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The Function of Public International Law pp 109–134Cite as

The Concept of General Principles of Law Situated Within the Framework of Obligation and the Framework of Authorization

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Abstract

The concept of general principles of law is traditionally conceived as a supplementary source of public international law, enabling the PCIJ and the ICJ to settle a dispute between States in the eventuality of the absence of an applicable rule of conventional international law or customary international law applicable. The category of general principles of law was included in the Statute of the PCIJ and retained in the Statute of the ICJ, in other words, so as to enable the Court to avoid having to pronounce non liquet. Because it was also deemed desirable to limit the discretion of the Court in this respect, it was suggested that the Court should draw these general principles of law from the internal law of the members of international society. This historical background will be described in Sect. 8.2. Section 8.3 will then outline how this link between the concept of general principles of law and the internal law of States turned the question of the use of general principles of law into the question of the appropriateness of the transposition of a general principle of the internal law of the members of international society to the international plane. In this way, the domestic analogy became central to the concept of general principles of law.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Advisory Committee of Jurists 1920, pp. 293, 306–307, 310–311, 318–319, 322–325, 332, 336.

  2. 2.

    Advisory Committee of Jurists 1920, p. 293 (Mr. Root), 315 (Lord Phillimore).

  3. 3.

    Advisory Committee of Jurists 1920, p. 316, 320 (Lord Phillimore).

  4. 4.

    Advisory Committee of Jurists 1920, pp. 312–314 (Mr. De Lapradelle).

  5. 5.

    Advisory Committee of Jurists 1920, p. 314 (Mr. Ricci-Busatti): ‘By declaring the absence of a positive rule of international law, in other words an international limitation on the freedom of the parties, nevertheless a legal situation is established. That which is not forbidden is allowed; that is one of the general principles of law which the Court shall have to apply. If a case is brought before the Court and if the latter finds that no rules exist concerning it, the Court shall declare that one party has no right against the other, that the conduct of the accused State was not contrary to any admitted rule.’

  6. 6.

    Advisory Committee of Jurists 1920, pp. 311–312 (Mr. Loder).

  7. 7.

    Advisory Committee of Jurists 1920, pp. 312–313, 335–336 (Mr. De Lapradelle).

  8. 8.

    Advisory Committee of Jurists 1920, pp. 296–297, 307–308, 317, 319 (Mr. Hagerup).

  9. 9.

    Advisory Committee of Jurists 1920, p. 316, 335 (Lord Phillimore).

  10. 10.

    Advisory Committee of Jurists 1920, p. 335 (Mr. De Lapradelle).

  11. 11.

    Tomuschat 1999, Chap. IX, para 42; Dupuy 2002, pp. 180–182.

  12. 12.

    Weil 1992, pp. 144–149.

  13. 13.

    Spiropoulos 1928, pp. 9, 26–27, 32; Charles de Visscher 1933, pp. 406–411; Cheng 1953, p. 390: ‘Law having been applied between individuals ever since men began to form into societies, and having been developed and elaborated in the course of time into highly technical and rigorous systems in the municipal sphere, it is natural that, in seeking the general principles of this universal concept in order to apply them to relations between States, we should look to the municipal sphere. Assuming a basic analogy between individuals and nations, between international relations and relations between individuals, international courts and tribunals apply to international relations those principles underlying municipal rules of law which have been found to work substantial justice between individuals, whenever circumstances similar to those justifying their application in the municipal sphere exist.’; Quadri 1964, pp. 350–351: ‘La conscience juridique internationale (…) a tendance à se constituer dans une large mesure parallèlement à la conscience juridique interne; l’inverse est aussi vrai. Les principes généraux ne sont que des principes soutenus par l’autorité de l’opinion publique universelle qui se sont manifestés plus souvent in foro domestico, car l’expérience juridique interne est plus ancienne, plus intense et plus riche que l’expérience internationale; le droit interne ne doit cependant pas être considéré comme une source, mais comme un simple indice du status conscientiae des Etats, status conscientiae qui, lorsqu’il y a ressemblance entre les situations, est également décisif pour l’ordre interétatique.’

  14. 14.

    Lauterpacht 1927, para 34; Waldock 1962, pp. 57, 64–65; Akehurst 1976, p. 814, 816; Elias and Lim 1997, p. 23.

  15. 15.

    Ripert 1933, paras 11–13; Blondel 1968, p. 213.

  16. 16.

    International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion of 11 July 1950, Separate Opinion Sir Arnold McNair, ICJ Reports 1950, 128, 148: ‘International law has recruited and continues to recruit many of its rules and institutions from private systems of law. Article 38 (I) (c) of the Statute of the Court bears witness that this process is still active, and it will be noted that this article authorizes the Court to ‘apply … (c) the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations’. The way in which international law borrows from this source is not by means of importing private law institutions ‘lock, stock and barrel’, ready-made and fully equipped with a set of rules. It would be difficult to reconcile such a process with the application of ‘the general principles of law’. In my opinion, the true view of the duty of international tribunals in this matter is to regard any features or terminology which are reminiscent of the rules and institutions of private law as an indication of policy and principles rather than as directly importing these rules and institutions.’

  17. 17.

    Siorat 1958, paras 341–348, 419–426.

  18. 18.

    Lauterpacht 1927, para 34; Cheng 1953, p. 390.

  19. 19.

    Lauterpacht 1927, paras 29–34: ‘This means that although the Court may apply, for the purpose of a particular case, a rule of criminal or administrative law of sufficient generality, it is of general rules of private law that, on the whole, we must needs think in this connection. For it is, as a rule, private law which gives shape and definite form to those general sources. Here lies the organising and ordering part played by it. Those ‘general principles’ threaten otherwise to degenerate into altogether subjective natural law or legal philosophy.’; Spiropoulos 1928, p. 9, 31; Ripert 1933, para 13; Charles de Visscher 1933, p. 410; Grapin 1934, pp. 53–54; Küntzel 1935, pp. 47–48, 50.

  20. 20.

    Lauterpacht 1927, paras 69–79a; Ripert 1933, paras 17–36; Grapin 1934, pp. 67–89; Blondel 1968, pp. 214–220.

  21. 21.

    Lauterpacht 1927, paras 58–66; Spiropoulos 1928, pp. 37–41; Ripert 1933, paras 37–56; Grapin 1934, pp. 89–134; Küntzel 1935, p. 50; Cheng 1953, pp. 161–253; Blondel 1968, pp. 221–222; Verdross 1968, pp. 521–530.

  22. 22.

    Cheng 1953, pp. 29–31, 49–51, 390, 392.

  23. 23.

    South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), Judgment of 18 July 1966, Dissenting Opinion Judge Tanaka, ICJ Reports 1966, p. 6, 294.

  24. 24.

    Lauterpacht 1927, para 34: ‘However, it is probable that with the legal development of international organisation and the creation of central authoritative institutions, a body of rules will evolve which, as regulating the relations between individual States and the authoritative organs of the international community, will closely correspond to public law within the municipal sphere, for instance, to constitutional and administrative law. In fact, there are already now rudiments of international rules of this kind.’; Quadri 1964, pp. 352–353.

  25. 25.

    Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, Dissenting Opinion Judge Oda, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para 52.

  26. 26.

    Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, para 158.

    Lauterpacht 1927, para 50; Spiropoulos 1928, pp. 32–35, 35–37, 41–43; Ripert 1933, paras 57–75; Grapin 1934, pp. 136–143; Verdross 1935, p. 204; Cheng 1953, pp. 103–160; Blondel 1968, pp. 229–233.

  27. 27.

    Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment of 9 April 1949, Dissenting Opinion Judge Azevedo, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 83.

  28. 28.

    Advisory Committee of Jurists 1920, p. 314: ‘By declaring the absence of a positive rule of international law, in other words an international limitation on the freedom of the parties, nevertheless a legal situation is established. That which is not forbidden is allowed; that is one of the general principles of law which the Court shall have to apply. If a case is brought before the Court and if the latter finds that no rules exist concerning it, the Court shall declare that one party has no right against the other, that the conduct of the accused State was not contrary to any admitted rule.’.

  29. 29.

    Lauterpacht 1933, Chap. V, para 14.

  30. 30.

    Lauterpacht 1933, Chap. V, paras 15–20.

  31. 31.

    Lauterpacht 1933, Chap. V, para 21.

  32. 32.

    Weil 1992, pp. 204–212.

  33. 33.

    Siorat 1958, paras 279–282, 287–288.

  34. 34.

    Siorat 1958, paras 276–278, 283–288.

  35. 35.

    Siorat 1958, paras 349–352.

  36. 36.

    Siorat 1958, paras 385–389.

  37. 37.

    Friedmann 1964, p. 118: ‘The relative scarcity of positive norms of conduct stemming from international law is not to be confused with the entirely different principle of non liquet, i.e., the inability of international law to answer a given question because of absence of a definitive rule. That latter principle has been overwhelmingly rejected by writers as well as by the practice of international courts.’; 189: ‘the Lotus Case (…) is not, of course, a proposition for the application of non liquet in international law, but for the very different theory that international law grants to states the liberty to invoke national jurisdiction over foreigners where there is no positive international norm to the contrary.’

  38. 38.

    Kolb 1998, p. 668: ‘Le droit international n’a peut-être pas de lacunes formelles, car dans tout ordre juridique on peut faire application de la règle résiduelle de liberté ou repousser une demande insufissament fondée en droit.’; Kolb 2001, passim.

  39. 39.

    Fastenrath 1991, p. 246: ‘Aus dem Souveränitätsprinzip folgt also nicht so sehr die Gewährung rechtlicher Handlungsfreiheit als die Regel, dass Völkerrecht nur insoweit besteht, als die Staaten Rechtssätze aufgestellt haben; ausserhalb dieses Bereichs liegt ein rechtsfreier Raum.’ .

  40. 40.

    Fastenrath 1991, p. 251: ‘Unabhängig davon, ob nun der negative Freiheitssatz Bestandteil der Völkerrechtsordnung ist oder nicht, könnte man meinen, im Ergebnis ändere sich - soweit der Satz auf der Handlungsebene überhaupt anwendbar ist – nichts: In beiden Fällen seien die Völkerrechtssubjekte nicht gehindert, sich nach Belieben zu verhalten. Es sei letztlich gleichgültig, ob dies aufgrund eines Rechtssatzes oder in einem rechtsfreien Raum geschehe.’.

  41. 41.

    Castberg 1933, pp. 342–351.

  42. 42.

    Castberg 1933, pp. 343–344.

  43. 43.

    Siorat 1958, paras 358–360.

  44. 44.

    Castberg 1933, pp. 351–354.

  45. 45.

    Castberg 1933, pp. 354–362.

  46. 46.

    Castberg 1933, pp. 362–366.

  47. 47.

    Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2 of 30 August 1924, Series A. – No. 2, 28.

  48. 48.

    Castberg 1933, pp. 369–373; Favre 1968, pp. 373–374; Mosler 1974, pp. 136–157; Lammers 1980, pp. 66–69; Mosler 1992, pp. 513; Zemanek 1997, para 242.

  49. 49.

    Charles de Visscher 1933, p. 406; Basdevant 1936, p. 498; Waldock 1962, pp. 68–69; Blondel 1968, pp. 204–211; Weil 1992, pp. 149–151; Tomuschat 1999, Chap. IX, para 49; Dupuy 2002, pp. 179–187.

  50. 50.

    Charles de Visscher 1933, pp. 406–407: ‘Par là nous n’entendons pas établir entre les principes généraux de droit et les principes généraux du droit des gens une opposition de nature, mais bien plutôt marquer une différenciation dans l’évolution historique de ces principes envisagés dans leur ensemble. Tout en répondant à la conviction juridique des nations civilisées, les principes généraux de droit, visés à l’article 38, 3° du Statut de la Cour, ne se sont pas encore affirmés dans la sphère des relations internationales, tandis que les principes généraux du droit des gens se dégagent de normes déja sanctionnées par le droit international conventionnel ou coutumier; 406: Les principes généraux du droit international (…) procèdent directement de la pratique internationale elle-même, des traités ou des coutumes (…)’; Lammers 1980, pp. 57–59; Weil 1992, pp. 149–151, 179–186; Zemanek 1997, para 242; Tomuschat 1999, Chap. IX, para 49.

  51. 51.

    Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, Separate Opinion President Nagendra Singh, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, 153.

    Lammers 1980, pp. 57–59; Mosler 1992, p. 523.

  52. 52.

    Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 22.

    Mosler 1974, pp. 85–90; Weil 1992, pp. 149–151; Tomuschat 1999, Chap. IX, para 71; Dupuy 2002, pp. 182–187.

  53. 53.

    Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 15, 23.

    Mosler 1974, pp. 85–90; Tomuschat 1999, Chap. IX, para 71.

  54. 54.

    Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para 215.

  55. 55.

    Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, paras 218, 220. Weil 1992, pp. 149–151; Tomuschat 1999, Chap. IX, para 49; Dupuy 2002, pp. 182–187.

  56. 56.

    Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Preliminary Objections), Judgment of 11 June 1998, ICJ Reports 1998, 275, para 38. Zemanek 1997, paras 49–80.

  57. 57.

    Favre 1968, pp. 373–374; Mosler 1992, pp. 513, 522–524; Elias and Lim 1997, pp. 28–30; Zemanek 1997, paras 49–80; Tomuschat 1999, Chap. V, para 1.

  58. 58.

    Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 22.

  59. 59.

    Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 28–29: ‘It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in accordance with international custom that States in time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas without the previous authorization of a coastal State, provided that the passage is innocent. (…) the Court has arrived at the conclusion that the North Corfu Channel should be considered as belonging to the class of international highways through which passage cannot be prohibited by a coastal State in time of peace.’

  60. 60.

    Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 15, 23; Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002; Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), Judgment of 3 February 2006, ICJ Reports 2006, 3, para 64.

  61. 61.

    Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, 43, paras 161–167.

  62. 62.

    Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para 214.

  63. 63.

    Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para 215.

  64. 64.

    Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, Dissenting Opinion Judge Oda, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para 89; Dissenting Opinion Judge Sir Robert Jennings, 536–537.

  65. 65.

    Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, Separate Opinion Judge Ago, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para. 6.

  66. 66.

    Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Preliminary Objections), Judgment of 11 June 1998, ICJ Reports 1998, 275, para 39.

  67. 67.

    Elias and Lim 1997, pp. 28–30; Graf Vitzthum 1997, para 72; De Wet 2000, p. 190.

  68. 68.

    Elias and Lim 1997, pp. 28–30.

  69. 69.

    Elias and Lim 1997, pp. 28–30.

  70. 70.

    Touret 1973, pp. 172–184.

  71. 71.

    Touret 1973, pp. 172–184; De Wet 2000, p. 191.

  72. 72.

    Tomuschat 1999, Chap. V, para 3, Chap. IX, para 40.

  73. 73.

    Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 17–22.

  74. 74.

    Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 22.

  75. 75.

    Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 22–23.

  76. 76.

    Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 28–30.

  77. 77.

    Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 28–32.

  78. 78.

    Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 33–35.

  79. 79.

    Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment of 9 April 1949, Dissenting Opinion Judge Badawi Pasha, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 60–64; Dissenting Opinion Judge Krylov, 69–71; Dissenting Opinion Dr. Ečer, 118–127.

  80. 80.

    Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment of 9 April 1949, Dissenting Opinion Judge Winiarski, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 51–56; Dissenting Opinion Judge Krylov, 71–72.

  81. 81.

    Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 28.

  82. 82.

    Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment of 9 April 1949, Dissenting Opinion Judge Krylov, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 73–75; Dissenting Opinion Judge Azevedo, paras 27–39; Dissenting Opinion Dr. Ečer, 128–130.

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    Jan Anne Vos

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Vos, J.A. (2013). The Concept of General Principles of Law Situated Within the Framework of Obligation and the Framework of Authorization. In: The Function of Public International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-861-3_8

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