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The European External Action Service: Enhancing Coherence in EU External Action?

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EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era

Abstract

In a rapidly changing world, the success of the European Union’s institutions in effectively addressing challenges and seizing opportunities is helped by the constant revision of EU strategies, as well as the focused support of and provision of resources by the Member States to make a difference. Arguably, when these elements are absent, EU external action flounders. The Union’s mixed performance in external action over the past few years illustrates the importance of the Lisbon Treaty, which was intended to create the tools for the EU to develop a more coherent, effective and visible foreign policy. One of the institutional innovations provided for in the Treaty on European Union to meet those ambitions is the creation of a European External Action Service (EEAS), which is intended to support the EU external action heroes. This contribution deals with the question whether the new EEAS is likely to enhance inter-institutional coherence in the Union’s external action. In order to answer this question, both the raison d’être and the mandate of the EEAS are examined, as well as the organisational structure and aspects of internal coherence of the Service. This chapter attempts to answer the question whether the envisaged structure of the Service corresponds to its mandate and whether the EEAS is likely to live up to its expectations by enhancing coherence in EU external action.

Prof. Dr. Steven Blockmans—Head of Research at the T.M.C. Asser Institute (The Hague) and Special Visiting Professor at the University of Leuven (Belgium).

Marja-Liisa Laatsit—Ph.D. candidate at the European University Institute (Florence).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on Europe Day, press release, Brussels, 7 May 2011, A 177/11, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/121895.pdf.

  2. 2.

    Vaisse and Kundnani 2011, 9. The assessment is of the collective performance of all EU actors rather than the action of any particular institution or country—either the High Representative, the European Council, the European Commission, a group of states like the EU3 (France, Germany and the UK), or an individual Member State.

  3. 3.

    Vaisse and Kundnani 2011, 11–12.

  4. 4.

    European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, 12 December 2003, as complemented by the High Representative’s Report on the Implementation of the ESS—Providing Security in a Changing World, doc. 17104/08 (S407/08), 11 December 2008, endorsed by the European Council, Presidency Conclusions, doc. 17271/08 (CONCL 5), 12 December 2008, point 30.

  5. 5.

    Compare, e.g. Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and European Commissioner for Enlargement Štefan Füle on the situation in Tunisia, Press release A 010/11, Brussels, 10 January 2011; ‘EEAS’ senior officials mission to Tunisia’, Press Release A 029/11, 26 January 2011; and Statement by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on Tunisia, Press Release A 034/11, Brussels, 28 January 2011. See also T. Garton Ash, ‘If this is young Arabs' 1989, Europe must be ready with a bold response’, The Guardian, 2 February 2011: ‘What happens across the Mediterranean matters more to the EU than the US. Yet so far its voice has been inaudible’.

  6. 6.

    See ‘Europe in the World—Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility), COM(2006) 278 final; the pre-Lisbon Draft IGC Mandate, annexed to the Presidency Conclusions of 22–23 June 2007; and the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP (2008).

  7. 7.

    Article 27(3) TEU.

  8. 8.

    For early findings on those ends, see Drieskens and Van Schaik 2010, and Emerson et al. 2011. These issues are dealt with by the contributions to this volume by Broberg and Schmidt.

  9. 9.

    See Articles 18(4), 21(3) and 26(2) TEU.

  10. 10.

    See, inter alia, Tietje 1997, Koutrakos 2001, 39–44, Hillion 2008, Cremona 2011 and, in this volume, Schmidt.

  11. 11.

    For a more detailed review of the Lisbon changes with regard to EU external action, see the contributions to Koutrakos 2011.

  12. 12.

    The most notable exception, however, is Article 216 TFEU, which provides Treaty foundation for the power to conclude international agreements, hitherto developed by the ECJ’s case law.

  13. 13.

    See, for example, Craig 2010, 380–381, Sari (this volume) and, insofar as the ECJ is concerned, Brkan (this volume).

  14. 14.

    This tendency has been most vocally criticised by Kishore Mahbubani, in ‘Europe’s Errors’, TIME Magazine, 8 March 2010: ‘(…) Europe’s obsession with restructuring its internal arrangements is akin to rearranging the deck chairs of a sinking Titanic. The focus on internal challenges when the real threats are external is the first of three strategic errors Europe is making.’

  15. 15.

    Article 13(1) TEU.

  16. 16.

    Article 22(1) TEU.

  17. 17.

    Article 15(6) TEU.

  18. 18.

    Article 207(2) TFEU. On the post-Lisbon arrangements for the CCP generally (and the new provisions on investment), see the contributions in this volume by Wu and Dimopoulos.

  19. 19.

    The name change (compare the title of the pre-Lisbon position) reflects the fact that it has become clear that the HR indeed represents the Union and not the (collective) Member States. Even the President of the European Council (note: not the European Union) exercises that position’s external competences ‘without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ (Article 15, para 6(d) TEU).

  20. 20.

    Article 18(2) TEU.

  21. 21.

    Article 24(3) TEU.

  22. 22.

    Articles 22–26 TEU, resp. Articles 26(2) and 28 TEU.

  23. 23.

    Article 15(2) TEU.

  24. 24.

    Article 18(2) TEU.

  25. 25.

    Article 17(4) TEU.

  26. 26.

    See Piris 2010, 243.

  27. 27.

    See Articles 18(4), 21(3) and 26(2) TEU.

  28. 28.

    It has been argued that the triple hats worn by the HR could lead to institutional schizophrenia, with the incumbent being subject to conflicting loyalties. See Devuyst 2008, 294–295. Indeed, the Member States of the EU may well have created an even more impossible job than that of the United Nations Secretary-General—a post often called the most difficult in the world.

  29. 29.

    CONV 459/02, Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action, Brussels, 16 December 2002, at 6–7.

  30. 30.

    Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, OJ 2010 L 201/30 (hereinafter: EEAS Council Decision).

  31. 31.

    Regulation No 1081/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Council Regulation No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, as regards the European External Action Service, OJ 2010 L 311/9; Regulation No 1080/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those Communities, OJ 2010 L 311/1; and European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2010 on Council's position on Draft amending budget No 6/2010 of the European Union for the financial year 2010, Section II—European Council and Council; Section III—Commission; Section X—European External Action Service [13475/2010—C7-0262/2010—2010/2094(BUD)].

  32. 32.

    Skytte Christoffersen 2010.

  33. 33.

    See Press Release IP/10/1769, Brussels, 21 December 2010.

  34. 34.

    For the EU as a whole, the external litmus test is the extent to which international partners find the EU to be more effective and visible. This point, however, is beyond the scope of the current chapter.

  35. 35.

    Article 1(2) EEAS Council Decision. On the character of the EEAS, see Van Vooren 2001a, b.

  36. 36.

    An exception could be provided by the inter-service ‘arrangements’ which the EEAS can conclude. (see below). These kinds of acts could potentially entail legal effects vis-á-vis third parties, within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU, and therefore could draw the EEAS into Court proceedings. See further Van Vooren 2001a, 493–496.

  37. 37.

    Article 1(3) EEAS Council Decision.

  38. 38.

    Article 2(1) EEAS Council Decision.

  39. 39.

    See Vanhoonacker and Duke 2010, 6.

  40. 40.

    See Lefebvre and Hillion 2010, 7.

  41. 41.

    A. Rettman, ‘UK champions own diplomacy over EU 'action service'’, EUObserver, 5 May 2011. Compare also Declarations concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Nos. 13 and 14) attached to the Lisbon Treaty which state, inter alia, that the CFSP, HR and EEAS provisions do not affect ‘the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist, for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy nor of their national representation in third countries and international organisations’ or ‘the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy’. These disclaimers show that, indeed, there is still room for national diplomacy after Lisbon.

  42. 42.

    According to one member of the Council Legal Service, the phrase should be interpreted in line with existing practice under Article 23(1) of the Council’s Rules of Procedure: ‘The Council shall be assisted by a General Secretariat…’ Gilles Marhic at the DSEU Conference ‘The Diplomatic System after Lisbon—Institutions Matter’, 18–19 November 2010, Maastricht University.

  43. 43.

    Lefebvre and Hillion 2010. For more on internal coherence, i.e. coherence within the confines of the organisational structure of the EEAS, see Sect. 7.4 of this chapter.

  44. 44.

    Press release IP/09/1837 of 27 November 2009. The requirement of close cooperation was repeated in the Mission Letters of the same date from Barroso (II) to Andris Piebalgs and Stefan Füle, and of 27 January 2010 to Kristalina Georgieva, ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/mission_letters/index_en.htm.

  45. 45.

    See Article 17(6)(b) TEU, which states that the President of the Commission shall ‘decide on the internal organisation of the Commission, ensuring that it acts consistently, efficiently and as a collegiate body’. On 22 April 2010, Barroso issued an Information Note from the President, ‘Commissioners groups’, SEC(2010) 475 final, in which the VP is tasked to chair the group of Commissioners responsible for ‘External relations’, a group further composed of Olli Rehn (economic and monetary affairs), Karel De Gucht (trade) and the three aforementioned Commissioners. The Note also says that ‘the President can decide to attend any meeting, which he will then chair’.

  46. 46.

    See the seventh recital of the Preamble of the EEAS Council Decision.

  47. 47.

    See Council Rules of Procedure, Articles 3(2 & 5), 5(3–4), 7(3), 27(3–5).

  48. 48.

    Article 3(2) EEAS Council Decision. This paragraph shall be implemented in accordance with Chapter 1 of Title V of the TEU, and with Article 205 TFEU.

  49. 49.

    Article 5(3) EEAS Council Decision.

  50. 50.

    Article 3(2) EEAS Council Decision.

  51. 51.

    Article 18(4) TEU.

  52. 52.

    European Commission President Barroso has been reported to take an uncooperative stance towards the difficulties which VP Ashton often faces to attend the Wednesday meetings of the College. Barroso has barred Ashton from participating via video conference or being deputised when abroad. See B. Waterfield, ‘Is absent Ashton a part-timer?’, EUObserver, 10 January 2011. On the other hand, cooperation between Ashton and individual Commissioners (Piebals, Füle, Georgieva) has been constructive, e.g. in monitoring the situation in the Arab World. To this end, and in an effort to keep his VP in check, Barroso published an Information Note from the President, Commissioners Groups, SEC (2010) 475 final, Brussels, 22 April 2010. For further analysis on this the latter, see Erkelens and Blockmans, loc. cit. See, more generally, Brok 2011.

  53. 53.

    Article 3(4) EEAS Council Decision.

  54. 54.

    Article 4(5) EEAS Council Decision.

  55. 55.

    Article 3(4) EEAS Council Decision.

  56. 56.

    Article 4(5) EEAS Council Decision.

  57. 57.

    Article 3(3) EEAS Council Decision. The terms ‘offices’ and ‘inter-institutional bodies’ leave room for coordination and cooperation between the EEAS and the office (cabinet) of the President of the European Council, the Publications Office, the European Personnel Selection Office, the European Administrative School and others.

  58. 58.

    Avery 2011, 2.

  59. 59.

    See ESS 2008.

  60. 60.

    Duke 2010, 35.

  61. 61.

    European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

  62. 62.

    See Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’, OJ 2006 C 46/1. The relationship between coherency and development policy is explored in more detail by Broberg (this volume).

  63. 63.

    See the European Commission’s 2009 review of the 2001 EU Strategy for Sustainable Development, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0400:FIN:EN:PDF>.

  64. 64.

    DG TRADE’s ‘Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU’s 2020 Strategy’, available at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/november/tradoc_146955.pdf>. The strategy aims to enhance the position of EU economy by getting new opportunities for trade and investment, deepening the existing trade and investment links, helping EU businesses access global markets, gaining foreign investment, implementing enforcement measures, and enhancing the ‘spirit of multilateralism and partnership’ in trade. These aims, no doubt, entail political consequences.

  65. 65.

    Ashton 2010), V. See also ESS 2008, 8–9; and ECJ, Case C-91/05 Commission v. Council (Small Arms and Light Weapons/ECOWAS), ECR 2008, I-03651.

  66. 66.

    As recognised in the ESS 2008, at 8–9.

  67. 67.

    European Council Conclusions of 16 September 2010, Press Release EUCO 21/10, CO EUR 16, CONCL 3.

  68. 68.

    See A. Rettmann, ‘Ashton designates six new ‘strategic partners’’, EUObserver, 16 September 2010.

  69. 69.

    Conclusions of the 3017th Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council meeting, Brussels, 31 May 2010.

  70. 70.

    European Council, Conclusions on Energy, Press Release PCE 026-11, 4 February 2011, pt. 11.

  71. 71.

    For an analysis of how training can contribute towards fulfilling the EEAS objectives and in nurturing a new EU diplomacy, see Lloveras Soler 2011.

  72. 72.

    See Avery 2011.

  73. 73.

    Ashton has been criticised—so far most vocally by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs—for not proposing a well-thought-out medium and long-term analytical approach for the Union’s foreign and security policy. See L. Maroun, ‘Steven Vanackere dit ses quatre vérités à Cathy Ashton’, Le Soir, 4 May 2011, at 14 : ‘Bien sûr, pour beaucoup de pays, la politique extérieure est au cœur de la souveraineté nationale. Nous, nous avons toujours voulu que le Service d’action extérieure soit l’axe central autour duquel les Etats membres peuvent s’organiser. Mais en l’absence d’un axe central qui répond, fait des analyses et tire des conclusions rapidement, les Allemands aujourd’hui, les Français demain, ou les Anglais, prennent une partie de ce rôle d’axe central, et c’est alors autour d’eux que les autres doivent s’organiser ! Le résultat est centrifuge, pas centripète. (…) Il est normal qu’Ashton ne soit pas partout en même temps. Il faut faire des choix, se concentrer sur les vrais enjeux, éviter de se perdre dans les détails, et une bonne gestion d’agenda. (…)Mais aujourd’hui, je n’ai pas l’impression qu’avec le Service d’action extérieure, on en soit déjà là. On peut accepter que certains réagissent plus vite qu’Ashton, mais à condition qu’elle puisse prouver qu’elle travaille sur le moyen et le long termes—et sur des thèmes hyper-importants, comme l’énergie par exemple. Mais ça, je n’ai pas encore vu non plus.’

  74. 74.

    The ENP review of May 2011, which goes far beyond the limits of the CFSP proper, was published by both the European Commission and the HR. See COM(2011) 303, 25 May 2011.

  75. 75.

    See Van Vooren 2001b, forthcoming.

  76. 76.

    See the fourth recital of the preamble of the EEAS Council Decision; Article 21(2)d TEU and Article 208 TFEU.

  77. 77.

    Article 9(3) EEAS Council Decision.

  78. 78.

    To be sure, actions undertaken under: the CFSP budget; the Instrument for Stability (other than the part referred to in Article 9(2) EEAS Council Decision); the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries; communication and public Diplomacy actions, and election observation missions, are under the responsibility of the HR/EEAS. The Commission is responsible for their financial implementation under the authority of the HR in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission. The Commission department responsible for this implementation shall be co-located with the EEAS. See Article 9(6) EEAS Council Decision.

  79. 79.

    Article 9(3) EEAS Council Decision.

  80. 80.

    Article 9(4) EEAS Council Decision (emphasis added).

  81. 81.

    Article 9(5) EEAS Council Decision.

  82. 82.

    See further Duke and Blockmans 2010.

  83. 83.

    It is important to once more make a distinction between the EEAS political role and its legal position. On the first point, the EEAS is potentially vested with significant influence on EU external relations policy-making but so far the Commission has ‘gone solo’ on several issues with a significant external dimension, e.g. trade, energy security and climate change. As for its legal position, the EEAS has not been formally conferred with competences to adopt legally binding instruments.

  84. 84.

    The organisational chart of 1 April 2011 was available online as late as on 1 July 2011. For updates, see <http://eeas.europa.eu/background/organisation/index_en.htm>.

  85. 85.

    For the purpose of this essay, we will restrict our analysis to reviewing the functionality of the Action Service’s central administration in promoting institutional coherence in the EU. On the role of the Union Delegations (provided for in Article 5 of the EEAS Council Decision), see Emerson et al. 2011, 5: ‘The EU Delegations are now in principle well placed institutionally to represent the EU in the main centres of multilateral diplomacy (New York, Geneva, Vienna, etc.) precisely because of their capacity to represent the entire EU—and not just the Commission, as in the pre-Lisbon era—in international organisations (…).’ At 52: ‘For representation abroad, the Heads of the 136 EU Delegations, substituting those of the Commission, are accountable to the HR, and take over the coordinating role on the ground, which had so far been carried out by the embassy of the member state holding the rotating Presidency—potentially a far-reaching change. In principle the Delegations should develop a key role in articulating EU policies towards third countries, linking not only to the EEAS in Brussels but also to Commission directorates general responsible for sectoral policies with important external aspects (e.g. agriculture, aid, trade, transport, energy migration).’

  86. 86.

    This first draft chart accompanied the High Representative’s proposal of 25 March 2010 and is on file with the authors.

  87. 87.

    Article 4(3)(a) of the EEAS Council Decision states: ‘the crisis management and planning directorate, the civilian planning and conduct capability, the European Union Military Staff and the European Union Situation Centre, placed under the direct authority and responsibility of the High Representative, (…) shall assist him/her in the task of conducting the Union’s CFSP in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty while respecting, in accordance with Article 40 TEU, the other competences of the Union.’ Moreover, ‘[t]he specificities of these structures, as well as the particularities of their functions, recruitment and the status of the staff shall be respected.’ Crisis management post-Lisbon is analysed in more detail by Schmidt (this volume).

  88. 88.

    They are seen as being in direct competition with the directors of the thematic and geographical desks. As reported by H. Mahony, ‘Diplomatic Service Blues’, EUObserver, 29 June 2011.

  89. 89.

    Pierre Vimont, on a par with the Chief Operating Officer (David O’Sullivan), and assisted by the Deputy Secretary General for Inter-institutional Affairs (Maciej Popowski) and the Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs (Helga Schmid). Together, they form the ‘Corporate Board’ of the EEAS, headed by the HR. The Managing Director Crisis Response and Operational Coordination may also be invited to attend the Corporate Board as necessary.

  90. 90.

    The term was dropped with the adoption of the provisional organisational chart of 21 December 2010.

  91. 91.

    Asia & Pacific; Africa; Europe & Central Asia; North Africa, Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, Iran & Iraq; Americas.

  92. 92.

    Article 4 (3) EEAS Council Decision.

  93. 93.

    A move is expected at the end of 2011.

  94. 94.

    See H. Mahony, ‘Diplomatic Service Blues’, EUObserver, 29 June 2011.

  95. 95.

    See European Commission, Draft amending Budget No. 6, COM (2010) 315 final, Brussels, 17.6.2010, at 5. This new configuration is expected to create synergies and efficiency gains. According to Ashton, on the fringes of the Gymnich of 10 September 2010, one could expect financial efficiency gains of at least 10%.

  96. 96.

    According to Article 5(2–3) of the EEAS Council Decision, the Head of Delegation shall receive instructions from the HR and the EEAS, and from the European Commission in areas where the Commission exercises the powers conferred upon it by the Treaties (cf. Article 221(2) TFEU) and shall be responsible for their execution. S/he shall also be accountable to the HR for the overall management of the work of the delegation and for ensuring the coordination of all actions of the Union.

  97. 97.

    See D. O’Sullivan, ‘Setting up the EEAS’, Speech at the IIEA, Dublin, 14 January 2011, 3, available at <http://www.iiea.com>. See also Lefebvre and Hillion 2010.

  98. 98.

    See Duke 2011, 77–78.

  99. 99.

    The EEAS Council decision stipulates that seconded national experts shall constitute no more than one-third of the positions at senior level, i.e. approximately 350 diplomats in total. The EEAS Council Decision stipulates that the members of the staff of the EEAS are subject to a high degree of mobility, in particular between the central administration and the delegations. Because of this, all EEAS staff will in principle serve periodically in EU delegations. This rotation is essential for staff to acquire experience on the ground and also to avoid an excessive identification with the interests of the states in which they are posted. Likewise, it is stated that civil servants serving in the EEAS will have the right to apply for posts in their institution of origin under the same conditions as internal candidates. It is by no means impossible that in the long term the existing links between the Action Service and the staff’s institutions of origin should be weakened, thus reinforcing the institutional autonomy of the EEAS.

  100. 100.

    Ibid.

  101. 101.

    Incidentally, it should be observed that while the organisational chart of 23 July 2010 still bore the tag line ‘The EEAS: a service for conflict prevention, security + stability’, this motto has been dropped from the organigramme floated on 21 December 2010 and has not returned in the chart of 1 April 2011. Arguably, these themes do therefore no longer represent the overriding goals to which all activities of the EEAS should be geared, but thematic issues which like all other global and multilateral issues covered by the directorate, which should be mainstreamed in the policy-making and decision-shaping of the geographical directorates of the EEAS.

  102. 102.

    See supra, Section 3.

  103. 103.

    See Duke 2011, at 77.

  104. 104.

    Ibid. Also, ‘[t]he linkage between the Managing Director Crisis Response and Operational Coordination, Agostino Miozzo, and the Corporate Board (on request) and the Policy Board is of particular importance since, aside from the HR/VP herself, this is the only obvious link with the CSDP bodies.’

  105. 105.

    Speech delivered on 19 February 2002 in Brussels on the occasion of the launch of CER publication by Steven Everts, ‘Shaping an effective EU foreign policy’, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/69508.pdf. Accessed 25 July 2011.

  106. 106.

    Dragneva and Wolczuk point to the fact that will have more underlying policy durability than any Member States and will potentially be better positioned to develop stronger ‘local knowledge’ but also to feed this knowledge into decision-making processes within the EU, this volume, Sect. 3.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Steven Blockmans

  2. University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

    Steven Blockmans

  3. European University Institute, Florence, Italy

    Marja-Liisa Laatsit

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  1. Steven Blockmans
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  2. Marja-Liisa Laatsit
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Correspondence to Steven Blockmans .

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  1. , School of Law, University of Sheffield, Bartolomé House, Winter Street, Sheffield, S3 7ND, United Kingdom

    Paul James Cardwell

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© 2011 T.M.C. ASSER PRESS, The Hague, The Netherlands, and the author

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Blockmans, S., Laatsit, ML. (2011). The European External Action Service: Enhancing Coherence in EU External Action?. In: Cardwell, P. (eds) EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era. T.M.C. Asser Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-823-1_7

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