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Anticipative Criminal Investigation pp 449–530Cite as

The Implications of Enabling Anticipative Criminal Investigations to Confront Terrorism for the Objectives of Criminal Procedural Law in the United States

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Abstract

The realization of a system of anticipative criminal investigation touches upon various aspects of the synthesis between the sword and shield objectives as it was traditionally realized in the United States. As a consequence of adopting the anticipative criminal investigation, the investigative purpose of national security investigations is merged with the investigative purpose of criminal investigation. Parallel to this development, the criminal investigative powers in terrorism cases have been extended. This brings about various implications for the shield objective of the criminal investigation. This Chapter analyzes and evaluates these implications from the perspective of the US criminal justice system and, primarily, the constitutional rights on which the regulation has been founded. The current scope and nature of traditional criminal investigative powers in terrorism cases is evaluated from the perspective of the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution. Also the current nature of the national security investigation is dealt with on the basis of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, an in-depth analysis of allowing national security investigative powers for criminal investigative purposes is provided. Institutional positions and functions are addressed as well as the constitutional adequacy of new institutional positions and functions, which includes the possibilities for realizing procedural due process in criminal proceedings.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873 (1967).

  2. 2.

    This concerns a significant increase compared with the increase of 36% over the period 1990–2000. In 2010 judges issued 1207 intercept orders on the federal level, against 479 in 2000. See Wiretap report 2010, 10 and Table 2 and Wiretap report 2000, 13 and Table 2. All statistical information regarding wiretaps is available at: http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/WiretapReports.aspx (accessed August 1, 2011).

  3. 3.

    See Sect. 5.3.2.1.3.

  4. 4.

    See Sect. 6.2.1.

  5. 5.

    Information based upon conversations with several federal prosecutors and investigators.

  6. 6.

    United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1968), 1456 and United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2nd Cir. 1990), 1337 (referring to the Supreme Court decision in Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 247, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 1688 (1979)).

  7. 7.

    United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986), 1456 (referring to Berger v. New York (1967)).

  8. 8.

    United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2nd Cir. 1990), 1337.

  9. 9.

    United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1968), 1456 and United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2nd Cir. 1990), 1337.

  10. 10.

    United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986), 1456.

  11. 11.

    United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2nd Cir. 1990), 1337. Section 213(2)(b)(2) of the USA PATRIOT Act, however, also allows the seizure of tangible property during the sneak-and-peek search, when the court finds “reasonable necessity for the seizure.”

  12. 12.

    United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2nd Cir. 1990), 1337.

  13. 13.

    Smith 2003, 439.

  14. 14.

    As alleged by the plaintiffs, Mayfield v. United States, 504 F.Supp.2d 1023 (D.Or. 2007), 1028.

  15. 15.

    United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2nd Cir. 1990), 1337 and United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1968), 1456.

  16. 16.

    Which was also the time limit set by the Department of Justice, which determined this period through relating it to the notification requirements of Title III. See Sect. 6.2.1.3 (footnote 37).

  17. 17.

    See e.g.: States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2nd Cir. 1990), 1337 and United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449 (2nd Cir. 1993), 453.

  18. 18.

    See: United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449 (2nd Cir. 1993), 454-455.

  19. 19.

    United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000), 403.

  20. 20.

    As to: Shumate 2006.

  21. 21.

    Smith v. Maryland, 42 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (1979), 742-746 and United States v. Karo, 468. U.S. 705 104 S.Ct. 3296 (1984), 712-713.

  22. 22.

    Title 18, Chapter 119: 18 U.S.C. § 3121-3127.

  23. 23.

    18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(2).

  24. 24.

    In re: Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Information on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F.Supp.2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), 460-461.

  25. 25.

    Smith v. Maryland, 42 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (1979).

  26. 26.

    United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 104 S.Ct. 3296 (1984).

  27. 27.

    In re: Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Information on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F.Supp.2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), 462.

  28. 28.

    See e.g. In the Matter of an Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register with Caller Identification Device Cell Site Location Authority on a Cellular Telephone, 2009 WL 159187 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) and In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F.Supp.2d 76 (D.Mass. 2007). See for a discussion of the Fourth Amendment issues involved in the tracking of cell site information: McLaughlin 2007.

  29. 29.

    Compare: Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (1979), 741.

  30. 30.

    Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (1979), 742.

  31. 31.

    Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).

  32. 32.

    Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010), 285.

  33. 33.

    Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010), 286.

  34. 34.

    Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007), 471.

  35. 35.

    Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (1979), 742.

  36. 36.

    Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (2001), 34. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented and strongly rejected this limitation on Fourth Amendment application as it can be expected that the exclusion of Fourth Amendment applicability to technical devices also used by the general public may give rise to serious privacy concerns in the future due to the rapid development of technology. See also: Casey 2008, 995-996.

  37. 37.

    Compare: Casey 2008, 1027-1033.

  38. 38.

    Smith 2003, 448-449.

  39. 39.

    As instructed by a (classified) FBI Memorandum of October 21, 2001. Savage 2011, 16. See on this subject: Kris 2011, 71-77.

  40. 40.

    Macwade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2nd Cir. 2006), see Sect. 6.2.2.

  41. 41.

    Coveny 2007, 333.

  42. 42.

    Airport security checks were permitted under ‘special needs reasoning’ by courts already prior to the explicit development of the special needs doctrine in New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985), see e.g. United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973) and United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2nd Cir. 1974). The Court reasoned that the purpose of the search, namely to prevent persons taking dangerous items on board of an aircraft and, thus, to prevent air piracy, outweighed the commensurate privacy concerns. The Court also noted that the searches would be illegal if used “as a general means of enforcing the criminal law.” See also: Power 2010, 656-657 and Coveny 2007, 352.

  43. 43.

    See Sect. 5.3.2.1.1.1 and footnote 302 of Chap. 5.

  44. 44.

    Sydejko 2006, 236-238.

  45. 45.

    National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1348 (1989), 681.

  46. 46.

    Compare: Slobogin 2007, 613.

  47. 47.

    Compare the factors of Illinois v. Lidster (2004) (Sect. 5.3.2.1.1.1), also applied in Macwade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2nd Cir. 2006), including ‘the degree to which the search advances the public concern’. See: Coveny 2007, 370-372.

  48. 48.

    The efficacy of the Container Inspection Program and the level of deterrence have also been criticized, considering the possibility to walk away when encountering such inspection and testimony in the case of Macwade has indicated that also deterrence was not likely to be achieved by the Program. See Coveny 2007, 371.

  49. 49.

    See Macwade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2nd Cir. 2006), 274.

  50. 50.

    The public fear of future terrorist attacks brings about a level of tolerance for far-going governmental measures (including giving up Fourth Amendment protections to allow expedient search powers) taken for the purpose of preventing future terrorist attacks. See Luna 2009, 120-121 (providing a criminological analysis of the relation between fear and the deviation from traditional restraints on employing criminal law and criminal procedural law). Albeit according to this criminological research fear is not the correct basis for deviating from Fourth Amendment requirements designed to protect the civil liberty of privacy.

  51. 51.

    This type of search will reasonably be either random or selective. When selective, such selection shall not be conducted solely on the basis of racial characteristics (e.g. selecting persons with a Middle-Eastern appearance only), but on the basis of some sort of individualized suspicion being more than racial characteristics only in order to avoid discrimination.

  52. 52.

    Simmons 2010, 916-921.

  53. 53.

    Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996).

  54. 54.

    United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125 (1972), 322. See in more detail Sect. 5.2.2.3.1.

  55. 55.

    In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002), 745-746.

  56. 56.

    Ibid., 746. See also: Power 2010.

  57. 57.

    Differently: Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990) where the primary purpose was to curtail the grave threat of driving while intoxicated for society, outweighing the privacy interest also when the primary tool was a law enforcement tool conducted by the police.

  58. 58.

    Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302 (1949), 176, see Sect. 5.3.2.1.1.2.

  59. 59.

    See Sect. 5.3.2.1.1.1.

  60. 60.

    United States v. Ramos, 629 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2010). See Sect. 5.3.2.1.1.1.

  61. 61.

    Ibid., 67-68.

  62. 62.

    Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302 (1949), p. 175-176. See Sect. 5.3.2.1.1.1.

  63. 63.

    Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727 (1967), 536-537. See Sect. 5.3.2.1.1.1.

  64. 64.

    Section 5.3.2.1.3.

  65. 65.

    Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 1598 (2008), 1604 (see Sect. 5.3.2.1.1.1).

  66. 66.

    Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967).

  67. 67.

    Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S.Ct. 1943 (2006), p. 403 and 406, see Sect. 6.2.2.

  68. 68.

    See Sect. 5.1.4.1. Textualists would therefore likely reject such an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, because the language suggests that the drafters’ intention was different (see e.g. Amar 1997, 17-20 and 31-32 and Arcila 2010, 1294). However, when solely looking at the purpose of the protection offered, the restraints that should be imposed on the governmental exertion of criminal procedural powers in relation to the presumption of innocence and in relation to the role of criminal procedural law, some sort of threshold shall apply when the government intends to use search powers that violate one’s reasonable expectation to privacy. Therefore, a form of suspicion shall be read as a minimum requirement for the reasonableness of the search.

  69. 69.

    Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 357.

  70. 70.

    See Chap. 5, Sect. 5.3.2.1.2.

  71. 71.

    United States v. Verdigo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 110 S.Ct. 1056 (1990). See Sect. 5.1.4.1.

  72. 72.

    Forgang 2009, 244.

  73. 73.

    Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (2006).

  74. 74.

    Brigham v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S.Ct. 1943 (2006).

  75. 75.

    Amar 1997, 4-10.

  76. 76.

    Compare Slobogin who proposes to apply the proportionality and exigency principle in order to govern the power to search. For non-exigent searches a warrant would be required. Christopher Slobogin 2007, 615 and 617.

  77. 77.

    In Sect. 5.1.4.1 the Reasonableness Fourth Amendment approach has already been identified as the current mainstream interpretation of the clauses of the Fourth Amendment.

  78. 78.

    It was already determined in Sect. 5.3.2.1.3 that, considering the multitude of exceptions that had been created to the other Fourth Amendment requirements, reasonableness is the final and ultimate test for the constitutionality of a particular search and/or seizure.

  79. 79.

    Katz v. Unites States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).

  80. 80.

    United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125 (1972), 316-317.

  81. 81.

    See for example Amar, concluding in 1998 that the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment can only be ‘reasonableness,’ considering that the multitude of exceptions deprives the other Fourth Amendment requirements of their status as mandatory requirements. Amar 1997, 2 and 31-32.

  82. 82.

    Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 1598 (2008), 1604.

  83. 83.

    Ibid., 1608. See Sect. 5.3.2.1.3.

  84. 84.

    Considering that reasonableness also covers the execution phase. See Sect. 5.3.2.1.3.

  85. 85.

    Fenske 2008, 345.

  86. 86.

    (Anonymous) Note 2009, 1717-1718 and Stuntz 2002 (Arguing why Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections should fluctuate with crime).

  87. 87.

    Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006), 594 and Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135,129 S.Ct. 695 (2009), 9. See in more detail also Chap. 5, Sect. 5.3.2.1.4.

  88. 88.

    More on this in Sect. 7.4.1.

  89. 89.

    White 2004, 14 and 15.

  90. 90.

    See Sect. 6.2.3.

  91. 91.

    Non-US persons engaging in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor without connections to a foreign-based group. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) heading and under (C).

  92. 92.

    See Sect. 6.3.1.

  93. 93.

    Followed by a decrease in authorized applications in 2009 and 2010. In 2010 1,506 FISA electronic surveillance applications were approved by the FISA Court, in 2005 the number was 2,072 (reaching its highest point in 2007 with 2,370 authorizations) and in 2000 the number of authorized applications was 1,012. Numbers derived from FISA Annual Reports to Congress, available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/#rept (accessed August 1, 2011). For an overview of the amounts of FISA Court orders and NSLs for the years 1979–2010, composed on the basis of annual and general reports, see: ‘Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 1979–2010’, Electronic Privacy Information Center, available at: http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html (accessed July 29, 2011).

  94. 94.

    Compare the rather strict framework of Title III, intended to provide sufficient protection against unnecessary interference with private life through surveillance, the most intrusive form of search (described in Sect. 5.3.2.2) with the FISA framework (described in Sect. 5.3.2.4).

  95. 95.

    For the definition of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power see Sect. 5.2.2.3.1, footnote 199 and Sect. 5.3.2.4.1 (50 U.S.C. § 1801(a) and (b)).

  96. 96.

    In addition, it should be taken into account that FISA investigations cover the gathering of foreign intelligence information. Like the definition of a foreign power or agent of a foreign power also the definition of foreign intelligence information is rather broad: “Information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against” certain national security threats that can be related to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (see for the precise definitions Sect. 5.2.2.3.1).

  97. 97.

    Compare, for example, Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873 (1967) where the Court struck down an eavesdropping statute authorizing surveillance over a period of two months with the validity of the FISA court order of 120 days (previously 90; see Sect. 6.3.1).

  98. 98.

    United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125 (1972), at 322.

  99. 99.

    Section 108(c) of the USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization Act of 2005. See Sect. 6.3.1.

  100. 100.

    Compare also: Power 2010, 679-681.

  101. 101.

    See Sect. 5.2.2.1.2.

  102. 102.

    See Sect. 5.3.2.1.2.

  103. 103.

    See Sect. 6.3.1.

  104. 104.

    See Sect. 6.3.1 and, in comparison, Sect. 5.2.2.3.1.

  105. 105.

    See Sect. 5.3.2.1.1.1.

  106. 106.

    Although not protected through the Fourth Amendment, considering that the Supreme Court in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619 (1976), 443 (see also Chap. 5, Sect. 5.1.4.1) has considered that someone cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy relating to personal information already entrusted to others.

  107. 107.

    “[T]he information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing foreign intelligence or international terrorism investigation being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under guidelines approved by the Attorney General,” See: 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2).

  108. 108.

    See Sect. 6.3.2.

  109. 109.

    Section 3(a) (2) Bill of 22 September 2009 ‘to extend the sunset of certain provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act and the authority to issue national security letters, and for other purposes’, 111th Congress. 1st Session S.1692.

  110. 110.

    Public Law 111-141, Feb. 27, 2010, 124 Stat. 37, 111th Congress.

  111. 111.

    PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, S.990, 112th Congress, 1st Session.

  112. 112.

    See Sect. 6.3.2.

  113. 113.

    Swire 2004, 1331-1332.

  114. 114.

    See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619 (1976), 443, and Chap. 5, Sect. 5.1.4.1.

  115. 115.

    Schulhofer 2005, 57-58.

  116. 116.

    FISA Annual Reports to Congress 2005–2010, available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/#rept (accessed August 4, 2011).

  117. 117.

    Swire 2004, 1332.

  118. 118.

    Ibid., 1357.

  119. 119.

    Section 3(a)(3)(B) Bill of 22 September 2009 ‘to extend the sunset of certain provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act and the authority to issue national security letters, and for other purposes’, 111th Congress, 1st Session S.1692.

  120. 120.

    See Sect. 6.3.1 and ‘Statement of David Kris, Assistant Attorney General, Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, entitled “Reauthorizing the USA PATRIOT Act: Ensuring Liberty and Security”, September 23, 2009, 3. See for additional statistical information regarding the use of section 215 in the period 2002–2005 (although largely classified): Report of the Office of the Inspector General 2007, A Review of the FBI’s Use of Section 215 Orders for Business Records, 15-46 and 77-78.

  121. 121.

    See Sect. 6.3.1 and the Statement of David Kris, Assistant Attorney General, before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate 2009, 3.

  122. 122.

    See also: Report of the Office of the Inspector General 2007, A Review of the FBI’s Use of Section 215 Orders for Business Records, 79-80.

  123. 123.

    See Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2nd Cir. 2008), 884-884. Section 6.3.2.

  124. 124.

    Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2nd Cir. 2008), 882-883.

  125. 125.

    Compare: Schulhofer 2005, 56, 58-59.

  126. 126.

    See Sect. 6.3.2.

  127. 127.

    See Sect. 5.1.4.2.

  128. 128.

    See Sect. 5.1.4.2.

  129. 129.

    See Sect. 6.4.1.

  130. 130.

    In 2010 a total of 96 applications for a section 215 order were authorized by the FISA Court, in 2005 the number was 155. See FISA Annual Reports to Congress (2010 and 2005), available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/#rept (accessed August 1, 2011).

  131. 131.

    Statement of David Kris, Assistant Attorney General, Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate 2009, 3.

  132. 132.

    Although there were no explicit legal barriers prohibiting the sharing of information, ‘the wall’—a consequence primarily of a history of abuse and the purpose language—and the cultural separation between law enforcement and intelligence that had followed, prevented any sharing. See Sect. 5.2.2.3.2.

  133. 133.

    See the Unclassified Report of the Office of the Inspector General: The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information’ 2003. Most of the recommendations in this report have resulted in the concrete memoranda or guidelines (as dealt with in this section) in order to enhance cooperation and sharing.

  134. 134.

    In re Sealed Case: 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002), 734. See also Sect. 6.4.1.

  135. 135.

    See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2011).

  136. 136.

    Sections 203 and 504 of the USA PATRIOT Act 2001. See in detail Sect. 6.4.1.

  137. 137.

    See 50 U.S.C. § 401a(2) and (3), amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 902 to include also international terrorist activities as foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information. See Sect. 6.4.1.

  138. 138.

    See Sect. 6.4.3.

  139. 139.

    Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft, Council on Foreign Relations, February 10, 2003. Available at: http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2003/021003agcouncilonforeignrelation.htm (last visited on December 9, 2010). See also Ashcroft 2006, 131-142 (‘New Priorities: From Prosecution to Prevention’).

  140. 140.

    Hence, in Chap. 5 the Guidelines were dealt with as part of the ‘shield’ of regulating criminal investigations. See Sect. 5.3.2.3.

  141. 141.

    See Sect. 6.4.2.2.

  142. 142.

    See Sect. 6.4.2.2.

  143. 143.

    In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002), 744.

  144. 144.

    Ibid., 744-745.

  145. 145.

    Compare: Power 2010, 624-625.

  146. 146.

    For an overview of the precise differences between the Smith Guidelines of 1983 and the Mukasey Guidelines of 2008, see the two tables (Tables 7.1, 7.2) at the end of this Chapter. Except for the main difference between the two sets of guidelines as to their scope (the Mukasey Guidelines cover the investigative activities for national security (including foreign intelligence) purposes and for law enforcement/criminal justice purposes, whereas the Smith Guidelines only cover investigations for law enforcement and national security (not foreign intelligence) purposes where there is a clear nexus to criminal activity), these tables demonstrate the differences and common features as to the type of investigation, its goal, the threshold and other restraints applicable and the powers available.

  147. 147.

    Hearing before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism on the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 98th Congress, First Session on Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic Security Investigations (Smith Guidelines), March 25, 1983, Serial No. J-98-25, S. Hrg 98-176, Appendix

  148. 148.

    The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (2008) (Mukasey Guidelines).

  149. 149.

    See Sect. 6.4.3.

  150. 150.

    Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873 (1967).

  151. 151.

    Katz v. Unites States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967).

  152. 152.

    United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125 (1972).

  153. 153.

    See Sect. 5.3.2.3.1.

  154. 154.

    United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).

  155. 155.

    United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125 (1972), 322.

  156. 156.

    See Sect. 5.2.2.3.2.

  157. 157.

    United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), 915.

  158. 158.

    In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002), 744.

  159. 159.

    See the reports of the Inspector General on this fingerprint misidentification: Report of the Office of the Inspector General 2006, A Review of the FBI’s Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case and Report of the Office of the Inspector General 2011, A Review of the FBI’s Progress in Responding to the Recommendations of the Office of the Inspector General Report on the Fingerprint Misidentification in the Brandon Mayfield Case.

  160. 160.

    Mayfield v. United States, 504 F.Supp.2d 1023 (D.Or. 2007), 1033, 1038-1039 and 1042-1043.

  161. 161.

    See in detail Sect. 5.3.2.3.1.

  162. 162.

    Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010). 970.

  163. 163.

    E.g.: United States v. Ning Wen, 477 F.3d 896 (7th Cir.2007), United States v. Mubayyid, 521 F.Supp.2d 125 (D.Mass. 2007), United States v. Warsame, 547 F.Supp.2d 982 (D.Minn. 2008) and United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102 (2nd Cir. 2010). The Court in United Stated v. Ning Wen took a slightly different approach in reasoning why FISA was constitutional under the significant purpose test: as long as the statutory requirements are met (the government could satisfy the requirement of probable cause that the target was an agent of a foreign power and a significant purpose of the surveillance was to gather foreign intelligence) any evidence obtained by the FISA surveillance was legitimate as being discovered in plain view during legitimately authorized surveillance.

  164. 164.

    See Sect. 5.3.2.1.1.1.

  165. 165.

    Macwade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2nd Cir. 2006).

  166. 166.

    In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002), 745-746. See also: Donohue 2008, 234.

  167. 167.

    See Sects. 7.2.2.1 and 5.3.2.1.1.1.

  168. 168.

    In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008), 1010.

  169. 169.

    Ibid., 1011. In re Directives dealt in particular with the ‘terrorist surveillance program’ as regulated in the Protect America Act of 2007 (see Sect. 6.5.1).

  170. 170.

    Macwade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2nd Cir. 2006), 263 and 268.

  171. 171.

    Also in this context it is important to realize the scope of the definition of foreign intelligence, which is not limited to intelligence concerning non-US persons or relating to activities abroad. Domestic activities, whether or not by US persons, which can (ideologically) be related to international terrorism fall within the definition of foreign intelligence. 50 U.S.C. § 401a (2) and (3) and see Sect. 6.4.2.

  172. 172.

    In fact, also the FISA of 1978 was based on the Keith decision with regard to domestic national security activities, considering that FISA provides for a weaker version of Fourth Amendment requirements such as probable cause and a warrant. Already at that time, foreign intelligence activities were likely to include also domestic national security activities. Compare also: Swire 2004, 1339.

  173. 173.

    Compare the new policy of the DoJ on the basis of the new paradigm of prevention and, in particular, the redefinition of the FBI’s highest priority “to protect the security of the nation and the safety of the American people against the depredations of terrorists and foreign aggressors.” See Sect. 6.4.2.2.

  174. 174.

    Mayfield v. United States, 504 F.Supp.2d 1023 (D.Or. 2007), 1033, 1038-1039 and 1042-1043.

  175. 175.

    United States v. Mubayyid, 521 F.Supp. 2d 125 (D.Mass. 2007), 136. The FISA Court judge is held to accept the showing of the government regarding the ‘significant purpose’ unless this is clearly erroneous.

  176. 176.

    United States v. Mubayyid, 521 F.Supp. 2d 125 (D. Mass. 2007), 136.

  177. 177.

    FISA Annual Reports to Congress 2000–2010. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/#rept (accessed August 4, 2011).

  178. 178.

    Compare: Power 2010, 682-687.

  179. 179.

    Although any person whose rights have been violated is entitled to instigate a civil action for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971). See Sect. 5.3.1.4.

  180. 180.

    See e.g. Sect. 6.2.1 (enhanced Congressional oversight for expanded law enforcement powers, such as on emergency disclosure and delayed notice), Sect. 6.3.1 (enhanced Congressional oversight on FISA surveillance), Sect. 6.3.2 (enhanced Congressional oversight on document production orders, although the Reauthorization Acts have also expanded the previously very limited possibilities for judicial review), Sect. 6.5.1 (enhanced Congressional oversight to compensate for the surveillance of non US-persons outside the US) and Sect. 6.5.2 (enhanced oversight on the use of NSL).

  181. 181.

    See Report of the Office of Inspector General 2010, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Use of Exigent Letters and Other Informal Requests for Telephone Records.

  182. 182.

    Sales 2007, 816. Immediately after taking Office, on January 21st 2009 President Obama issued a Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on ‘Transparency and Open Government’ in order to enhance the government’s openness and transparency in order to improve accountability. Memorandum available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/obama/transparency.pdf (accessed December 12, 2010). In another Memorandum by President Obama issued on the same day regarding the Freedom of Information Act, Obama directed that a presumption of disclosure and thus in favor of transparency shall be guiding when dealing with FOIA requests. Memorandum available at: http://www.sec.gov/foia/president-memo-foia-nov2009.pdf (accessed December 12, 2010). See also the preamble to Executive Order No. 13526 ‘National Security Information’, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29 2009), stipulating that: “[o]ur democratic principles require that the American people be informed of the activities of their Government. Also, our Nation’s progress depends on the free flow of information both within the Government and to the American people. Nevertheless, throughout history, the national defense has required that certain information be maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions, our homeland security, and our interactions with foreign nations. Protecting information critical to our Nation’s security and demonstrating our commitment to open Government through accurate and accountable application of classification standards and routine, secure, and effective declassification are equally important priorities.”

  183. 183.

    Sales 2007, 817.

  184. 184.

    See in detail Sects. 5.1.4.2 (on due process) and 5.3.1.2–5.3.1.3 (on disclosure).

  185. 185.

    See Sects. 7.4.1 and 6.4.

  186. 186.

    50 U.S.C. § 1801(a) and (b). Although the order which is applicable to US citizens cannot be based upon First Amendment protected activities. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2).

  187. 187.

    As follows from the FISA Annual Reports to FISA (934 authorized applications in 2001 versus 2,370 in 2007 and 1,506 in 2010), available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/#rept (accessed 4 August 2011).

  188. 188.

    See on the role that information collected in FISA investigations has played in ‘terrorist’ trials: Zabel and Benjamin Jr. 2008, 80-81 and 95-96.

  189. 189.

    Zabel and Benjamin Jr. 2008, 96.

  190. 190.

    Zabel and Benjamin Jr. 2008, 98.

  191. 191.

    See on the CIPA procedures Sects. 5.3.1.2 and 5.3.1.3.

  192. 192.

    United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004). See Sect. 5.3.1.3.

  193. 193.

    United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008), 253.

  194. 194.

    Ibid., 253. Nevertheless, the establishment of the violation of the Sixth Amendment did not have any procedural consequences, as the court considered it to be a ‘harmless error.’ Ibid., 257.

  195. 195.

    See Sect. 5.3.1.3.

  196. 196.

    Zabel and Benjamin Jr 2008, 87. See also: Zabel and Benjamin Jr 2009, 25 and 26 and Kris 2011. Others consider the criminal justice system to be unsuitable, because the application of CIPA is considered detrimental to national security interests, for trying terrorists. See on this discussion: Guiora 2008.

  197. 197.

    See: United States v. Mubayyid, 521 F.Supp.2d 125 (D.Mass. 2007), United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F.Supp.2d 299 (D.Conn. 2008) and United States v. Warsame, 547 F.Supp.2d 982 (D.Minn. 2008).

  198. 198.

    Compare: United States v. Mubayyid, 521 F.Supp.2d 125 (D.Mass. 2007), 131.

  199. 199.

    United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102 (2nd Cir. 2010), 108. See also the District Court’s decision: United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F.Supp.2d 299 (D.Conn. 2008).

  200. 200.

    United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102 (2nd Cir. 2010), 117-129.

  201. 201.

    Internal citations omitted, Ibid., 129. See also United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F.Supp.2d 299 (D.Conn. 2008), 310 and United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93 (2nd Cir. 2009), 129.

  202. 202.

    United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F.Supp.2d 299 (D.Conn. 2008), 310-311. Affirmed in United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102 (2nd Cir. 2010), 129.

  203. 203.

    Compare also the case of United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004): it was not the determination whether or not the defense has been put in a worse position by allowing the introduction of classified information but the nature of the government’s national security interests that were decisive for permitting the substitutes under CIPA instead of full disclosure. See Sect. 5.3.1.3.

  204. 204.

    United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F.Supp.2d 299 (D.Conn. 2008), 311. Affirmed in United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102 (2nd Cir. 2010), 130-131.

  205. 205.

    United States v. Warsame, 547 F.Supp.2d 982 (D.Minn. 2008), 988-989.

  206. 206.

    Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S, 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). See Sects. 5.3.1.2 and 5.3.1.3.

  207. 207.

    Lobel 2002, 788.

  208. 208.

    Schulhofer 2005, 48.

  209. 209.

    See Sect. 6.5.1.

  210. 210.

    United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125 (1972), 321-322.

  211. 211.

    United States v. Truong Ding Hung, 629. F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), 913-914.

  212. 212.

    See also: Forgang 2009, 245-249 and (Anonymous) Note 2008, 2220.

  213. 213.

    Compare: Cooper Blum 2009, 299-300.

  214. 214.

    See Sect. 6.5.2.

  215. 215.

    The availability of NSL authority in FBI investigations, both in preliminary investigations and in full investigations, pursuing multiple purposes is explicitly acknowledged in the DIOG of the FBI: DIOG FBI (2008), 114-115. Also the National Security Act provides that NSL are available to conduct i.e. law enforcement investigations: 50 U.S.C. § 436(a)(1). See also Sect. 6.5.2.

  216. 216.

    The Obama Administration proposed, in the spring of 2010, to expand the scope of national security letters to records concerning an individual’s Internet activity. See: Nakashima 2010.

  217. 217.

    See Sects. 6.5.2 and 6.3.2.

  218. 218.

    See Sect.  7.3.1.1.

  219. 219.

    See Sects. 7.4.2 and 7.4.3.

  220. 220.

    See Sect. 7.2.2.2.4.

  221. 221.

    See Sect. 7.2.1.1.

  222. 222.

    See Sect. 7.3.

  223. 223.

    See Sect. 7.3.2.

  224. 224.

    See Sect. 7.4.3.

  225. 225.

    See Sect. 7.5.

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  1. Pels Rijcken & Droogleever Fortuijn N.V., PO Box 11756, 2502 AT, The Hague, Zuid-Holland, The Netherlands

    Dr. Marianne F. H. Hirsch Ballin

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Hirsch Ballin, M.F.H. (2012). The Implications of Enabling Anticipative Criminal Investigations to Confront Terrorism for the Objectives of Criminal Procedural Law in the United States. In: Anticipative Criminal Investigation. T.M.C. Asser Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-843-9_7

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