and 21 of Directive 2004/18/EC. The codes mentioned in the Annex can also be found on the de website of DG Internal market, available at: www.simap.europa.eu.

  87. 87.

    The Common Procurement Vocabulary (CPV) establishes a single classification system for public procurement aimed at standardising the references used by contracting authorities and entities to describe the subject of procurement contracts. consists of a main vocabulary for defining the subject of a contract, and a supplementary vocabulary for adding further qualitative information. The main vocabulary is based on a tree structure comprising codes of up to 9 digits (an 8 digit code plus a check digit) associated with a wording that describes the type of supplies, works or services forming the subject of the contract.

  88. 88.

    CJEU, Case C-160/08, Commission v. Germany [2010] ECR I-3713.

  89. 89.

    As well as for the award of limited authorisation schemes; however, as we clarified, this topic is beyond the scope of this contribution.

  90. 90.

    See n. 42 supra.

  91. 91.

    CJEU, Case C-95/10 Strong Seguranca SA v. Municipio de Sintra and Securitas- Servicos e Tecnologia de Seguranca [lodged on 22 February 2010, nyr].

  92. 92.

    CJEU, Joined Cases C-147/06 and C-148/06 SECAP SpA and Santorso Soc. Coop. Arl v. Comune di Torino [2008] ECR I-3565, para 21.

  93. 93.

    Para 31.

  94. 94.

    Para 30.

  95. 95.

    Since CJEU, Case C-206/08 WAZV Gotha v. Eurawasser [2009] ECR I-8377 we know that the risk involved can be very limited from the start depending on the construction used.

  96. 96.

    COM (2011) 895 final and COM (2011) 896 final.

  97. 97.

    COM (2011) 897 final.

  98. 98.

    COM (2011) 869, Article 11.

  99. 99.

    Ibid. p. 8.

  100. 100.

    Ibid. Article 4 (d).

  101. 101.

    Ibid. Articles 74–76.

  102. 102.

    Manunza 2010d, Sect. 14.2.

  103. 103.

    On legality and efficiency see Manunza 2010c, pp. 49–86. See also Radbruch 1932, vol. 2.

  104. 104.

    COM (2011) 896 final, Art. 74.

  105. 105.

    See Manunza 2010d, Sect. 14.2. The historical research contained in this publication reveals that already in the age of the Romans public procurement was a common method to prevent corruption: see the reports of Pliny the Younger when he was proconsul of Bithynia (now northern Turkey) to emperor Trajan on corruption related to the execution of public works in the Imperial period: Epistulae, X, 37. See also X, 38, 1–2 en 39, 1–2. It is unknown to what extent and in which circumstances this method was obligatory. What we do know is that the oldest known attempt to establish a legal obligation for the tendering of works (and tax collection) dates back to this period; in 169 B.C., Livy describes how tribune Rutilius proposed an act to annul recent awards made by the censors Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (the father of the famous brothers) and Gaius Claudius Pulcher and ‘… to award them again, and to give everybody without any distinction the right to collect taxes and execute works’. See Titus Livius, Ab urbe condita libri, XLIII, 16, 6–7: ‘([6] Hinc contentione orta cum veteres publicani se ad tribunum contulissent, rogatio sub unius tribuni nomine promugaltur, [7] quae publica vectigalia aut ultro tributa C. Claudius et ti. Sempronius locassent, ea rata locatio ne esset:) ab integro locarentur, et ut omnibus redimendi et conducendi promiscue ius esset. See also Cicero, In Verrem, II, I, 130–131, on corruption in public procurement. See on public procurement in Roman times also Perelli 1994, pp. 195–244; Taylor 2003, p. 16 et seq and Robinson 1992, p. 48 et seq.

    In Dutch history public procurement is recorded from the late Middle Ages. When tendering becomes obligatory, in 1815, the method is related to the aim of fighting corruption. In later times, other aims were added: see Hartenlust 1980, pp. 490–497. See also Chao-Duivis 2009, p. 9 et seq; White 2000 and Manunza 2003b, pp. 747–757.

  106. 106.

    See for example, the arguments used in the Netherlands by organisations representing municipalities, educational institutions and government purchasers and which eventually led to the rejection of a Public Procurement Act in 2008. See Manunza 2010a.

  107. 107.

    See the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy—Towards a more efficient European Procurement Market’ (2011/C 318/19) in which the committee calls professionalism a ‘basic condition for any public purchasing’. See also Van de Meent 2010.

  108. 108.

    A discussion of the concept ‘general interest’, services of general interest’ and ‘services of general economic interest’ is beyond the scope of this contribution. See for this long-lasting discussion: Commission, Communication from the Commission, Services of General Interest in Europe, OJ 1996 C 281/3; Commission, Communication from the Commission, Services of General Interest in Europe, OJ 2001 C 17/4; Commission, Report to the Laeken European Council—Services of General Interest, COM (2001) 598 final, 17 October 2001; Commission, Green Paper on Services of General Interest, COM (2003) 270 final, 21 May 2003; Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Council of the Regions, White Paper on Services of General Interest, COM (2004) 374 final, 12 May 2004; COM (2007) 725 final. See also Slot et al. 2007, pp. 102–105; Arnon and Sluijs 2008, p. 108 et seq; Krajewksi 2008, pp. 377–397.

  109. 109.

    Manunza 2010e.

  110. 110.

    COM (2011) 896 final, Article 76(2).

  111. 111.

    Ibid. recital 11 in which the Commission emphasises and clarifies this point.

  112. 112.

    This is true on both the European and the national level (in the Netherlands but also in other Member States).

  113. 113.

    Public Law 105-270; 31 USC 501. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement_fairact.

  114. 114.

    Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a076_a76_incl_tech_correction.

  115. 115.

    In order to measure welfare or well-being social aspects are taken into account in addition to economic data. On the basis of that idea in 1974 The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) developed the life situation index: a single figure expressing the development of welfare and wellbeing. The figure is composed of eight indicators: health, sport, social participation, cultural/leisure activities, housing, mobility, holidays and possession of assets. According to Boelhouwer (Boelhouwer 2010) the index is a good instrument to capture both welfare and wellbeing and follow their development over time. See also Baarsma 2010a.

  116. 116.

    Baarsma 2010a, p. 8. Baarsma is a member of the Academisch Genootschap Aanbesteden (an academic interdisciplinary board on public procurement consisting of economists and lawyers founded by Elisabetta Manunza in cooperation with Jan Telgen, economist. Available at: http://tst.acgea.nl/). See also Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2003.

  117. 117.

    Baarsma 2010a and 2010b.

  118. 118.

    Baarsma et al. 2006. In this report, the authors explain how they as economists think this test should be performed. As we said before, the criteria for the rationalisation of the choice of public authorities between performing tasks themselves or externalising their provision to third parties need to be developed. That is why Wouter Jan Berends recently (1 August 2011) started a PhD research project with this specific aim at Utrecht University under the supervision of Elisabetta Manunza. Hopefully, we can present the results in the next few years.

  119. 119.

    Interesting in this context are the theories of Nasar on the positive effects of competition: Nasar 2011.

  120. 120.

    Baarsma and Manunza 2010a, b. See also European Parliament, Resolution of 18 May 2010 on new developments in public procurement (P7_TA (2010)0173). European Parliament, Report on new developments in public procurement (A7-0151/2010).

  121. 121.

    P7_TA (2010)0173, in which a number of the complaints of public authorities are visible. In the proposals for the new directives the European Commission seems to have responded to the complaints by giving public authorities a wider margin of discretion.

  122. 122.

    Monti 2010, p.73.

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  1. Department of Law, Europa Institute, Utrecht University, Achter Sint Pieter 200, 3512 HT, Utrecht, The Netherlands

    Elisabetta Manunza & Wouter Jan Berends

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  1. Elisabetta Manunza
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Correspondence to Elisabetta Manunza .

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  1. , Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, Studiestræde 6, Copenhagen K, 1455, Denmark

    Ulla Neergaard

  2. , School of Law, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester, LE1 7RH, United Kingdom

    Erika Szyszczak

  3. , Faculty of Law, Radboud University, Comeniuslaan 4, Nijmegen, 6525 HP, Netherlands

    Johan Willem van de Gronden

  4. , Fachbereich Rechtswissenschaft, Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Schillerstraße 1, Erlangen, 91054, Germany

    Markus Krajewski

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Manunza, E., Berends, W.J. (2013). Social Services of General Interest and the EU Public Procurement Rules. In: Neergaard, U., Szyszczak, E., van de Gronden, J., Krajewski, M. (eds) Social Services of General Interest in the EU. Legal Issues of Services of General Interest. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-876-7_14

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