Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Pieces of Me: On Identity and Information and Communications Technology Implants

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Human ICT Implants: Technical, Legal and Ethical Considerations

Part of the book series: Information Technology and Law Series ((ITLS,volume 23))

Abstract

Ever since the dawn of mankind, we have used artefacts to extend our physical abilities or to overcome our bodily shortcomings. We use a stick to reach the apples on the highest branch of a tree, or a lever to lift things that are heavier than our own bodies. And we use microscopes and telescopes to see things beyond the natural range of our visual system. Several twentiethcentury philosophers have pointed out that when humans use artefacts and technologies, these often tend to become extensions of their bodies: they become incorporated into the user’s body schema. Most of us can flawlessly park a car or write with a pen because of this principle. Technologies, although ‘other’, can become ‘part’ of a user’s bodily repertoire, even if they are not embedded into the human body. At the same time, it is interesting to note that in some cases technologies can be experienced as ‘alien’, or that they can even lead users to feel ‘alienated’ from themselves. The former may happen when we are new at using a technology, or when it malfunctions or breaks down. The latter has been shown to occur, for example, in patients who undergo Deep Brain Stimulation. After treatment, these patients sometimes state that they feel estranged from themselves, that they no longer feel they are the same person. In this chapter we use some of the central ideas from philosophy of technology to clarify these two (seemingly contradictory) perspectives.

Dr Bibi van den Berg is assistant professor at eLaw@Leiden.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Plutarch 75 A.D., retrieved from http://classics.mit.edu/Plutarch/theseus.html [last accessed on 6 July 2011].

  2. 2.

    Many arguments have been put forth in favour of, and against, the claim that Theseus’ ship is still the same ship. One could argue that a ship (or a person, for that matter) is none other than the totality of its parts, and hence, if one replaces (all of the) parts, it is a different ship. Note that this means that even the replacement of a single plank on the ship entails that it is no longer the same ship. Alternatively, one could argue that a ship is more than the sum of its parts. It is a structure, a set of parts with in a specific configuration and it derives its identity from that configuration. On this line of reasoning, Theseus’ ship would still be the same ship, because the structure of the ship has been left unchanged. But if this is true, then when does an object change its identity—when is the ‘structure’ of a thing ever (suddenly?) transformed from one thing into something else? What qualifies as change and when does change lead to a qualitative shift in identity? Finally, one could argue that Theseus’ ship is still the same because a ship is more than its parts or its structure—rather, it is an object that is used for certain purposes (sailing the seas), and owned by a specific person (Theseus). Despite the fact that the actual make up of the ship changes, its purposes and its ownership do not. Hence, Theseus’ ship is still Theseus’ ship in some sense. As with the ‘structure argument’, this line of reasoning raises the question at what point (or by what qualification) a ship (or an identity in general) would change. Do identities only change when purposes or ownership change?

  3. 3.

    Merleau-Ponty 1962.

  4. 4.

    Heidegger 2000.

  5. 5.

    Merleau-Ponty 1962.

  6. 6.

    Heidegger 2000.

  7. 7.

    Verbeek 2005, p 124.

  8. 8.

    Merleau-Ponty 1962, pp 112–113.

  9. 9.

    Merleau-Ponty 1962, Chap. 3.

  10. 10.

    Clark 2008, p 31.

  11. 11.

    Ihde 1990, p 74.

  12. 12.

    Merleau-Ponty 1962, p 165.

  13. 13.

    Merleau-Ponty 1962, p 165.

  14. 14.

    Also see Don Ihde’s discussion of the ‘embodiment relation’ (Ihde 1990, pp 72–80), and Peter-Paul Verbeek’s analysis thereof (Verbeek 2005, pp 125–126).

  15. 15.

    Verbeek 2005, p 125.

  16. 16.

    Clark 2008, p 33.

  17. 17.

    Clark 2008, p 33.

  18. 18.

    Ihde 1990, p 75, emphasis in the original.

  19. 19.

    Note that terms such as ‘alienness’ or ‘alienation’ are far from neutral, if only for the politicised (read: Marxist) ring they may carry. Moreover, as Petran Kockelkoren rightly remarks, speaking of ‘alienation’ in relation to technology seems to suggest that, somehow, somewhere, there is a ‘natural world’ out there or at least a non-technologically mediated, original way of relating to the world and that if we were to not use technologies, we could return to this ‘natural world’. However, this depiction of things is false. Our perceptions are always mediated (see, for example, Plessner 1975). Kockelkoren writes: ‘…in philosophy of mediation there is no natural substratum to fall back on. [There is no] unspoilt, primeval state…’ (Kockelkoren 2003, p 34). Despite these disclaimers, it is still worthwhile to investigate the ways in which individuals can come to feel estranged from themselves, or at least can come to consider themselves at some distance from their original conception(s) of themselves, through the use of artefacts or technologies. This is the interpretation of ‘alienness’ and ‘alienation’ that will be studied here.

  20. 20.

    Heidegger 2000, p 98, also see Clark 2008, p 10.

  21. 21.

    Clark 2008, p 10, also see Ihde 1990, pp 72–80.

  22. 22.

    Kockelkoren 2003.

  23. 23.

    Kockelkoren lists a number of different symptoms, such as ‘eye infections and diminution of vision, […] miscarriages, blockages of the urinary tract, and haemorrhage’. Soon thereafter a list of mental disorders was added, ranging from ‘mental disturbance’ and ‘delirium furiosum’ to ‘siderodromophobia’, which Kockelkoren describes as ‘the general disorientation accompanied with physical discomfort that seems to have affected the first rail passengers en masse’. (Kockelkoren 2003, pp 15–16).

  24. 24.

    Kockelkoren 2003, p 17.

  25. 25.

    cf. Kockelkoren 2003 pp 17–18.

  26. 26.

    Also see Kockelkoren 2003 pp 17–18.

  27. 27.

    cf. http://www.deafau.org.au/info/policy_cochlear.php.

  28. 28.

    cf. Kraemer 2011; Schermer 2011; Rabins et al. 2009.

  29. 29.

    Witt et al. 2011, p 1.

  30. 30.

    Schüpbach et al. 2006.

  31. 31.

    Although the sample of this study is small, it is one of the few studies conducted in this field and hence the article is considered a landmark work, to which almost all of the other authors cited in this section refer.

  32. 32.

    Schüpbach et al. 2006, p 1815.

  33. 33.

    Schüpbach et al. 2006, p 1813.

  34. 34.

    Schüpbach et al. 2006, p 1813.

  35. 35.

    Schüpbach et al. 2006, p 1812.

  36. 36.

    Schüpbach et al. 2006, p 1813.

  37. 37.

    Kraemer 2011, p 4.

  38. 38.

    Kraemer 2011, p 1.

  39. 39.

    Kraemer 2011, p 4.

  40. 40.

    Schüpbach et al. 2006, p 1815.

  41. 41.

    Schermer 2011, p 2.

  42. 42.

    Also see for example Blumstein 2000; Charon 1989; Goffman 1959; Mead and Morris 1934; Van den Berg 2008 and Van den Berg 2010.

  43. 43.

    Benford and Malartre 2007, pp 46–47.

References

  • Benford G, Malartre E (2007) Beyond human: living with robots and cyborgs. Forge, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Blumstein P (2000) The production of selves in interpersonal relationships. In: Branaman A (ed) Self and society. Blackwell Publishers, Malden, pp 183–198

    Google Scholar 

  • Charon JM (1989) Symbolic interactionism: an introduction, an interpretation, an integration. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark A (2008) Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Goffman E (1959) The presentation of self in everyday life. Doubleday, Garden City

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger M (2000) Being and time (trans: Macquarrie J and Robinson E). Blackwell Publishing Ltd, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Ihde D (1990) Technology and the lifeworld: from garden to earth. Indiana University Press, Bloomington

    Google Scholar 

  • Kockelkoren P (2003) Technology: art, fairground, and theatre. NAi Publishers, Rotterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Kraemer F (2011) Me, myself and my brain implant: deep brain stimulation raises questions of personal authenticity and alienation. Neuroethics, DOI:10.1007/s12152-011-9115-7

  • Mead GH, Morris CW (1934) Mind, self & society from the standpoint of a social behaviorist. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Merleau-Ponty M (1962) Phenomenology of perception. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Plessner H (1975) Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. Walter De Gruyter & Co, Berlin

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Rabins P, Appleby BS, Brandt J, Delong MR, Dunn LB, et al (2009) Scientific and ethical issues related to deep brain stimulation for disorders of mood, behavior, and thought. Arch Gen Psychiatry 66(9): 931–937

    Google Scholar 

  • Schermer M (2011) Ethical issues in deep brain stimulation. Front Integr Neurosci 5:1–6

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schüpbach M, Gargiulo M, Welter ML, Mallet L, Béhar C, Houeto JL, Maltête D, Mesnage V, Agid Y (2006) Neurosurgery in Parkinson disease: a distressed mind in a repaired body? Neurology 66:1811–1816

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van den Berg B (2008) Self, script, and situation: identity in a world of ICTs. In: Fischer-Hübner S, Duquenoy P, Zuccato A, Martucci L (eds) Self, script, and situation: identity in a world of ICTs. Springer, New York, pp 63–77

    Google Scholar 

  • Van den Berg B (2010) The situated self: identity in a world of ambient intelligence. Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen

    Google Scholar 

  • Verbeek PP (2005) What things do: philosophical reflections on technology, agency, and design. Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park

    Google Scholar 

  • Witt K, Kuhn J, Timmermann L, Zurowski M, Woopen C (2011, forthcoming) Deep brain stimulation and the search for identity. Neuroethics. DOI:10.1007/s12152-011-9100-1

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. eLaw Center for Law in the Information Society, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands

    Bibi van den Berg

Authors
  1. Bibi van den Berg
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Bibi van den Berg .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. , School of Systems Engineering, University of Reading, Redhatch Dr, Earley, Reading, RG6 6AY, Berkshire, United Kingdom

    Mark N. Gasson

  2. , ICRI, KU Leuven, St. Michielsstraat 6, Leuven, B-3000, Belgium

    Eleni Kosta

  3. , Risk Science Centre, University of Michigan, Washington Heights 1420, Ann Arbor, 48109-2029, Michigan, USA

    Diana M. Bowman

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 T.M.C. ASSER PRESS, The Hague, The Netherlands, and the author(s)

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

van den Berg, B. (2012). Pieces of Me: On Identity and Information and Communications Technology Implants. In: Gasson, M., Kosta, E., Bowman, D. (eds) Human ICT Implants: Technical, Legal and Ethical Considerations. Information Technology and Law Series, vol 23. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-870-5_12

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Societies and partnerships

Search

Navigation