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International Law and the Separation of Powers

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Separating Powers: International Law before National Courts

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Abstract

This chapter considers the confluence of international law and national law in a domestic legal system through the channel of the separation of powers. The first part of the chapter sketches how the conception of international law has changed its orientation following the Second World War by pursuing a more internal view, the regulation through the mechanisms and institutions internal to the state itself. The second part of the chapter introduces the separation of powers doctrine and its irrevocable, necessary connection to a particular constitutional settlement. The third part of the chapter details the problem of drawing international law into a constitutional framework which allocates lawmaking power differently and elsewhere than in the international legal order. Three options for bridging this disjunction exist: the institutional, the presumptive and the reflexive.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Bentham is considered to have coined the term “international law”: Bentham 1843.

  2. 2.

    See, e.g., Polish Nationals in Danzig PCIJ A/B44 (1932), and Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia PCIJ A15 (1928); also Shaw 2008, pp. 135ff, pp. 257–259.

  3. 3.

    Trading on Hart 1961. Hoffmann 2005, p. 222 ascribes the distinction “internal/external” sovereignty to Vattel, Wheaton, and thus, the positivistic period in international law.

  4. 4.

    See, e.g., Polish Nationals in Danzig (PCIJ); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US) ICJ Reps 1986 p. 14; Lagrand (Germany v US) ICJ Reps 2001, p. 466, and Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v US) ICJ Rep. 2004, p. 12.

  5. 5.

    See, e.g., Bartlesen 1995, 2001 (questioning the modern need for and persistence of “state” and “sovereignty”); Poggi 1990; Philpott 2001 (the development of the concept “sovereignty”); O’Connell 1970, vol. I, p. 80ff; Brölmann 2007, p. 84 (deterritorialised actors establishing concurrent normative regimes to entrenched state concept), and Walter 2007, p. 191 (loosening connection of “constitution” from state concept); and Perkins 1997, p. 436ff (survey of “traditional canon”).

  6. 6.

    165 LNTS 19.

  7. 7.

    See e.g., Brownlie 2008, pp. 105ff, 289ff; Koskenniemi 2005, Chap. 4. By contrast Shaw 2008, pp. 645ff, 697ff, frames the issues under “jurisdiction” and “immunities from jurisdiction”.

  8. 8.

    Tracking broadly the 1933 Montevideo Convention criteria in its Article 1 (viz. a permanent population, defined territory, effective government and capacity to enter into relations with other states). The further nuance of whether state recognition is constitutive for another sovereign state, or merely confirmatory, is not relevant here.

  9. 9.

    A quick perusal of the earliest treatises on international law—aptly and accurately, the “law of nations”—reveals a goodly portion of their pages devoted to describing the exercises of ostensibly internal sovereignty.

  10. 10.

    Philpott’s “revolutions in sovereignty” which have arguable impacted upon international relations fall in fact into two categories: “Westphalian sovereignty” and the national political realities of the post-war twentieth century: Philpott 2001. See also Olsted 2005, p. 435 (definitions of the nation-state).

  11. 11.

    As argued by, e.g., Slaughter 2004, pp. 12ff, 131ff.

  12. 12.

    See e.g., Walter 2007; Paulus 2007; Peeters 2007; and Kumm 2009 (attacking “sceptics” who, by miscontruing constitutionalism, find it inapplicable to international law).

  13. 13.

    Aust 2007, pp. 13–14.

  14. 14.

    Thus the scores of academic works attacking or seeking to establish or buttress customary international law, in addition to the conceptual divide between international relations theory and international law theory, such as Boyle and Chinkin 2007; Byers 1999; Murphy 2010; Lepard 2010; Goldsmith and Posner 2005; Koh 1997; Kelly 2000; Guzman 2005, Trimble 1986 (and works cited therein) and see Perkins 1997, p. 461ff.

  15. 15.

    As considered by, inter alia, Fassbender 1998, and his reconsideration, Fassbender 2009. As an alternate perspective, Doyle 2009, p. 113ff. Paulus 2009 approaches the same idea.

  16. 16.

    Shaw 2008, p. 114 (and works cited at n. 193); at p. 115 he refers to a suggestion found in Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua ICJ Reps 1986 14. See also Brownlie 2008, p 15.

  17. 17.

    And Murphy 2010, p. 104ff suggests that they have not been effective.

  18. 18.

    As a leading proponent, Benvenisti 20081 and Benvenisti and Downs 2009; also Conforti 1993, p. 8 and Kumm 2003.

  19. 19.

    Notwithstanding Article 59 of the ICJ Statute limiting effect of its judgments to the parties.

  20. 20.

    Henkin 1979, p. 26.

  21. 21.

    Henkin 1979, p. 329.

  22. 22.

    Henkin’s response to the “cynic’s formula”: Henkin 1979, pp. 49ff, 90ff.

  23. 23.

    Henkin’s response: Henkin 1979, pp. 88ff, 319ff.

  24. 24.

    See e.g., Murphy 2010, esp. Chap. 3, concluding that the UNSC has often failed to accomplish its objectives of halting aggression and maintaining peace.

  25. 25.

    As seen in the debates surrounding the critique of international law in Goldsmith and Posner 2005, such as Berman 2006, Symposium 2006b and Hart 1961, pp. 89–91 (yet see p. 208ff).

  26. 26.

    Keohane and Nye 2000; also Byers 1999 (trying to reconcile international relations theory with international law theory) and see the historical overview of Knutsen 1997.

  27. 27.

    Article 26 VCLT; Aust 2007, pp. 179–181.

  28. 28.

    Aust 2007, pp. 13, 179–180; Shaw 2008, pp. 903ff.

  29. 29.

    Czech Republic v European Media Ventures SA [2007] 2 CLC 908 (QB Comm) 917–18 (citing O’Connell, International Law I, p. 252; and an epigram “a Treaty is a disagreement reduced to writing”); and see Aust 2007, Chap. 13 and p. 230ff.

  30. 30.

    The enduring favourite of those who argue no general obligation to obey the law being the stop sign in the middle of a lifeless desert: see e.g., Edmunson 1998, 2004. This was not a significant issue for Hart 1961, pp. 211–215.

  31. 31.

    Rao 2004 (referring to the ICJ, ITLOS, ICTY, ECtHR and WTO).

  32. 32.

    Henkin 1979, p. 47; Franck 1990 and Franck 1988 (perception of legitimacy through symbolism, coherence).

  33. 33.

    Goldsmith and Posner 2005, p. 185ff.

  34. 34.

    Hart 1961, pp. 54ff, 98ff. Echoing (with much greater impact) what Ehrlich 2002 had already observed.

  35. 35.

    See Cohen 1996, pp. 177–181 an insightful and cogent reply to Korsgaard 1996a.

  36. 36.

    Thus the tenor of Kelly 2000.

  37. 37.

    See e.g., Guzman 2005; Shaw 2008, p. 74ff (and with the idea of “automatic international custom” as suggested by Bin Cheng for UN resolutions on outer space); and Lepard 2010, pp. 34ff, 224ff.

  38. 38.

    Hoffman 2005, pp. 212–213, 226ff (suggesting that the decision of Judge Alvarez in PCIJ Lotus recognised at that early stage already the pressures of globalism on international law).

  39. 39.

    Delbrück 2001 (emphasising the denationalisation of law).

  40. 40.

    See further, e.g., Steger 2009; Friedmann 2000 and Friedmann 2005; Stiglitz 2003, and Delbrück 1993.

  41. 41.

    Taken up in and explored in a vast swathe of legal and ethical philosophy, an extremely brief cross-section of which includes McIntyre 1984 and McIntyre 1988; Berman 1983; Habermas, 1996 (establishing “constitutional patriotism”); de Been 2008, and Forst 2002; see also Brudner 2004 and Alexy 2004 (both positing a general theory of (constitutional) rights).

  42. 42.

    See, e.g., Haljan 2009, pp. 278–279, and works cited there.

  43. 43.

    Whether further the constitution itself derives from a norm one level higher, or represents an irreducible or self-generating and self-standing political fact, remains live for debate between the schools conventionally headlined by Kelsen on the one hand, and by Schmitt, Hart, and so on, on the other. But even behind Kelsen’s ultimate norm there is the irreducible and self-standing political fact of a world comprised of states.

  44. 44.

    Not to dismiss the impact of terrorism. In fact, the impulse to casual violence has shifted from states to non-state groups, working within and outside of established states, to destabilise them. See generally, Chadwick 1996.

  45. 45.

    As in Moran 2007.

  46. 46.

    Hence the qualification added by Koskeniemi 2005, p. 497ff: a peace based on principles of which we can approve. And echoed in Chadwick 1996.

  47. 47.

    Koskeniemi 2005, p. 476ff.

  48. 48.

    See, e.g., Franck 1990; Benvenisti 2008; Slaughter and Burke-White 2007; Moran 2007; Gardbaum 2009, and Kumm 2009.

  49. 49.

    See e.g., Raustialia 2006, p. 428ff; Boyle and Chinkin 2007. And hence the proliferation of treaty-based international bodies, such as the UN (1945, following upon the ill-starred League of Nations); the ICJ (1947, succeeding the PCIJ); the WTO (1948, 1995); the IMF (1944); the World Bank collection of bodies (IBRD 1947; IDA 1960; IFC 1956, MIGA 1988, and ICSID, 1966); NATO (1948); OECD (1961); OSCE (1975, successor to the CSCE); the CoE (1949, notably supporting the EConvHR and the ECtHR), and of course the predecessors to EU, the ECSC (1950) and the EEC (1957).

  50. 50.

    Not necessarily one of reprisal or aggression, but perhaps being ostracised, or being excluded from international dealings, and so on.

  51. 51.

    See e.g., Henkin 1979, p. 29.

  52. 52.

    Jennings and Watt 1992, p. 13, and see O’Connell 1970, vol I, 1.

  53. 53.

    Perkins 1997, p. 469ff.

  54. 54.

    Most international law scholars would root the concept of “ius cogens” more deeply in international law, by virtue of latter’s natural law heritage. Hence its appearance in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties represented merely a codification of a rule of longer standing, rather than the crystallisation of a new rule: see e.g., Byers 1997; Paulus 2005, pp. 300–301 (and works cited there). See also Weil 1983 and Tams 2005, p. 99ff. See also Lepard 2010, p. 243.

  55. 55.

    Boyle and Chinkin 2007, p. 1, and see also Hollis 2005.

  56. 56.

    A notable exception, opening the presumption within a pronounced Australian context to scrutiny, is Charlesworth et al. 2005. Also, for example, Slaughter’s model of “transjudicial communication and network”: see e.g., Slaughter 1994.

  57. 57.

    Codified in Articles 27, 46 VCLT.

  58. 58.

    Early examples being Lauterpacht 1933, and Kelsen 1944.

  59. 59.

    See e.g., Allott 2007; Brölmann 2007, p. 93ff; Peeters 2007; Berman 2005; Picciotto 2008 (imposed co-ordination, but no formalised constitutional structure), and de Wet 2006.

  60. 60.

    This phrasing accounts for the cogent demonstration by Vile that the (modern) doctrine of the separation of powers is in fact and pace Montesquieu an amalgamation of two different political features: balanced government and divided government: Vile 1998. And see also Gwyn 1966.

  61. 61.

    Montesquieu 1998, Book 11, Chaps. 1–6, 18, distinguishing it from political liberty in relation to the citizen, which he discusses in Book 12 following. The distinction, albeit not one without question and uncertainty, seems to separate the mechanism of making and enforcing the law (liberty in relation to the constitution) from the content of the law, in terms of certainty and its intrusive and restrictive nature (liberty in relation to the citizen). Hence a citizen’s political liberty is a function of his security from unclear, oppressive and overly restrictive laws. Suggesting this as some type of “rule of law” concept, complementing the constitutionalist first arm, is perhaps an overly eager and too hasty extrapolation.

  62. 62.

    See, e.g., Hamilton et al. 1961, No. 47 (Madison); Vile 1998 and Gwyn 1966 (historical basis); Barendt 199; Tomkins 1999; Barber 2001; Craig and Brown 1990. See also Ackerman 2000 and Carolan 2007 (arguing for a redefinition of the separation of powers).

  63. 63.

    Montesquieu 1998, XI, Chaps. 1–6.

  64. 64.

    Montesquieu 1998, XI Chap. 6, 163. It is under the second exception of mitigating the rigours of the law, that the well-cited passage occurs of judges being the “mouth that pronounces the words of the law, inanimate beings who can moderate neither its force nor its rigour.” On which, see the excellent article of Schönfeld 2008, taking issue with the passive “judge-automaton” reading of Montesquieu’s phrase.

  65. 65.

    As understood, e.g., by no less a figure than Madison, evidenced by his essay No. 47 in the Federalist Papers.

  66. 66.

    See e.g., Magill 2000 distinguishing the two main camps (in the US) into formalists and functionalists; Strauss 1987, and Ackerman 2000.

  67. 67.

    Montesquieu 1998, XI, Chap. 6.

  68. 68.

    Montesquieu 1998, XI, Chap. 6.

  69. 69.

    Montesquieu 1998, 1, Chap. 1.

  70. 70.

    Thus the conclusions of, e.g., Magill 2000, Strauss 1987 and Vile 1998.

  71. 71.

    Hence suggestions to build administrative agencies as a fourth estate to the trias politica given the development of the managerial state in the twentieth century, as in e.g., Carolan 2007; Strauss 1984 and Strauss 1987; McCutcheon 1994.

  72. 72.

    Montesquieu 1998, III, 3, Chap. 1; XI, Chap. 5. Hence his survey of the various types and examples of government, which serves as the framework for The Spirit of the Laws.

  73. 73.

    As seen, e.g., in the continuing call to establish formally the a-political administrative wing of government as a “fourth branch”: see, e.g., Carolan 2007 and Strauss 1984.

  74. 74.

    As advanced by Barber 2001 and Carolan 2007.

  75. 75.

    Montesquieu 1998, XXVI, Chap. 23; XXIX, Chap. 1.

  76. 76.

    Vile 1998, Chap. 2.

  77. 77.

    Drawing upon Marshall 1971; see also Dicey 1967; Bagehot 1873; and Munro 1999. Taking the pragmatic approach, Jennings acknowledges the difficulties presented by the “pure theory”, and concentrates instead on the doctrine’s actual manifestation in UK (British) constitutional practice: Jennings 1967, Chap. 1, esp. 18ff. More recent efforts take up the same path: Barendt 1995; Tomkins 1999 and Barber 2001.

  78. 78.

    Dicey 1967, pp. 336–338.

  79. 79.

    See, e.g., Claus 2005 who, like Dicey, would capitalise upon Montesquieu’s misconception of the English situation at the time; Dicey 1967, pp. 337–339.

  80. 80.

    There are for the 2010 general election 650 MP’s elected (per the Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986 c.56); previous elections also having about the same number, thus giving around 350 seats as the start of a comfortable majority: 1992: 336 Conservative, 271 Labour; 1997: 418L, 165C; 2001: 412L, 166C; 2005: 355L, 198C; 2010: 306C, 258L, 57 Liberal Democrat. Sec. 2 of the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 c.24 prohibits more than 95 MP’s from holding ministerial office—as a means of avoiding the perception of executive dominance of the legislature, per Loveland 2006, p. 140.

  81. 81.

    Echoed in Loveland 2006, p. 171.

  82. 82.

    Loveland 2006, pp. 132–134, 157, 250.

  83. 83.

    See e.g., Loughlin 1999, pp. 43ff.

  84. 84.

    E.g., R (Abbasi) v Sect. State FCO [2002] EWCA Civ 1598 (6 Nov. 2002); M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377; R (Jackson) v AG [2006] 1 AC 262; R v. Sect. State Home Dept. ex p. Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513 (decision not to legislate not reviewable) Magor and St Mellons Rural DC v Newport Corp [1952] AC 189; Buchanan v Babco [1977] QB 208 (CA); Buttes Oil v Occidental Oil and Hammer [1982] AC 88; R (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v Prime Minister [2002] EWHC 2777 (Div. Ct.) (17 Dec. 2002); Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 375; R (Bancoult) v and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] 3 WLR 955; Dupont Steels Ltd v Sirs [1980] 1 WLR 142 (HL) and Hinds v The Queen [1977] AC 195 (PC Jamaica).

  85. 85.

    Jennings 1967, p. 20.

  86. 86.

    See e.g., Campbell and Goldsworthy 2000; Forsyth 2000 and Allan 2001 (liberalism perspective).

  87. 87.

    Bagehot 2001, p. 48.

  88. 88.

    Across English constitutional history, through the Civil War and Interregnum, the Restoration and Glorious Revolution, to the Act of Settlement 1700 and even the Parliament Act 1911—and not to be tied unrealistically to a larger than life Magna Carta.

  89. 89.

    By convention and tradition, a bill is introduced in the Commons on first reading, and by bare majority vote (usually a formality) then passes to a second reading which is a more substantial Parliamentary debate. By bare majority vote approving the bill’s contents, it moves to a more detailed consideration before a (standing) committee. Next the bill returns to the Commons in the report stage, where committee amendments or government ones are debated. The bill (as amended) moves to third reading, which a bare majority vote suffices to send the bill for consideration by the House of Lords. The House of Lords may also propose legislation, but its success in the Commons is very much in the hands of the government and its desired Parliamentary timetable. The passage of the bill there mirrors in general terms that in the Commons. If amended in the Lords, the bill must return to the Commons for approval. If the Commons then amends the bill further, these amendments must in turn be approved by the Lords. The bill is not ready for assent by the Queen and promulgation until both the Commons and the Lords consent to a single text.

  90. 90.

    See e.g., Loveland 2006, p. 137ff; and generally Adonis 1993.

  91. 91.

    In practice, the variety of usages shows that it matters little what precise title the regulation bears: what counts is who made the rule, on what authority and for what purpose. This said, there is nonetheless some distinction to be made between “Orders in Council” (representing both significant regulations prescribed by statute to issue from the Crown, and the formal exercise of the Crown prerogative not pursuant to a statute), and byelaws (regulations issued by municipal authorities). See generally, House of Commons Information Office 2008 and the Statutory Instruments Act 1946.

  92. 92.

    While statutory backing to administrative act certainly and presumptively grounds their judicial review, the absence of that backing does not exclude the possibility of judicial review. The difficulties or reserve expressed in Wade and Forsyth 2009 reflects a formalistic approach which does not account for the more substantialist approach of the courts: i.e. who made the rule, for what purpose and how was it actually used; hence the cases cited in Wade and Forsythe 2009, pp. 741–744, and see also R v D ir. Pub. Prosecutions Ex p. Kebilene [2002] AC 326 (ECHR, referenced by the Minister in making his decision, though having no legal force), and R (Abbasi) v Sect. State FCO (Foreign & Commonwealth Office Circular on Diplomatic Assistance to Citizens Abroad, now Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2011a and Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2011b).

  93. 93.

    See e.g., Loveland 2006, pp. 152–153, and Wade and Forsythe pp. 734–7; Barber and Young 2003.

  94. 94.

    Craig 2008, p. 725; Loveland 2006, p. 140ff.

  95. 95.

    Allen 1965, p. 136 cited in Craig 2008, p. 725.

  96. 96.

    See e.g., Maitland 1961, pp. 195–196, 418–430; and Dicey 1967, pp. 423–427, 464ff.

  97. 97.

    Dicey 1967, p. 425.

  98. 98.

    Incidentally, like arguments can be made for presidents, albeit whose constitutional inheritance and basis renders an equivalent position much less justifiable: see Martinez 2005–2006.

  99. 99.

    For the leading and recent listing, see Council of Civil Service Unions v Min. Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (per Lord Roskill), and Burmah Oil v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 (per Lord Reid); R v Sect. State Home Dept. ex p. Northumbria Police Authority [1988] 1 All ER 556 (CA).

  100. 100.

    See generally, e.g., Sunkin and Payne 1999 covering different aspects of the prerogative powers; Jackson 1964; Markensis 1973; and see also e.g., AG v De Keyser’s Hotel [1920] AC 508; Laker Airways v DTI [1977] 2 All ER 182 (CA); Council of Civil Service Unions v Min. Civil Service [1985] AC 374; R (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v Prime Minister [2002] EWHC 2777 (Div. Ct.).

  101. 101.

    Blackstone 1979, vol. I Chap. 7, pp. 231–232; and see e.g., Wade 1999, p. 29ff, and Wade 1985. see also Payne 1999, p. 77.

  102. 102.

    Dicey 1967, p. 425, and generally pp. 423–427, 464–469 (echoing Locke, Two Treatises, as per Payne 1999, pp. 88–90).

  103. 103.

    See e.g., Loughlin 1999, p. 64ff.

  104. 104.

    Laski 1918–1919 quoted in part in Loughlin 1999, pp. 64–65, and also echoing Locke: see Payne 1999, pp. 88–89.

  105. 105.

    For example, Walker v Baird [1892] AC 491 (PC); Rustomjee v The Queen (1876) 2 QBD 69 (CA); AG v de Keyser’s Royal Hotel [1920] AC 508; Burmah Oil v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75; Nissan v AG [1970] AC 179; The Zamora [1916] 2 AC 77 (prize claim during war time); Council of Civil Service Unions v Min. Civil Service [1985] AC 374; R (Gentle) v The Prime Minister [2008] 1 AC 1356.

  106. 106.

    Following from Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74.

  107. 107.

    Rustomjee v The Queen (1876) 2 QBD 69 (CA); Civilian War Claimants v The King [1932] AC 14, and more recent authority confirming the established position: Republic of Italy v Hambros Bank [1950] Ch 314; JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) v DTI [1990] 2 AC 418; R v Sect. State Home Dept ex p. Brind [1991] 1 AC 696; R v Lyons [2003] 1 AC 976; In re McKerr [2004] 1 WLR 807 (HL).

  108. 108.

    Practice Statement [1966] 1 WLR 1234, and for the Court of Appeal, see e.g., Young v Bristol Aeroplane [1944] KB 718 (CA).

  109. 109.

    Stockdale v Hansard (1839) 112 ER 1112 (HL); Bradlaugh v Gossett (1884) 12 QBD 271 (CA).

  110. 110.

    Pickin v British Rwy [1974] AC 765; Edinburgh and Dalkeith Rwy Co v Wauchope (1842) 8 ER 279 (HL); and see also, e.g., Fletcher v Peck 10 US 87 (1810) from the US standpoint.

  111. 111.

    Bowles v Bank of England [1913] 1 Ch 57.

  112. 112.

    Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251, 279–280 (in contrasting the desirability and accessibility of travaux prépartoires for domestic legislation and international instruments).

  113. 113.

    On which see Bennion 1984.

  114. 114.

    See Re Queensland Mercantile and Agency [1892] 1 Ch 219 CA; Salomon v Commrs Customs and Excise [1967] 2 QB 116 CA; Collco Dealings v IRC [1962] AC 1; Kuwait Airways v Iraq Airways (Nos 4 & 5) [2002] 2 AC 883; and see also Bennion 1984, s134 and cases cited therein.

  115. 115.

    Malone v Commr Metropolitan Police (No 2) [1979]; Corocraft v Pan Am Airways [1968] 3 WLR 1273 (CA) per Diplock LJ (Denning MR advocating a much more activist stance).

  116. 116.

    Council of the Civil Service Unions v Min. Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (“the GCHQ case”); R (Bancoult) v Sect. State Foreign and Cmwth. Affairs (No 2) [2008] 3 WLR 955 (PC).

  117. 117.

    The listing by Lord Roskill in the GCHQ case being taken as definitive.

  118. 118.

    R v Sect. State (Home Dep ex p. Bentley [1993] 4 All ER 442; R (Abbasi) v Sect. State FCO [2002] EWCA Civ 1598.

  119. 119.

    See further Cohn 2009 and Elliott 2009.

  120. 120.

    R (Gentle) v The Prime Minister et al. [2008] 1 AC 1356; R (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v The Prime Minister [2002] EWHC 2777 (Div. Crt.) (17 Dec. 2002).

  121. 121.

    See, e.g., The Parlement Belge (1879–1880) LR 5 PD 197 (CA); Luther v Sagor [1921] 3 KB 532 (CA); Chung Chi Cheung v The King [1939] AC 160 (PC); Blackburn v AG [1971] 1 WLR 1037 (CA); Philippine Admiral v Wallem Ship’g [1977] AC 373; Buttes Oil v Occidental Oil and Hammer [1982] AC 888.

  122. 122.

    See, e.g., The Schooner “Exchange” v McFaddon 11 US 116 (1812), cited with approval by Lord Atkin in Chung Chi Cheung v The King [1939] AC 160 (PC).

  123. 123.

    See, e.g., Sovereign Immunity Act 1978 c.33 (as amd.); Playa Larga (Owners of Cargo laden on) v I Congreso del Partido (Owners of) [1983] 1 AC 244.

  124. 124.

    R v Bow St. Met. Stipendiary Magistrate ex p. Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [2000] 1 AC 147.

  125. 125.

    R (Abbasi) v Sect. State FCO [2002] EWCA Civ 1598 (6 Nov. 2002); R (Al Rawi) v Sect. State FCO [2008] QB 289 (CA); Kuwait Airways v Iraq Airways (Nos 4 & 5) [2002] 2 AC 883.

  126. 126.

    The constitutional periods are as follows (simplifying by omitting the various intermittent constitutional phases within each bloc): monarchical deconstruction (1789–1791); First Republic (1793–1804), First Empire (1804–1815); Restoration (1815–1848); Second Republic (1848–1851); Second Empire (1852–1870); Third Republic (1870–1940); Occupation and Reconstruction (1940–1946); Fourth Republic (1946–1958); and Fifth Republic (1958–present). See generally, e.g., Favoreu et al. 2008; Chantebout 2008; Ardant and Mathieu 2008 and Gicquel and Gicquel 2008.

  127. 127.

    Favoureu et al. 2008, pp. 405–406, and for recent English language examinations, Lassser 2004, and Neuborne 1982.

  128. 128.

    Following Favoureu et al. 2008 and Gicquel and Gicquel 2008.

  129. 129.

    As noted in Gicquel and Gicquel 2008; and see Vile 1998, and Bell 2008.

  130. 130.

    Jean-Claue Colliard, cited in Gicquel and Gicquel 2008, p. 486.

  131. 131.

    “Toute société dans laquelle la garantie des droits n’est pas assurée, ni la separation des pouvoirs determine, n’a point de constitution.”

  132. 132.

    Invoked once to date, by De Gaulle during the Algerian Crisis.

  133. 133.

    Expressly (typically in a “non-obsolescence Act”), or implicitly/by necessary implication: see, e.g., 72–73 DC (29 Feb. 1972), (implicit); 86–224 DC (23 Jan. 1987) (implication).

  134. 134.

    See e.g., 62–20 DC (4 Dec. 1962) (election law); 72–73 DC (29 Feb. 1972) (salaried employees); 77–101 DC (3 Nov. 1977) (reform of expropriation laws), and 96–179 DC (14 Oct. 1999) (immigration control).

  135. 135.

    Lasser 2004 and Neuborne 1982, p. 384ff.

  136. 136.

    See, e.g., Cappeletti 1985 (as well as Cappeletti 1980). Vile 1997, Chaps. 7–9 reviews clearly and thoroughly the historical aspects.

  137. 137.

    As confirmed in, e.g., CdE 13 Dec. 1889 (Cadot) (rejection of residual review jurisdiction held by Ministers (minister–juge) in competition with or superior to the CdE). See generally (for an English language account of French administrative law), Bell and Neville Brown 1998, esp. Chaps. 2 and 6.

  138. 138.

    See Neuborne 1982, p. 385ff; and generally, Bell and Neville Brown 1998; and Auby and Cluzel–Métayer 2007.

  139. 139.

    CdE 20 Oct. 1989 (Nicolo); see the case comment of Bothwell 1990.

  140. 140.

    CdE 30 October 1998 (Sarran); CdE 6 June 1997 (Aquarone); see also the comment on Sarran of Reestman 2002 (reviewing the state of French law on the matter).

  141. 141.

    See e.g., CdE 20 Oct. 1989 (Nicolo). And as do their non public law colleagues in the other judicial streams: on which, see Lasser 2004.

  142. 142.

    Pfersmann 2010, p. 224 (arguing that the Conseil was intended at the outset to keep Parliament within a limited jurisdiction, but has now regrettably grown into more of a constitutional court).

  143. 143.

    2009–595 DC (3 Dec 2009).

  144. 144.

    80–116 DC (17 July 1980); 92–312 DC (2 Sept. 1992); 2007–560 DC (20 Dec. 2007).

  145. 145.

    See e.g., 97–394 DC (31 Dec. 1997) (relating to 92–312 DC and 92–308 DC) and 2007–560 DC (20 Dec. 2007) (relating to 2004–505 DC); and all relating to fundamental changes to the treaties constituting the EU.

  146. 146.

    Namely, 1840, 1848, 1884, 1887, 1917, 1922, 1938, 1946, 1948, 1953, 1956, 1963, 1972, 1983, 1987, 1995, 1999/2000, 2002, 2005, 2006 and 2008, and depending on how one counts them.

  147. 147.

    See generally, Elzinga and De Lange 2006; Kortmann 2005, and the English language works Heringa and Kiiver 2007 and Kortmann et al. 2002.

  148. 148.

    For the sake of technical completeness, there is also some decentralisation of powers (Chap. VII, Articles 123–136), having been spun off to provinces, “waterschappen” (Water Management Boards), and municipalities. Accounted for must also be the provisions made for the Imperial Kingdom of the Netherlands (pursuant to the Act Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden) which encompasses its overseas territories as well, and whose complex status (in some ways a style of federalism) is continually being reviewed and adjusted. Unless otherwise specified, “the Netherlands” in what follows refers only to the continental state.

  149. 149.

    See Bovend’Eert and Kummeling 2004.

  150. 150.

    Bovend’Eert and Kummeling 2004, p. 351ff.

  151. 151.

    “Ministerraad”, distinguished from the Inner Cabinet (of select senior ministers) which has no explicit constitutional foundation, but rather originates in parliamentary/constitutional convention.

  152. 152.

    While bills must also pass in the First Chamber, this assembly does not have the right to amend or propose bills. Bills must be submitted to the Raad van State (Conseil d’Etat) for nonbinding preliminary review and advice, and thereafter are reviewed in committee and approved by majority vote, with or without amendments, before moving to the First Chamber for consideration. That consideration is either to accept or reject the bill: the Chamber has no power of amendment. Because of what is effectively a right of veto, the practice has developed that, if the First Chamber desires amendments in order to pass the bill, it will advise the Second Chamber which will then pass the necessary supplementary amendment, and the First Chamber will adopt both instruments as a whole.

  153. 153.

    Bovend’Eert and Kummeling 2004, p. 177.

  154. 154.

    Article 89(3) and (4) refer to “algemene maatregelen van bestuur” and “algemeen verbindende voorschriften” respectively, which translate into “general rules of governance” and “generally binding precepts”. The latter is understood as the general class, qua “law” and subsuming the former. The former refers to two further categories of regulation: those issuing from the Crown, government ministries or government departments (see Orde in de regelgeving) and those issuing independently through the residue of the Crown prerogative. By constitutional convention, the latter class of prerogative regulation is generally reserved (subject to the impact on a person and the potential for criminal sanction) for urgent, emergency situations, rules internal to government administration, and temporary, subsidiary measures: Jaarverslag Raad van State 2002, p. 25. See generally, Elzinga and de Lange 2006, pp. 673–677, and Kortmann 2005, pp. 351–358. See also van der Burg 1995, p. 313ff.

  155. 155.

    I omit here the courts dealing with corporate matters.

  156. 156.

    See, for the organising statute of the ordinary courts, including the Hoge Raad, Wet op de rechterlijk organisatie (as amd).

  157. 157.

    Articles 74, 76–80 Wet op de rechterlijk organisatie.

  158. 158.

    See further Elzinga and de Lange 2006, p. 595ff; Kortmann 2005, p. 256ff; Damen et al. 2005; Seerden and Stroink 2007.

  159. 159.

    For recent consideration, see, e.g., Verhey 2005; also Bellekom et al. 2002, p. 270 and Mok 1984, p. 55.

  160. 160.

    An amalgamation and recasting in 1983 of what was originally Article 115 in the 1848 Constitution, providing that legislation is inviolable, and Article 60 in the 1953 Constitution, that the courts may not rule on the constitutionality of international agreements (scil., in general terms, treaties).

  161. 161.

    “De regter moet volgens de wet regt spreken: hij mag in geen geval de innerlijk waarde of billijkheid der wet beoordelen.”

  162. 162.

    Specifically Prakke 1992, Koopmans 1992, and Barendrecht 1992; Prakke 1972; Schutte 2004; Hirsch Ballin 2005; de Lange 2006, and Schutgens 2007.

  163. 163.

    HR 13 Jan. 1879, W 1879 4330.

  164. 164.

    HR 16 May 1986, NJ 1987 251. See also HR 24 Jan. 1969 (Pocketbooks II); HR 1 July 1983, NJ 1984 360 (LSV), and HR 1 Dec. 1993, AB 1994 35.

  165. 165.

    HR 12 May 1999, NJ 2000 271.

  166. 166.

    HR 21 March 2003, NJ 2003 691.

  167. 167.

    In a complementary decision, HR 19 Nov. 1999, AB 2000 387, the Court held that it has no jurisdiction to forbid the passage of such legislation.

  168. 168.

    To give just a small sampling from the academic camp: Goldwin and Kaufman 1986; Redish 1995, esp. Chap. 4; Gwyn 1989; Merrill 1991; Brown 1991; Nourse 1996 and Nourse 1999; Flaherty 1996 (the executive being the “most dangerous branch”); Magill 2000 (and the sizeable listing of separation of powers Articles at nn. 34 and 35, pp. 1136–1137) and Magill 2001; Ackerman 2000 and Colburn 2004.

  169. 169.

    On the “balancing” nature to the US version, see, e.g., CFTC v Schor 478 US 833 (1986); Morrison v Olson 487 US 654 (1988); US v Mistretta 488 US 361 (1989) 381; see also Bowsher v. Synar 478 US 714 (1986).

  170. 170.

    The first 10 amendments were adopted by states’ ratification between 1789 and 1791, and include the “Bill of Rights”. The last amendment, the 27th, was first proposed in 1789, and only received the last necessary state’s ratification (that of Michigan) in 1992.

  171. 171.

    On the history of the separation of powers in the US, see esp. Vile 1998, esp. Chaps. 6, 10, and 11; and Gwyn 1966.

  172. 172.

    Curtiss Wright v US 299 US 304 (1936) 318–320 (per Sutherland J).

  173. 173.

    See e.g., Missouri v Holland 252 US 416 (1920); American Insurance Assoc. v Garamendi 539 US 396 (2003) and Dames Moore v Regan 453 US 654 (1981) (executive agreements), and see Curtiss Wright v US 299 US, at 316ff.

  174. 174.

    Youngstown Sheet & Tube v Sawyer 343 US 579 (1952) 634–635, per Jackson J.

  175. 175.

    US v Sprague 282 US 716 (1931) 733; and US v Darby 312 US 100 (1941) 124, “The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.” And see Fry v US 421 US 542 (1975) 547.

  176. 176.

    On which, see Ackerman 1991 and Ackerman 1998.

  177. 177.

    See e.g., Cooper 2002; Strauss 1997; Fleischman and Afuses 1976; Cash 1963. Consider also the (debated) legal implications of the presidential use of signing statements (comments issued with legislation at the time of presidential signing) to declare how aspects of particular legislation will or will not be enforced, consistent with the President’s views on its constitutionality and constitutional application: see e.g., Lee 2008; Thompson 2007; Skrodzki 2007, and Bradley 2003; and see generally Cleary 2007.

  178. 178.

    McCulloch v Maryland 17 US 316 (1819) 405.

  179. 179.

    See, e.g., Monaghan 1970; Sunstein 2005; Hansen 2009; Devins 2009 and Blomquist 2010.

  180. 180.

    Youngstown Sheet & Tube v Sawyer, 343 US 579 (1952) 637–660.

  181. 181.

    Black, Burton, Jackson, Clark, Frankfurter, and Douglas JJ concurring; Vinson CJ, Reed and Minton JJ dissenting. See Swaine 2010 (and commentaries cited therein).

  182. 182.

    Youngstown Sheet & Tube v Sawyer, 343 US 579 (1952) 637–638.

  183. 183.

    See e.g., Chevron v NRDC 467 US 837 (1984) and US v Mead 533 US 218 (2001) (test for judicial deference to regulatory policies).

  184. 184.

    Stack 2005, p. 546 (arguing for a broader coverage for judicial review of presidential orders, and narrower grounds for constitutional exemption from that review).

  185. 185.

    Following Stack 2005; Strauss 1997, and Cash 1963.

  186. 186.

    As in Youngstown v Sawyer 343 US 579 (1952); Curtiss Wright v US 299 US 304 (1936); Dames & Moore v Regan 453 US 654 (1981), and Sealand Serv. Inv. v ICC 738 F (2nd) 1311 (DC Cir.) (1984) (retroactive effect permissible).

  187. 187.

    See e.g., American Ins. v Garamendi 539 US 396 (2003) (executive agreement) and Old Dominion Branch 496 Nat. Assoc. Letter Carriers v Austin 418 US 264 (1974) (executive labour relations order pre-empts state libel laws).

  188. 188.

    Franklin v Massachusetts 505 US 788 (1992) (Administrative Procedure Act—V US Code §5—not applying to executive orders).

  189. 189.

    Dalton v Spector 511 US 482 (1994) (review for abuse of discretion not available). Also Curtiss Wright v US (export restrictions); Dames & Moore v Regan (staying civil claims).

  190. 190.

    Note also V US Code §6 which echoes the rule and burden reducing objectives of the UK Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act.

  191. 191.

    Chevron v NRDC 467 US 837 (1984) and US v Mead 533 US 218 (2001) (review whether EPA legislation allows agency to fill definitional gaps, but no review of the wisdom of regulations if they are not otherwise unreasonable).

  192. 192.

    Overview based on Magill 2000.

  193. 193.

    See e.g., Reid v Covert 354 US 1 (1957); Bowsher v Synar 478 US 714 (1986) (legislation limiting federal budget intrudes into executive function), and CFTC v Schor 478 US 833 (1986) (primacy of federal agency regulating commodities trader over state adjudicative powers).

  194. 194.

    See e.g., Myers v US 272 US 52 (1926) 293 (“… by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy” per Brandeis J dissenting).

  195. 195.

    McCulloch v Maryland 17 US 316 (1819) (federal vs state power); Missouri v Holland 252 US 416 (1920) and Youngstown Sheet & Tube v Sawyer 343 US 579 (1952) (foreign affairs powers, executive orders, and treaties).

  196. 196.

    Buckley Valeo 424 US 1 (1976); CFTC v Schor 478 US 833 (1986); Bowsher v Synar 478 US 714 (1986) (if retains legislative character, must still comply with legislative functions per Art 1); INS v Chadha 462 US 919 (1983); Morrison v Olson 487 US 654 (1988); Metro Washington Airport Auth v Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise 501 US 252 (1991), and see also Free Enterprise Fund v CFAO 551 US _ (2010).

  197. 197.

    Lujan v Dept Wildlife 504 US 555 (1992).

  198. 198.

    INS v Chadha.

  199. 199.

    Clinton v City of New York 524 US 417 (1998).

  200. 200.

    American Ins. v Canter 26 US (1 Pet.) 511 (1828); Gordon v US 69 US (2 Wall.) 561 (1864); Northern Pipeline v Marathon 458 US 50 (1982) (bankruptcy courts); Thomas v Union Carbide Agri. Prods 473 US 568 (1985); CFTC v Schor (orders of commodities trading commission enforceable in federal courts, not contra Art III guarantees), Mistretta v US 488 US 361 (1989) (sentencing commission issuing guidelines binding on federal judges); Granfinanciera SA v Nordberg 492 US 33 (1989) (id., jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts).

  201. 201.

    Youngstown Sheet & Tube v Sawyer, 343 US 579 (1952) 635, and see Elliott 1989, pp. 506–507.

  202. 202.

    Marbury v Madison 5 US 179 (1801–1803); Mistretta v US 488 US 361 (1989) 360 citing US v Nixon 418 US 683 (1974).

  203. 203.

    Recited in, e.g., Marbury v Madison and Mistretta v US 488 US, 380ff. Nixon v Admin Gen Services 433 US 425 (1977) 443 (three branches of government not hermetically sealed).

  204. 204.

    US v. Lopez 514 US 568 (1995) 577–578; US v Morrison 529 US 598 (2000), and see US v. Harris 106 US 629 (1883) 635.

  205. 205.

    Mistretta v US 488 US, 385ff; Northern Pipeline v Marathon Pipe 458 US 50 (1982); DC Crt of Appeals v Feldhaver 460 US 462 (1983), and Glidden v Zdansk 370 US 530 (1962).

  206. 206.

    Marbury v Madison and Ware v Hylton 3 US 199 (1796).

  207. 207.

    369 US 186 (1962); see also Nixon v US 506 US 224 (1993).

  208. 208.

    See e.g., Oetjen v Central Leather 246 US 297 (1918); Chicago & S Airlines v Waterman Steamship 333 US 103 (1948); Luther v Borden 48 US 1 (1849) and see Japan Whaling Assoc v American Cetacean Soc 478 US 221 (1986).

  209. 209.

    Goldman v Weinberger 475 US 503 (1986) 507, and see Powell v McCormack 395 US 486 (1964); Gilligan v Morgan 413 US 1 (1973).

  210. 210.

    Underhill v Hernandez 168 US 250 (1897) 252 (per Fuller CJ); and likewise to individuals acting as agents of state: Oetjen v Central Leather.

  211. 211.

    Banco Nacional Cuba v Sabbatino 376 US 398 (1964) 423, and 427–428 (with reference to the vertical separation of powers).

  212. 212.

    Discounting federally administered territories.

  213. 213.

    As recognised, e.g., in Metro Washington Airport Auth v Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, and South Dakota v Dole 483 US 203 (1987).

  214. 214.

    See, e.g., Arizona v Evans 514 US 1 (1995); Gregory v Ashcroft 501 US 452 (1991), and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 469 US 528 (1985).

  215. 215.

    As recognised in the longstanding practice of the Supreme Court: see e.g., Mistretta v US 488 US 361 (1989) 380– 383 (“encroachment and aggrandizement” animating separation of powers jurisprudence); US v Nixon 418 US 683 (1974) 693, 703–5; and US v Lopez 514 US 549 (1995) 575 (Kennedy and O’Connor JJ conc.); aff’d US v Morrison 529 US 598 (2000) 607ff.

  216. 216.

    304 US 64 (1938).

  217. 217.

    As in Missouri v Holland 252 US 416 (1920).

  218. 218.

    552 US 491 (2008), discussed below in Chap. 3.

  219. 219.

    Yet see Carolan 2007, pp. 22ff, 253–254, suggesting that the indeterminacy of the concept (in its current formulation) deprives it of any practical, active efficacy in structuring the state, thus prompting his revised conceptualisation.

  220. 220.

    See, e.g., Gwyn 1989 and J. Colburn 2004.

  221. 221.

    Montesquieu 1989, I, Chaps. 3 and 4, XI, Chaps. 1, 6, 18.

  222. 222.

    Although we refer here to “laws”, we could just as easily expand the scope to “acts intended to have consequences in domestic law”.

  223. 223.

    Hart 1961, Chap. 5.

  224. 224.

    This conception comes with the obvious risk of succumbing to an infinite regress. If secondary rules prescribe primary rules, it would follow that tertiary rules ought to prescribe the secondary ones; quaternary, the tertiary and so on. But an endpoint, the “final cause”, is invariably postulated for each legal system’s chain of rules. And it consistently rests on a simple constatation of fact: “that just the way it is”. For each state legal system, the endpoint is the political reality of its particular constitutional settlement. A myriad of historical factors, spanning the full range from accidental, catastrophic, economic, social, religious and much more, combine to produce a constitution. This in turn leads to the debate whether the political constitution precedes the legal constitution (following Schmitt, in the majority) or vice versa (following Kelsen, in the minority). To the extent relevant, I choose neither: both are, in the phrasing of Habermas, “co-original”. The formation of any association through intersubjective relations necessarily implies the contemporaneous, coextensive organisation of structured relationships represented in and through law.

  225. 225.

    Locus classicus: Danzig Courts PCIJ B15 (1928); Polish Nationals in Danzig PCIJ A/B44 (1932); Exchange of Greek & Turkish Pops PCIJ B10 (1925); Chorzow Factory PCIJ A17 (1928); see also Elettronica SiculaSpA (US v Italy) ICJ Reps 1989 15 (illegality under domestic law not entailing illegality under international law).

  226. 226.

    Applicability of Obligations to Arbitrate (Adv. Op.) ICJ Reps 1988 12; Lagrand (Germany v US) ICJ Reps 2001 466, and Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v US) ICJ Rep. 2004 12.

  227. 227.

    Thus it follows—Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v Nigeria) ICJ Reps 1998 275—no general obligation in international law for one state to follow developments in the internal law of other states which may have a bearing on the conduct of mutual, international relations (unless perhaps specific, important mutual or internal interests at stake: Fisheries (UK v Norway) ICJ Reps 1951 116.

  228. 228.

    Memel Territory PCIJ AB 49; and see also Applicability of Obligations to Arbitrate (Adv. Op.) ICJ Reps 1988 12; Lagrand (Germany v US) ICJ Reps 2001 466, and Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v US) ICJ Rep. 2004 12.

  229. 229.

    Non-state entities recognised by international law may also stand as subjects of international law and contribute to the formation. What bodies and associations have that status, apart from UN organs and other treaty-based bodies, is unsettled. Like other commentators, Boyle and Chinkin 2007 refer to a number of “emerging” trends, which by definition therefore have not yet crystallised into hard and fast rules.

  230. 230.

    As a system of law-making, international law is at best byzantine, at worst, a process by default. And it is highly dependent upon the archival efforts and opinions of academic commentators, who, in spite of best efforts and intentions, often leave it unclear what is actual established practice, lex lata, and what is desirable, lex ferenda.

  231. 231.

    On “institutions” as bodies and concepts, see, e.g., Zijderveld 2000 p. 37ff (distinguishing between institutions (conceptual) and institutes (organisational)) and MacCormick 2007, p. 11ff.

  232. 232.

    France: Article 55 (“Les traités ou accords régulièrement ratifiés ou approuvés ont, dès leur publication, une autorité supérieure à celle des lois, sous réserve, pour chaque accord ou traité, de son application par l’autre partie.”); the Netherlands: Article 93 (“Bepalingen van verdragen en van besluiten van volkenrechtelijke organisaties, die naar haar inhoud een ieder kunnen verbinden, hebben verbindende kracht nadat zij zijn bekendgemaakt.”), and the US, Article VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).

  233. 233.

    E.g., the Refugee and Asylum Convention Rules incorporated into the UK Refugee and Asylum Act, or the Warsaw Conventions, in the UK Carriage by Air Acts.

  234. 234.

    See, e.g., R v Jones (Margaret) [2007] 1 AC 136. The Scottish Court of Sessions in Lord Advocate’s Reference No. 2 (nuclear weaponry in Scotland not contrary to international law as applied in Scotland) did not even cite authority.

  235. 235.

    Adair 1963, p. 290.

  236. 236.

    The Paquette Habana 175 US 677, 700 (“international law is part of our law”). See also Murray v Schooner Charming Betsy 6 US 64 (1804) 118 (construing US statutes so as not to be inconsistent with or violate the law of nations).

  237. 237.

    12 US 110 (1814) 128–129.

  238. 238.

    O’Connell 1970, vol. I, pp. 9–13 (and p. 11, citing Judge Tanaka’s dissenting opinion in International Status of South West Africa (Adv. Op.) ICJ Reps 1950 128 regarding “general” to mean “common to all branches of law”); Shaw 2008, p. 98ff.

  239. 239.

    And repeating the same text found in the 1920 constituting statute of its predecessor, the PCIJ, at Article 38.

  240. 240.

    Shaw 2008, p. 98.

  241. 241.

    Relying here on O’Connell’s outline of argument: O’Connell 1970, vol. I, p. 43ff.

  242. 242.

    O’Connell 1970, vol. I, p. 44.

  243. 243.

    Quoted in Preuss 1950, pp. 413–415 (from J.P Niboyet, in Melanges R. Carré de Malberg (Receuil Sirrey, 1933), discussing the interaction of French law and treaty provisions).

  244. 244.

    Of course, there are those who obviously would find no issue or fault in that proposition. The interpenetration of all those normative systems is a feature of natural law and of systems invoking a Kant-inspired categorical imperative as revealed through human conduct. But there are equally those who are not so persuaded, and thus controversy persists.

  245. 245.

    Lawrence v Texas 539 US 558 (2003).

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    David Haljan

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Haljan, D. (2013). International Law and the Separation of Powers. In: Separating Powers: International Law before National Courts. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-858-3_2

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