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The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Concept of Obligation Erga Omnes Situated Within the Framework of Obligation and the Framework of Authorization

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Abstract

The concept of international institution, dealt with in the previous chapter, refers the protection of the common aims or interests of the members of international society to the establishment of intergovernmental organizations and the concomitant creation of organs. Alongside the development of intergovernmental organizations, a second movement has taken place which locates the protection of the common or public interests of States in the ‘unorganized’ concept of international community. Descriptively, the concept of international community (community of States) has long since formed a part of international jurisprudence. However, with the development of the concept of jus cogens and the concept of obligation erga omnes within the concentric circle of the international community (of States) as a whole, the concept of international community has aspired to acquire a normative meaning. A peremptory norm of general international law is defined as a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted. An obligation erga omnes is defined as an obligation towards the international community as a whole. In these definitions, it is the international community (of States) as a whole which recognizes and accepts a norm of general international law as a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted and to which an obligation erga omnes is owed.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Fisheries Case, Judgment of 18 December 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 116, 138–139; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 63.

  2. 2.

    Yasseen 1976, pp. 40–41.

  3. 3.

    Schwarzenberger 1965, pp. 460–461: ‘In the absence of clear evidence of international jus cogens, the freedom of contract of the subjects of international law is unlimited. (…) The rules of international customary law (…) are prohibitory rules.’; Virally 1966, pp. 9–12: ‘(…) le jus cogens présente un caractère prohibitif (…) le jus cogens introduit une limitation à l’autonomie de la volonté des Etats, c’est-à-dire à leur liberté contractuelle, considérée traditionnellement comme absolue, parce qu’elle représente un des attributs les plus essentiels de la souveraineté. Sous cet aspect, le jus cogens pourrait être considéré comme une atteinte à la souveraineté des Etats.’; Schwelb 1967, pp. 948–949, 951, 963–964; Marek 1968, pp. 439–440: ‘Notre examen ne portera que sur la liberté de déterminer le contenu du contrat, en d’autres termes sur la question de savoir s’il existe en droit international des règles impératives venant limiter cette liberté (…) De tout temps le droit international, s’il existe, n’a fait que [limiter la volonté souveraine des Etats]; autrement il n’existerait pas. Cette limitation de la volonté souveraine des Etats peut être relativement faible; elle n’en reste pas moins l’essence même du droit international. (…) Par définition, tout droit – comme tout ordre normatif – est une limite à la liberté de ses sujets. Par le fait même de poser des règles, il ordonne, il permet et il interdit.’; Mosler 1968, pp. 14–22; Barberis 1970, p. 26: ‘L’objet de notre étude consiste à rechercher si, dans le domaine des normes réglant le droit conventionnel, il y en a qui interdisent aux Etats de déroger par la voie de traité à certaines règles juridiques. Il s’agit donc de savoir s’il y a des normes limitant la liberté contractuelle des Etats. En droit des gens il y a un principe selon lequel une conduite est permise dans la mesure où elle n’est pas juridiquement interdite. Par conséquent les Etats ont la liberté de donner aux conventions n’importe quel contenu et de déroger à n’importe quelle norme dans la mesure où il n’existe pas une norme juridique interdisant de le faire.’; Rozakis 1976, pp. 15–19, 27–30; De Hoogh 1991, pp. 185–187; Weil 1992, pp. 263–266.

  4. 4.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 63.

  5. 5.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 72.

  6. 6.

    Dupuy 2002, pp. 275–277.

  7. 7.

    Verdross 1937, pp. 571–572: ‘Our starting-point is the uncontested rule that, as a matter of principle, states are free to conclude treaties on any subject whatsoever. All we have to investigate, therefore, is whether this rule does or does not admit certain exceptions. The answer to this question depends on the preliminary question, whether general international law contains rules which have the character of jus cogens. For it is obvious that if general international law consists exclusively of non-compulsory norms, states are always free to agree on treaty norms which deviate from general international law, without by doing so, violating general international law. If, on the other hand, general international law does contain also norms which have the character of jus cogens, things are very different. For it is the quintessence of norms of this character that they prescribe a certain, positive or negative behavior unconditionally; norms of this character, therefore, cannot be derogated from by the will of the contracting parties.’; Verdross 1966, p. 55: ‘For this purpose it seems to me necessary to point out that, according to the general opinion of writers and jurists of international law, the power of states to conclude international treaties is in principle unlimited. They are in principle competent to enter into international agreements on any subject whatever. The problem arises, however, if under general international law there are exceptions to this principle. Hence the question is whether all norms of general international law may be repealed by treaty provisions in relations among the contracting parties, or whether there are norms of general international law restricting the freedom of states to conclude treaties. In other words the question is whether all norms of international law have the character of jus dispositivum or if there exist some norms having the character of jus cogens too, from which no derogation is permitted by an agreement inter partes.’; Weil 1992, pp. 263–266.

  8. 8.

    Gómez Robledo 1981, pp. 192–204.

  9. 9.

    Marek 1968, pp. 439–441; Mosler 1968, pp. 22–26; Weil 1992, pp. 281–282.

  10. 10.

    Suy 1967, pp. 70–76; Paulus 2001, pp. 351–354.

  11. 11.

    Dupuy 2002, pp. 280–283.

  12. 12.

    Gómez Robledo 1981, pp. 192–204. In so far as the concept of jus cogens is seen as sustained by both customary international law and conventional international law, the hierarchy may be located in the vertical relationship between norms of jus cogens and other norms; Rozakis 1976, pp. 19–24.

  13. 13.

    Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962; Second Phase), Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970, 3, para 33: ‘In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection, they are obligations erga omnes.’

  14. 14.

    Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962; Second Phase), Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970, 3, para 34: ‘Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination.’

  15. 15.

    Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Compnay, Limited(New Application: 1962; Second Phase), Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970, 3, para 34: ‘Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law (…); others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.’

  16. 16.

    Annacker 1994a, pp. 138–148, 162–165; Frowein 1994, pp. 427–429; Coffman 1996, pp. 296–299; Paulus 2001, pp. 364–379; Tams 2005, pp. 158–197.

  17. 17.

    Tams 2005, pp. 198–251.

  18. 18.

    Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited(New Application: 1962; Second Phase), Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970, 3, paras 32, 35–36.

  19. 19.

    Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962; Second Phase), Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970, 3, para 91: ‘With regard more particularly to human rights, to which reference has already been made in paragraph 34 of this Judgment, it should be noted that these also include protection against denial of justice. However, on the universal level, the instruments which embody human rights do not confer on States the capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such rights irrespective of their nationality. It is therefore still on the regional level that a solution to this problem has had to be sought; thus, within the Council of Europe, of which Spain is not a member, the problem of admissibility encountered by the claim in the present case has been resolved by the European Convention on Human Rights, which entitles each State which is a party to the Convention to lodge a complaint against any other contracting State for violation of the Convention, irrespective of the nationality of the victim.’

  20. 20.

    Case Concerning East Timor, Judgment of 30 June 1995, ICJ Reports 1995, 90, para 29: ‘In the Court’s view, Portugal’s assertion that the right of peoples to self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has an erga omnes character, is irreproachable. The principle of self-determination of peoples has been recognized by the United Nations Charter and in the jurisprudence of the Court (…); it is one of the essential principles of contemporary international law. However, the Court considers that the erga omnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are two different things. Whatever the nature of the obligations invoked, the Court could not rule on the lawfulness of the conduct of a State when its judgment would imply an evaluation of the lawfulness of the conduct of another State which is not a party to the case. Where this is so, the Court cannot act, even if the right in question is a right erga omnes.’

  21. 21.

    Case Concerning East Timor, Judgment of 30 June 1995, Dissenting Opinion Judge Weeramantry, ICJ Reports 1995, 90, 214: ‘In Barcelona Traction, the Court was (…) dealing with obligations that are owed erga omnes. In that case, the Court was spelling out that, where a State has an obligation towards all other States, each of those other States has a legal interest in its observance.’

  22. 22.

    Case Concerning East Timor, Judgment of 30 June 1995, Dissenting Opinion Judge Weeramantry, ICJ Reports 1995, 90, 214, 215.

  23. 23.

    Case Concerning East Timor, Judgment of 30 June 1995, Dissenting Opinion Judge Weeramantry, ICJ Reports 1995, 90, 215: ‘However, this case has stressed the obverse aspect of rights opposable erga omnes—namely, the right erga omnes of the people of East Timor to the recognition of their self-determination and permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. The claim is based on the opposability of the right to Australia.’

  24. 24.

    Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Preliminary Objections), Judgment of 11 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, 595, para 31: ‘(…) as to the territorial problems linked to the application of the Convention, the Court would point out that the only provision relevant to this, Article VI, merely provides for persons accused of one of the acts prohibited by the Convention to “be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed…”. It would also recall its understanding of the object and purpose of the Convention, as set out in its Opinion of 28 May 1951 (…):

    The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of the United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as ‘a crime under international law’ involving a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and which is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations (Resolution 96 (I), December 11th, 1946). The first consequence arising from this conception is that the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation. A second consequence is the universal character both of the condemnation of genocide and of the co-operation required ‘in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge’ (Preamble to the Convention). (I.C.J. Reports, 1951, p. 23.)

    It follows that the rights and obligations enshrined by the Convention are rights and obligations erga omnes. The Court notes that the obligation each State thus has to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the Convention.’; Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002; Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), Judgment of 3 February 2006, ICJ Reports 2006, 3, para 64.

  25. 25.

    Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Preliminary Objections), Judgment of 11 July 1996, Dissenting Opinion Judge Kreća, ICJ Reports 1996, 595, para 101.

  26. 26.

    Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, 136, para 154.

  27. 27.

    Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, 136, para 155.

  28. 28.

    Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, 136, paras 156, 159.

  29. 29.

    Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, 136, para 157.

  30. 30.

    Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, 136, paras 158, 159.

  31. 31.

    Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, Separate Opinion Judge Higgins, ICJ Reports 2004, 136, paras 36–39; Separate Opinion Judge Kooijmans, paras 37–51.

  32. 32.

    Rozakis 1976, pp. 115–122; Gómez Robledo 1981, pp. 155–162; Paulus 2001, pp. 348–350.

  33. 33.

    Rozakis 1976, pp. 15–19; Dupuy 2002, pp. 299–307.

  34. 34.

    MacDonald 1987, pp. 135–139; Gaja 1989, pp. 158–159; De Hoogh 1991, pp. 193–194; Annacker 1994b, pp. 49–50; Frowein 1994, pp. 405–406; Byers 1997, pp. 229–238; Paulus 2001, pp. 413–416; Dupuy 2002, pp. 377–387; Study Group 2006, paras 404–406.

  35. 35.

    Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002; Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), Judgment of 3 February 2006, ICJ Reports 2006, 3, para 64: ‘The Court observes, however, as it has already had occasion to emphasize, that “the erga omnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are two different things” (…), and that the mere fact that rights and obligations erga omnes may be at issue in a dispute would not give the Court jurisdiction to entertain that dispute. The same applies to the relationship between peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) and the establishment of the Court’s jurisdiction: the fact that a dispute relates to compliance with a norm having such a character, which is assuredly the case with regard to the prohibition of genocide, cannot of itself provide a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain that dispute. Under the Court’s Statute that jurisdiction is always based on the consent of the parties.’

  36. 36.

    Tomuschat 1999, Chap. II, paras 37–41, 43–45.

  37. 37.

    Weil 1992, pp. 261–262, 282–284, 306–312.

  38. 38.

    Mosler 1968, p. 37; Rozakis 1976, pp. 27–30; Annacker 1994b, p. 31; Bleckmann 1995, p. 32; Carillo Salcedo 1997, pp. 586, 592; Delbrück 1998, p. 27.

  39. 39.

    Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 15, 23: ‘In such a convention the contracting States do not have any interest of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d’être of the convention.’

  40. 40.

    Annacker 1994a, pp. 136–137; 1994b, p. 32.

  41. 41.

    Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, Joint Dissenting Opinion Judges Guerrero, Read, Hsu Mo, and Sir Arnold McNair, ICJ Reports 1951, 15, 46: ‘(…) an undeniable fact that the tendency of all international activities in recent times has been towards the promotion of the common welfare of the international community with a corresponding restriction of the sovereign power of individual States.’

    Annacker 1994a, p. 31; Carillo Salcedo 1997, p. 588.

  42. 42.

    Mosler 1968, p. 18: ‘Es ist aber unbestritten, dass die Gemeinschaft der Staaten (…) die Rolle des Gesetzgebers im Völkerrecht übernehmen kann. Wenn das richtig ist, kann die Staatengemeinschaft auch bestimmen, daß die frei gestalteten Beziehungen zwischen den Staaten eingeschränkt sind. (…) Sie können bestimmen, daß gewisse Rechtssätze der grundsätzlich freigestalteten Beziehung zwischen einzelnen Mitgliedern der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft vorgehen.’; MacDonald 1987, pp. 129–135.

  43. 43.

    Yasseen 1976, pp. 40–41; Rozakis 1976, pp. 73–84.

  44. 44.

    Gómez Robledo 1981, pp. 104–108; Weil 1992, p. 273. This tension is highlighted when conventional international law is treated as a possible source of general international law; Rozakis 1976, pp. 66–73; Gómez Robledo 1981, pp. 96–100.

  45. 45.

    Annacker 1994a, pp. 138–148; Annacker 1994b, pp. 53–65.

  46. 46.

    Paulus 2001, pp. 379–386.

  47. 47.

    Fitzmaurice 1957b, paras 124–126; 1958b, para 91; Dupuy 2002, pp. 135–146.

  48. 48.

    South West Africa Cases (Preliminary Objections), Judgment of 21 December 1962, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Sir Percy Spender and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ICJ Reports 1962, 319, 550–552.

    Weil 1992, pp. 282–291, 293–303; Zemanek 1997, paras 529, 603, 558–559, 612.

  49. 49.

    Tomuschat 1999, Chap. V, para 2, Chap. VII, paras 33–34, Chap. IX, para 5; Dupuy 2002, pp. 263–265, 307–310.

  50. 50.

    Bleckmann 1995, p. 32: ‘If in fact the obligations in the common interest establish rights of all States of the public international law community, then, as the other side of the coin, a right in the common interest must obligate all States.’

  51. 51.

    Virally 1966, pp. 13–14: ‘Le fait que le jus cogens soit constitué exclusivement de normes de droit international général souligne, en effet, qu’il présente un caractère d’universalité (…) En d’autres termes, on constate que la notion qui nous occupe conduit nécessairement à la conception d’une société internationale universelle, dotée de ses valeurs propres et pouvant invoquer, à son profit, un véritable intérêt général, qui doit l’emporter sur les intérêts particuliers de ses membres: il s’agit donc d’une société internationale à laquelle les Etats ne sont pas libres de s’ouvrir ou de se refuser.’; Coffman 1996, pp. 296–299; Ragazzi 1997, passim; De Wet 2000, pp. 192–193: ‘Such a constitutional outlook on the Charter and other peremptory norms offers a coherent explanation of current developments in international law by emphasizing the growing interest of the international community as a whole over those of individual states. (…) It is also an almost logical consequence that norms of such fundamental importance such as jus cogens would apply to the international community as a whole. (…) It could therefore be concluded that a norm from which no derogation is permitted because of its fundamental nature will normally be applicable erga omnes, i.e. all members of the legal community.’

  52. 52.

    Virally 1966, pp. 12–13.

  53. 53.

    Marek 1968, p. 449.

  54. 54.

    Virally 1966, p. 12; Touret 1973, pp. 180–184.

  55. 55.

    Verdross 1966, pp. 58–59; Mosler 1968, p. 37; Barberis 1970, pp. 36–37.

  56. 56.

    Verdross 1937, p. 572.

  57. 57.

    Mosler 1968, p. 37.

  58. 58.

    Case Concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea, Judgment of 8 October 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, 659, paras 283–305.

  59. 59.

    Case Concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea, Judgment of 8 October 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, 659, para 316.

  60. 60.

    Case Concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea, Judgment of 8 October 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, 659, para 315.

  61. 61.

    Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, Judgment No. 16 of 10 September 1929, Series A.—No. 23, 27.

  62. 62.

    Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, Judgment No. 16 of 10 September 1929, Series A.—No. 23, 26–29.

  63. 63.

    Case of the S.S. “Lotus”, Judgment No. 9 of 7 September 1927, Series A.—No. 10, 16, 18.

  64. 64.

    Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para 190; Separate Opinion President Nagendra Singh, 153.

  65. 65.

    Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, Separate Opinion Judge Sette-Camara, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, 199–200.

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Vos, J.A. (2013). The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Concept of Obligation Erga Omnes Situated Within the Framework of Obligation and the Framework of Authorization. In: The Function of Public International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-861-3_14

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