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The Implications of Enabling Anticipative Criminal Investigations to Confront Terrorism for the Objectives of Criminal Procedural Law: The Netherlands

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Abstract

The realization of a system of anticipative criminal investigation touches upon various aspects of the synthesis between the sword and shield objective as it was traditionally realized in the Netherlands. An anticipative criminal investigation adds a new investigative function to the sword objective, namely the prevention of crime. This brings about various implications for the shield objective of the criminal investigation. This chapter analyzes and evaluates these implications from the perspective of the Dutch criminal justice system and, primarily, the rights and principles on which the regulation has been founded. From the perspectives of the fundamental right to privacy, the principle of legality and the presumption of innocence, the shield function of the lowered threshold for using criminal investigative methods for preventive methods is evaluated. Furthermore, attention is given to the classification of the interests of prevention and legal protection and a renewed division of responsibilities between the different actors in the anticipative criminal investigation. Lastly, a thorough analysis is provided of the exact scope of the anticipative criminal investigation in relation to the investigations by the intelligence service and to the administrative supervisory investigation and the implications of this scope of the anticipative criminal investigation for achieving fair criminal proceedings.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Referred to as the ‘multiplier effect’ in: Rapport van de Commissie Evaluatie Antiterrorismebeleid 2009, 46.

  2. 2.

    See Sect. 3.2.1.

  3. 3.

    HR 26 January 2010, NJ 2010, 77, para 3.4.

  4. 4.

    Compare: Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 30 164, no. 3, 2: ‘It must be possible to conduct criminal investigative activities whenever these activities may contribute to the prevention of terrorism.’ And ibid., 8: ‘terrorism requires a different appraisal. It is undesirable that the government shall have to refrain from criminal investigative activities in the absence of a well-founded suspicion, whilst the criminal investigation can reasonably contribute to the prevention of terrorism.’

  5. 5.

    See also: Prakken 2004 and Van Kempen 2005b, 8-9 (elaborate version of Van Kempen 2005A).

  6. 6.

    See Sect. 3.2.1.3.

  7. 7.

    Van Kempen 2005b, 7 and 11.

  8. 8.

    As has been explained in Sect. 2.3.2.3.2.3, the preliminary investigation is in this project covered by the term criminal investigation, considering that the (ultimate) purpose of the preliminary investigation coincides with the full criminal investigation when the preliminary investigation is used to prepare the full criminal investigation and the information produced by the preliminary investigative techniques is used as starting information for the full criminal investigation. Nevertheless, the legislature still considers that the preliminary investigation is not covered by Article 132a CCP and precedes the criminal investigative phase.

  9. 9.

    Sikkema 2008, para 8.1, Knigge 2005, 353, and the annotation by Borgers at HR 11 March 2008, NJ 2008, 329, ann. Borgers. See also the introduction Sects. 2.3.2.3 and 2.3.2.3.1.

  10. 10.

    See Sect. 2.3.2.3.3 and for the assessment of the indications threshold in the light of Article 8 ECHR, Sect. 4.2.1.3.

  11. 11.

    See Sect. 2.3.2.3.3.

  12. 12.

    See the introduction Sects. 2.3.2.3, 2.3.2.3.2 and 2.3.2.3.3.

  13. 13.

    Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 164, no. 7, 15.

  14. 14.

    Three out of seven of the indications investigations were triggered by CIE information in the period February 2007-February 2009. Van Gestel et al. 2009, 28.

  15. 15.

    Krips 2009, 146-147.

  16. 16.

    Although in only one of the seven cases in the period 2007–2009, whereas AIVD information triggered a classical investigation into terrorism on three occasions. Van Gestel et al. 2009, 28.

  17. 17.

    Van Gestel et al. 2009, 8 and 27.

  18. 18.

    See Sect. 2.3.2.3.2.4.

  19. 19.

    At the same time, these implications must also not be overestimated as it can be concluded that the investigation upon indications will mainly be applied to exclude risks in time. Practical considerations as to the effectiveness of using SIT without knowing sufficiently precisely what to look for reduce the use of SIT on the basis of vague non-verifiable information. In addition, it follows from the evaluations of the use of Title Vb in practice that deploying SIT when there are indications is rarely intended for evidence gathering, but mainly to exclude risks. This implies ‘mini-investigations’ in which the most far-reaching techniques will not be needed. De Poot et al. 2008, 43. See in more detail on the practical considerations as to choosing between criminal investigative domains Sect. 4.2.2.2.

  20. 20.

    See e.g. ECHR 24 April 1990, App. no. 11801/85 and App. no. 11105/84 (Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France), para 33/32.

  21. 21.

    Compare the annotation of Borgers para 6, HR 11 March 2008, NJ 2008. 329. Borgers enumerates the following relevant circumstances for determining the presence of a reasonable suspicion in a particular situation: the contents of the information (in the case addressed in the annotation this information came from an anonymous source); the fact whether the police or PPS have independently checked the information; the concrete possibilities to verify the information, taking into account the need to act with urgency; the possibility to use less intrusive techniques; and the possible alternatives to criminal investigative action.

  22. 22.

    Compare also HR 18 May 1999, NJ 2000, 104, ann. Sch, para 5.3, where the Supreme Court accepted, before the entry into force of the Act on SIT, the use of an intrusive method of investigation (systematic observation) and the continuation of applying such a method on the basis of the level of suspicion present.

  23. 23.

    Lindenberg 2002, 424. This passage has also been cited in the Opinion of the Advocate General (para 34) in the case of Zwolsman (HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249, ann. Sch) to support the view that activities falling outside the scope of the criminal investigation (lacking a reasonable suspicion), but which are necessary for investigative officers to carry out their tasks effectively, must be accepted and can therefore be based on Article 2 of the Police Act 1993.

  24. 24.

    Compare: Knigge 2005, 353.

  25. 25.

    See in detail Sects. 2.3.2.3.2 and 2.3.2.3.3.

  26. 26.

    ECHR 29 June 2006, App. no. 45934/00 (Weber and Saravia v. Germany) (admissibility decision).

  27. 27.

    ECHR 2 September 2010, App. no. 35623/05 (Uzun v. Germany), para 63.

  28. 28.

    ECHR 12 January 2010, App. no. 4158/05 (Gillan and Quinton v. The United Kingdom), para 77.

  29. 29.

    See Sect. 2.3.2.1.

  30. 30.

    See Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 30 164, no. 3, 3 and 10.

  31. 31.

    Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 30 164, no. 3, 3, 11-12, 16, 28-29 and 31-32, Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 164, no. 12, 5-6 and Kamerstukken I 2006/07, 30 164, no. D, 12-13.

  32. 32.

    Report by the Commissioner for Human Rights Mr Thomas Hammarberg on his visit to the Netherlands 2009, 38-39 (para 171).

  33. 33.

    ECHR 16 October 2001, App. no. 37555/97 (O’Hara v. The United Kingdom), para 34 and ECHR 30 August 1990, App. nos. 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/86 (Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. The United Kingdom), para 32.

  34. 34.

    Ibid., preamble.

  35. 35.

    Article 15 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, CETS 196, 16.V.2005 (Trb. 2006, 34): “(…) the Party concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary under its domestic law to investigate the facts contained in the information.”

  36. 36.

    ECHR 24 April 1990, App. no. 11801/85 and App. no. 11105/84 (Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France), para 33/32.

  37. 37.

    Nevertheless, these activities are conducted for the purpose of protecting national security (and not in the context of criminal proceedings), which is, however, not a distinction made by the ECrtHR as the Court focuses only on the question whether citizens are afforded sufficient protection against arbitrary interferences with their right to privacy as guaranteed in Article 8 ECHR. ECHR 29 June 2006, App. no. 45934/00 (Weber and Saravia v. Germany) and ECHR 1 July 2008, App. no. 58243/00 (Liberty and Others v. The United Kingdom). Although not objecting to strategic monitoring as such, in the latter case the Court considered the regulation “not to indicate with sufficient clarity, so as to provide adequate protection against abuse of power, the scope or manner of exercise of the very wide discretion conferred on the State to intercept and examine external communications.” Ibid. para 69.

  38. 38.

    ECHR 6 September 1978, App. no. 5029/71 (Klass and others v. Germany). The aim of the German G10 legislation assessed in this case was to protect national security and/or to prevent disorder or crime (para 44) and could be used upon ‘factual indications’ (Tatsächliche Anhaltspunkte) “for suspecting a person of planning, committing or having committed certain serious criminal acts” (para 17 and 51).

  39. 39.

    ECHR 24 April 1990, App. no. 11801/85 and App. no. 11105/84 (Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France), para 35/34.

  40. 40.

    Compare: Van Kempen and Van de Voort 2010, 69.

  41. 41.

    Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 30 164, no. 3, 10.

  42. 42.

    See Sect. 2.3.2.4.2.

  43. 43.

    See also Sect. 2.3.1.

  44. 44.

    See in detail: Franken 2009, 79-92. See also Sect. 4.2.2.1.

  45. 45.

    Franken 2006, 269 and see Sect. 2.3.1.3. Whether the Act on Strengthening the Position of the Examining Magistrate will change this situation remains to be seen.

  46. 46.

    Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 30 164, no. 12, 3.

  47. 47.

    Compare: Van Kempen and Van de Voort 2010, 70.

  48. 48.

    See Sects. 2.3.2.4.1 and 2.3.1.6.

  49. 49.

    ECHR 12 January 2010, App. no. 4158/05 (Gillan and Quinton v. The United Kingdom), para 86.

  50. 50.

    ECHR 2 August 1984, App. no. 8691/79 (Malone v. The United Kingdom), para 68.

  51. 51.

    Van Sliedregt 2006, 23 and Van Kempen 2005b, 11.

  52. 52.

    ECHR 2 August 1984, App. no. 8691/79 (Malone v. The United Kingdom), para 79.

  53. 53.

    ECHR 26 April 1979, App. no. 6538/74 (Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom), para 49. See Sect. 2.1.3.2.1.

  54. 54.

    Loof 2005, 204 and see Sect. 2.1.3.2.1.

  55. 55.

    ECHR 29 June 2006, App. no. 45934/00 (Weber and Saravia v. Germany).

  56. 56.

    ECHR 1 July 2008, App. no. 58243/00 (Liberty and Others v. The United Kingdom).

  57. 57.

    Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 30 164, no. 3, 21.

  58. 58.

    Compare: Buruma 2004, 665-675, putting into perspective the intrusion on privacy made by collecting publicly stored information or information stored with third parties. Compare also the approach of the United States, where the collecting of third party information is not considered to be a violation of ‘a reasonable expectation of privacy’ and, hence, is not covered by the Fourth Amendment (United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619 (1976), para 443), see Chap. 5, Sect. 5.1.4.1. Nevertheless, the ECrtHR does consider the method of collecting and analyzing information as conducted in the context of the preliminary investigation to be covered by Article 8 ECHR, see: ECHR 4 May 2000, App. no. 28341/95 (Rotaru v. Romania), para 43.

  59. 59.

    See in detail Sect. 3.2.1.2.

  60. 60.

    See supra footnote 58.

  61. 61.

    ECHR 2 August 1984, App. no. 8691/79 (Malone v. The United Kingdom), para 68. See also the previous Sect. 4.2.1.3.1.3.

  62. 62.

    ECHR 12 January 2010, App. no. 4158/05 (Gillan and Quinton v. The United Kingdom). See for a detailed comparison of the Dutch search powers for the prevention of terrorism and the Gillian and Quinton v. The United Kingdom case Van Kempen and Van de Voort 2010, 73-80.

  63. 63.

    ECHR 12 January 2010, App. no. 4158/05 (Gillan and Quinton v. The United Kingdom), para 87.

  64. 64.

    ECHR 12 January 2010, App. no. 4158/05 (Gillan and Quinton v. The United Kingdom), para 80 and 83.

  65. 65.

    ECHR 12 January 2010, App. no. 4158/05 (Gillan and Quinton v. The United Kingdom), para 80 and 81.

  66. 66.

    Compare: Van Kempen and Van de Voort 2010, 75.

  67. 67.

    See Sect. 3.2.1.3.

  68. 68.

    As established by Stb. 2006, 730, Article 3(1) and Appendix. Maybe with the exception of the security zone of Schiphol Airport, including its immediate ‘environment’, which includes highways, bikeways, homes, restaurants and bars, and industrial parks. See Van Kempen and Van de Voort 2010, 76.

  69. 69.

    See Sect. 3.2.1.3.

  70. 70.

    See on this issue in more detail Sect. 4.2.3.

  71. 71.

    ECHR 12 January 2010, App. no. 4158/05 (Gillan and Quinton v. The United Kingdom), para 83.

  72. 72.

    See Sect. 3.2.1.3.

  73. 73.

    Compare also ECHR 12 January 2010, App. no. 4158/05 (Gillan and Quinton v. The United Kingdom), para 86.

  74. 74.

    Compare also Prakken 2004.

  75. 75.

    Van Kempen 2005b, 7.

  76. 76.

    As also concluded in Van Kempen and Van de Voort 2010, 79-80.

  77. 77.

    See Sect. 2.3.2.1.1.

  78. 78.

    Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 30164, no. 3, 32.

  79. 79.

    Trechsel 2006, 540.

  80. 80.

    Ibid., 555.

  81. 81.

    Compare the remarks in this regard in Sect. 4.2.1.3.1.1. See also Van Kempen and Van de Voort 2010, 80-81.

  82. 82.

    See on this Chap. 1, Sect. 1.3.3.

  83. 83.

    See for an overview of the catalysts of the main changes in the area of the criminal justice system towards a ‘hardening’ and expansion of the criminal justice system: Groenhuijsen and Kooijmans 2010. Concerns about this development, in particular since the government of the liberals (VVD) and Christian-democrats (CDA), with the support of Geert Wilders’ far-right party (PVV), took office pursuing a harsh, strict and repressive security policy, has come from different angles, see e.g. Van Westerloo 2006 and De Roos 2010.

  84. 84.

    See on the influence of an increased emphasis on security, and the role of the threat of terrorism as the catalyst for this emphasis on security, on the adoption of legislation in the field of criminal law in the Netherlands: Van der Woude 2010, in particular 2-15, 108-109 and 292. See also Borgers 2007.

  85. 85.

    Compare: Van der Woude 2010, in particular 7 and 8.

  86. 86.

    Stb. 2010, 325. This Act was one of the measures in the context of the policy program ‘Security begins with prevention.’ Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 28 684, no. 119. See also Sect. 3.1.1.

  87. 87.

    Kamerstukken 2007/08. 31 467, no. 3, 1-2 and 18.

  88. 88.

    Compare: Van der Woude 2010, in particular 249 and 292.

  89. 89.

    Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 30 164, no. 3, 3.

  90. 90.

    Corstens 2008, 706-707 and Franken 2004a, 22-23.

  91. 91.

    Franken 2009. See also: Muller et al. 2007, 36-38.

  92. 92.

    HR 30 March 2004, NJ 2004, 376 and Franken 2004a, 24-25. See Sect. 2.3.2.4.3.

  93. 93.

    Van Gestel et al. 2009, 8.

  94. 94.

    Ibid., 9.

  95. 95.

    Ibid., 46.

  96. 96.

    Van Gestel et al. 2010, 13.

  97. 97.

    Ibid., 9.

  98. 98.

    Van Gestel 2009, 27-28.

  99. 99.

    Van Gestel 2010, 9.

  100. 100.

    Krommendijk et al. 2009, 135-137.

  101. 101.

    Gerechtshof’s-Gravenhage 2 October 2008, LJN BF3987 (Piranha).

  102. 102.

    See Sects. 2.3.2.3.1 and 4.2.1.2.

  103. 103.

    De Poot et al. 2008, 43.

  104. 104.

    Van Gestel 2010, 9.

  105. 105.

    Rapport Evaluatie Antiterrorismemaatregelen 2011, 15 and 49 and Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 30 164, no. 3, 33. That this specific goal of the Act was (initially) also assumed in the field, follows from the interviews conducted for the first evaluation of the Act: De Poot et al. 2008, 47.

  106. 106.

    De Poot et al. 2008, 52 and 57-58 and Rapport Evaluatie Antiterrorismemaatregelen 2011, 49 and Van Gestel et al. 2009, 19.

  107. 107.

    See Rapport Evaluatie Antiterrorismemaatregelen 2011, 49.

  108. 108.

    Compare Van Kempen 2005b, 7 and Rapport van de Commissie Evaluatie Antiterrorismebeleid 2009, 62-63.

  109. 109.

    This recommendation will be further elaborated in Chap. 9, Sects. 9.3.1.1 and 9.3.1.2.

  110. 110.

    Van Gestel et al. 2010, 9. See also De Poot et al. 2008, 19.

  111. 111.

    See further Chap. 9, Sects. 9.3.1.1 and 9.3.1.2.4.

  112. 112.

    Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 30 164, no. 3, 11.

  113. 113.

    Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 164, no. 7, 18.

  114. 114.

    With the exception of the preliminary investigative technique of Article 126hh CCP. This concerns a newly introduced technique with a more intrusive character than the other preliminary investigative techniques, for which reason the legislature considered the additional authorization of the examining magistrate for this technique to be required.

  115. 115.

    Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 164, no. 11.

  116. 116.

    Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 164, no. 7, 11.

  117. 117.

    See Sect. 2.3.1.3.

  118. 118.

    Franken 2006, 269.

  119. 119.

    Compare: Van Kempen 2005b, 10.

  120. 120.

    Van Kempen advocates additional control by means of an order by the public prosecutor in security zones and an authorization by the examining magistrate before indicting 12-hour zones. Compare: Van Kempen 2005b, 6-7.

  121. 121.

    See Sect. 2.3.2.3.

  122. 122.

    De Poot et al. 2008, 50.

  123. 123.

    HR 11 October 2005, NJ 2006, 625, para 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 and HR 21 November 2006, NJ 2007, 233 ann. Mevis, para 3.4 and annotation para 3. See also Sects. 2.3.1.1 and 2.3.2.4.3.

  124. 124.

    See: Van der Meij 2010a, 554-560.

  125. 125.

    Brinkhoff 2009, 123-128.

  126. 126.

    Section 3.3.2.

  127. 127.

    Franken 2009, 8.

  128. 128.

    Kamerstukken I, 2006/07, 30 164, no. D, 3-4.

  129. 129.

    Franken 2004a, 22-24.

  130. 130.

    ECHR 6 September 1978, App. no. 5029/71 (Klass and Others v. Germany), para 55.

  131. 131.

    ECHR 14 September 2010, App. no. 38224/03 (Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The Netherlands), para 88. 90, 92 and 98-100.

  132. 132.

    See on this: Franken 2004b, 219, Franken 2004a, 18 and Berkhout-van Poelgeest 2001, 31.

  133. 133.

    Rapport van de Commissie Evaluatie Antiterrorismebeleid 2009, 46-47.

  134. 134.

    See also Vermaas 2011, 25 and ‘Schadevergoeding voor opgepakte Somaliërs’, Volkskrant 14 January 2011.

  135. 135.

    See e.g. also Van Kempen 2005b and Rapport van de Commissie Evaluatie Antiterrorismebeleid 2009.

  136. 136.

    This suggested recommendation will be further elaborated in Chap. 9, Sects. 9.3.1.1 and 9.3.1.2.

  137. 137.

    Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 30 164, no. 3, 33.

  138. 138.

    See Sect. 3.3.4.

  139. 139.

    See Sect. 3.3.2.

  140. 140.

    De Poot et al. 2008, 52.

  141. 141.

    As is repeatedly stated in the context of cooperation between the AIVD and the PPS/police, the interest of national security prevails above the interest of criminal proceedings. See e.g. explanatory memorandum to the Shielded Witnesses Act Kamerstukken II 2004/04, 29743, no. 3, 1. See also the 2007 Amendment to the WIV 2002, amending Article 38 WIV 2002 in order to provide the AIVD with more discretion as to the situations where it shall send an official report to the PPS: the interest of national security prevails above the interest of prosecuting criminal offenses, for which reason the AIVD is no longer obliged to inform the PPS when criminal offenses are discovered during its investigations. Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 30 553, no. 8, 2.

  142. 142.

    De Poot et al. 2008, 43, Van Gestel et al. 2009, 46 and Van Gestel et al. 2010, 9.

  143. 143.

    De Poot et al. 2008, 53 and 63.

  144. 144.

    See Sects. 3.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2 and 4.2.2.2.

  145. 145.

    Rapport Evaluatie Antiterrorismemaatregelen 2011, 102.

  146. 146.

    See Sect. 4.2.2.2. This difference between the current experiences in practice and the possible theoretical implications may be supported by the fact that it has followed from the interviews conducted for the evaluation reports that the investigative possibilities under Title Vb are understood to be ‘broader’. However, the use of Title Vb seems currently to be more dependent on the preferences and knowledge of the persons in charge than the actual nature and concreteness of the information available. See Van Gestel 2009, 46.

  147. 147.

    Rapport Evaluatie Antiterrorismemaatregelen 2011, 49.

  148. 148.

    HR 13 November 2007, NJ 2007, 614, para 3.5.2.

  149. 149.

    In fact, the use of SIT in the context of a criminal investigation based upon indications in order to strengthen the information position in order to prepare a more effective criminal investigation (most likely upon a reasonable suspicion) with regard to the gathering of evidence against persons for the purpose of prosecution is similar to the goal for which the preliminary investigation has been created.

  150. 150.

    De Poot et al. 2008, 46-47.

  151. 151.

    See Sect. 3.4.4 and also: De Poot et al. 2008, 17 and 35-36.

  152. 152.

    Although the practical implementation of the policy pursued may face obstacles considering that the risk that the AIVD loses its information position as a consequence of sharing information with the PPS and the police will remain and, consequently, also the ‘reversed’ criminal investigation (first an arrest to remove a threat and then collecting the evidence). See also De Poot et al. 2008, 52-53 and Vermaas 2011.

  153. 153.

    See Sect. 3.1.1.

  154. 154.

    As also concluded by Luchtman 2007, 678.

  155. 155.

    See Sect. 2.3.2.2.2.

  156. 156.

    The discussion as to whether administrative disturbance can actually be considered as criminal law enforcement, considering the repressive nature and the purpose of preventing terrorist crimes, for which reason the public prosecutor instead of the mayor shall have the authority to order this method of disturbance, falls outside the scope of the subject of this research. See on this subject: Brouwer 2006, 12 and Muller et al. 2007b, 118-119.

  157. 157.

    See Sect. 3.4.1.

  158. 158.

    Rapport van de Commissie Evaluatie Antiterrorismebeleid 2009, 47-50.

  159. 159.

    See Sect. 2.2.2.2.2.

  160. 160.

    See on these search powers in security zones from the point of view of the ECrtHR decision in Gillan and Quinton v. The United Kingdom (ECHR 12 January 2010, App. no. 4158/05): Ölçer 2010, 21-30.

  161. 161.

    On April 6, 2011 the Minister of Security and Justice announced that the possibilities for preventive frisking and searches in security zones will be expanded by allowing the mayor to assign security zones without the intervention of the municipal council. Nevertheless, for the use of search powers on the basis of Articles 50-52 WWM the order of the public prosecutor is still required according to the first version of the bill (available at: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/regelingen/2011/04/07/wetsvoorstel-preventief-fouilleren-voor-consultatie.html (accessed May 18, 2011)), although the public prosecutor may be replaced by an assistant public prosecutor in the case of urgency.

  162. 162.

    Rapport van de Commissie Evaluatie Antiterrorismebeleid 2009, 52, 67-69 and 58.

  163. 163.

    More precisely: ‘making prosecutorial decisions’ implies a limitation to the collection of information that is relevant for the making of criminal procedural decisions with regard to criminal offenses, such as the decision whether or not to charge or a decision to arrest a suspect. Borgers 2009, 40 and 46. See also Sect. 2.3.2.2.1.

  164. 164.

    Borgers 2009, 52-53 and Knigge and Kwakman 2001, 305.

  165. 165.

    This does not correspond with the approach of the Criminal procedure 2001 researchers, who firstly opted to define the criminal investigation on the basis of the investigative purpose, whereas the supervision of the public prosecutor is consequently an applicable regulatory element (as well as the applicability of other procedural guarantees). According to Borgers, the choice of the legislature to retain the element of the supervision of the public prosecutor in the definition is erroneous. Borgers 2009, 53.

  166. 166.

    According to Borgers the criterion that the criminal investigative activities are conducted by the investigative officers under Articles 141 and 142 CCP should be favored above a material criterion that the information collected has potential relevance for the criminal investigation. The latter criterion would make it impossible to establish the supervision of the public prosecutor over all criminal investigative activities, because of the factual situation that many administrative supervisory powers may result in the discovery of information which is relevant for criminal investigations. Also the duty to compile records under Article 152 only applies to investigative officers and the application of Article 359a CCP to investigative activities beyond the responsibility of the public prosecutor would be troublesome. In other words: a material criterion to determine what activities are conducted for the purpose of criminal investigation will, although arguably being more accurate, diverge from the current system of the CCP. Borgers 2009, 57-58. This interpretation can now also be recognized in the case law interpreting Article 132a CCP. See HR 7 July 2009, NJ 2009, 528, ann. Buruma, para 6.2.3, citing the argumentation of the Court of Appeal, Gerechtshof’s-Gravenhage 1 March 2007, LJN AZ9644, para 5.1.1.

  167. 167.

    Compare also the Supreme Court, repeating the argumentation of the Court of Appeal: including the regulation of SIT in the CCP is intended to guarantee that these SIT are only used for the purpose of criminal investigation under Article 132a CCP, when the interest of the investigation requires the use of SIT for that purpose. HR 26 January 2010, NJ 2010, 77, para 3.4.

  168. 168.

    Kamerstukken II 2005/6, 30 164, no. 7, 24-25. See also Borgers 2009, 49-50.

  169. 169.

    See the argumentation provided in footnote 166 of this chapter.

  170. 170.

    This does not mean that the AIVD has obtained a different task. The task of the AIVD is still exclusively to protect national security (in the sense of the precise task description in Article 6 WIV 2002). It only means that also the AIVD is aware of the shared mission of preventing terrorism, for which reason the agencies cooperate (in the context of the CT Infobox by entering into regular consultations and under the auspices of the NCTb) and the AIVD shares information with the PPS whenever they consider a criminal investigation to be required in order to realize prevention. When the AIVD considers that sharing information is harmful to its own information position and that the protection of this information is more important for the purpose of realizing prevention, the AIVD will refrain from sharing information with the PPS.

  171. 171.

    See Sect. 2.1.3.4.

  172. 172.

    ECHR 16 December 1992, App no. 13071/87 (Edwards v. The United Kingdom), para 36.

  173. 173.

    See Sect. 4.2.1.2.

  174. 174.

    Inter alia, HR 5 September 2006, NJ 2007, 336, ann. Sch (Eik) and HR 25 September 2001, NJ 2002, 97.

  175. 175.

    ECHR 30 August 1990, App. nos. 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/86 (Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. The United Kingdom), para 32 and 34. In this case the Court assessed the reasonableness of the suspicion required for an arrest under Article 5 ECHR. The Court considered the information available to be insufficient for justifying the arrest as there were no facts or information that could satisfy the Court that the arrested person was reasonably suspected of having committed a criminal offense, because this information could not be disclosed.

  176. 176.

    ECHR 30 August 1990, App. nos. 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/86 (Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. The United Kingdom), para 34 and ECHR 16 October 2001, App. no. 37555/97 (O’Hara v. The United Kingdom), para 35.

  177. 177.

    HR 11 October 2005, NJ 2006, 625, para 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 and HR 21 November 2006, NJ 2007, 233, ann. Mevis, para 3.4 and annotation para 3.

  178. 178.

    Compare the annotation by Borgers para 6, HR 11 March 2008, NJ 2008, 329.

  179. 179.

    HR 11 March 2008, NJ 2008, 329, ann. Borgers.

  180. 180.

    HR 5 September 2006, NJ 2007, 336 and Gerechtshof’s-Gravenhage 2 October 2008. For the acceptance of CIE information as starting information see e.g. HR 14 September 1992, NJ 1993, 83 (see in more detail Sect. 2.3.2.3.1 and footnote 413 of Chap. 2).

  181. 181.

    ECHR 30 August 1990, App. nos. 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/86 (Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. The United Kingdom), para 34.

  182. 182.

    See Sects. 3.3.1 and 2.3.2.3.1 and see Brinkhoff 2009 10, 127-128, 136 and 138-139.

  183. 183.

    HR 5 September 2006, NJ 2007, 336, ann. Sch, annotation para 2.

  184. 184.

    HR 5 September 2006, NJ 2007, 336, ann. Sch, para 4.6.

  185. 185.

    According to the annotator, the Supreme Court undermines its own stance with this reasoning.

  186. 186.

    HR 5 September 2006, NJ 2007, 336, para 4.3.9. Compare: ECHR 16 October 2001, App. no. 37555/97 (O’Hara v. The United Kingdom), para 35, affirming the importance of shielding confidential sources in the case of a suspicion of a terrorist crime.

  187. 187.

    HR 5 September 2006, NJ 2007, 336 para 4.7.2 and HR 13 November 2007, NJ 2007, 614, para 3.6.

  188. 188.

    See e.g. Gerechtshof Amsterdam 9 June 1994, NJ 1994, 709. See in more detail Brinkhoff 2009.

  189. 189.

    The Supreme Court did not address this particular issue once again, but upheld the argumentation of the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof’s-Gravenhage 1 March 2007, LJN AZ9644, r.o, 5.1.1), HR 7 July 2009, NJ 2009, 528, ann. Buruma para 6.2.3 and 8.4. See also the Opinion of the Advocate General at para 5.8. agreeing with the argumentation of the Court of Appeal. See also the annotation by Buruma at para 3, warning that relying on secrecy should not result in a “secret of convenience” when the AIVD fears that a particular plea could adversely affect the service.

  190. 190.

    Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 29 743, no. 3, 1.

  191. 191.

    See for more detail on this issue: Alink 2004.

  192. 192.

    ECHR 16 October 2001, App. no. 37555/97 (O’Hara v. The United Kingdom), para 35.

  193. 193.

    See e.g.: ECHR 30 August 1990, App. nos. 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/86 (Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. The United Kingdom), para 34 and ECHR 15 November 1996, NJ 1997, 301 (Chahal v. The United Kingdom), para 131. See in this regard also: Vervaele 2005, 20-23 and Aksu 2007, 98-100.

  194. 194.

    ECHR 6 September 1978, App. no. 5029/71 (Klass and Others v. Germany), para 55.

  195. 195.

    The main conclusion of the report of the supervisory commission on the intelligence and security services, investigating the issuance of official reports by the AIVD in the period January 2004-October 2005, was the following: the contents of all examined official reports were supported by the content of the underlying files. In addition, the precision of the process for determining that the information underpinning the official reports is reliable is sufficiently guaranteed. Rapport van de Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten inzake het onderzoek naar de door de AIVD uitgebrachte ambtsberichten in de periode van januari 2004 tot oktober 2005, 2006, 7-8.

  196. 196.

    See also Krips 2009, 161. The supervisory commission for the AIVD has argued that the AIVD shall include in its reports, similar to the CIE, a judgment with regard to the veracity of the information provided as a matter of general practice. Rapport van de Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten inzake het onderzoek naar de door de AIVD uitgebrachte ambtsberichten in de periode van januari 2004 tot oktober 2005, 2006, 7-8.

  197. 197.

    Critical: Brinkhoff 2009.

  198. 198.

    EHRM 6 September 1978, App. no. 5029/71 (Klass and others v. Germany), para 55, 56 en 59.

  199. 199.

    A similar conclusion was drawn by Advocate General Machielse in the Piranha case: HR 15 March 2011, LJN BP7544 (CPG 08/04418), para 5.20 and 5.21. The decision of the Supreme Court in this case is still pending.

  200. 200.

    Gerechtshof’s-Gravenhage 1 March 2007, LJN AZ9644, para 5.1.1 and HR 7 July 2009, NJ 2009, 528, para 6.2.3 and 8.4.

  201. 201.

    Compare the approach that the courts have taken to assess issues following from the ‘cumulating spheres’ of administrative law and criminal law. See Sect. 2.3.2.2.2.

  202. 202.

    Report by the Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Thomas Hammarberg, on his visit to the Netherlands 2009, 37-38.

  203. 203.

    Although there is the possibility to follow the examination through telecommunication facilities or to submit written questions to the examining magistrate.

  204. 204.

    Compare: annotation Schalken para HR 5 September 2006, NJ 2007, 336. In the end it will be the trial judge who needs to decide whether he/she considers the information from uncontrollable sources to be sufficiently reliable to use as evidence. The ECrtHR has decided, as a safeguard, that a conviction may not exclusively or to a decisive extent be based upon anonymous sources. ECHR 17 November 2005, App. no. 73047/01 (Monika Haas v. Germany).

  205. 205.

    Rechtbank Rotterdam 1 December 2006, LJN AZ3589.

  206. 206.

    See on this e.g. Vervaele 2005, 16-27, Coster van Voorhout 2006, 123-130 and 137-143, Beijer 2006 and Krips 2009, 167-188.

  207. 207.

    See Sect. 4.2.1.1.

  208. 208.

    See Sect. 4.2.1.2.

  209. 209.

    See Sect. 4.2.2.2. This idea will be further discussed in Chap. 9.

  210. 210.

    Section 4.2.3.

  211. 211.

    See in detail Sect. 4.3.4.

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  1. Pels Rijcken & Droogleever Fortuijn N.V., PO Box 11756, 2502 AT, The Hague, Zuid-Holland, The Netherlands

    Dr. Marianne F. H. Hirsch Ballin

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Hirsch Ballin, M.F.H. (2012). The Implications of Enabling Anticipative Criminal Investigations to Confront Terrorism for the Objectives of Criminal Procedural Law: The Netherlands. In: Anticipative Criminal Investigation. T.M.C. Asser Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-843-9_4

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