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Between Legalisation and Organisational Development: Explaining the Evolution of EU Competence in the Field of Foreign Policy

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EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era

Abstract

The absorption of the European Community by the European Union has laid the foundations for the Union to become a more coherent and effective international actor. At the same time, the merger of the previously separate legal orders of the Community and the Union has put the intergovernmental character of the Common Foreign and Security Policy under considerable strain. The nature and extent of the Union’s competences in foreign policy matters constitute one of the areas where this tension is particularly acute. The present chapter investigates why the question of Union competence in the field of foreign policy was not the subject of concern before the Treaty of Lisbon and what prompted the Member States to address this question during the treaty reform process. The chapter develops an answer to these questions by relying on two concepts borrowed from International Relations scholarship, legalisation and organisational development, and argues that the institutional design of European foreign policy cooperation is governed by what we may term the Goldilocks Principle.

Aurel sari—Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the EUI and in Sheffield. I am grateful to the participants of these events, in particular Marise Cremona, Christiaan Timmermans, Pascal Vennesson, and Joris Larik, for their helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Academic works studying the Union in terms of its ‘actorness’ abound. For some examples, see Taylor 1982; Cameron 1998; Ginsberg 1999; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Greiçevci et al. 2007; Smith 2008, 25.

  2. 2.

    According to the influential scheme proposed by Jupille and Caporaso 1998, the Union’s capacity as an actor should be assessed with reference to four components: recognition by other actors, authority or legal competence to act, autonomy conceived as institutional distinctiveness and independence, and cohesion, meaning the ability to formulate internally consistent policy preferences. A different analytical framework is offered by Bretherton and Vogler 2006, who argue that the EU’s actorness is determined by its ability to exert influence as measured in terms of opportunity, presence and capability.

  3. 3.

    The notion of actorness has been imported into legal writing where it has mostly, although not exclusively, been treated as synonymous with legal personality. See Cremona 1998; Lenaerts and De Smijter 1999–2000; Editorial Comment 2001; Cannizzaro 2002; Tomuschat 2003.

  4. 4.

    The leading case on the notion of international legal personality is Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) (1949) ICJ Rep. 174. In line with the Reparation case, most contemporary commentators derive the legal personality of international organisations from their constituent instruments and thus ultimately from the consent and will of their creators, whether manifested expressly or by implication. See Amerasinghe 2005, 77–86; White 2005, 68–69; Akande 2006, 282; Klabbers 2009, 46–51; Sands and Klein 2009, 473–480. See also Rama-Montaldo 1970, 111–131 and Bederman 1995–1996, passim.

  5. 5.

    Those denying that the EU has acquired legal personality under international law include Neuwahl 1998; de Zwaan 1999; Denza 2002, 176, whilst those arguing in favour of this view include Wessel 1997; Tizzano 1998; Gütt 2003. For an overview of the opposing positions with extensive references to the literature, see Sari 2008, 71–80.

  6. 6.

    It should be noted that in recent years a consensus has emerged in the literature to the effect that the EU has evolved into a separate legal person of international law even before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon as a result of its extensive treaty practice under the second pillar. See Thym 2006, 870–875; Naert 2007, 101; Grard 2006, 352–354.

  7. 7.

    Papathanasiou 2009.

  8. 8.

    Treaty on the European Union, Article 47 simply declares that ‘[t]he Union shall have legal personality’. Cf. MacLeod et al. 1996, 29–36.

  9. 9.

    Treaty on the European Union, Article 1 provides that ‘[t]he Union shall replace and succeed the European Community’. This is not the first time the EU has taken on the functions of another international organisation: see Wessel 2001.

  10. 10.

    ECJ, Case C- 22-70, Commission v. Council (European Agreement on Road Transport) [1971] ECR 263, paras 13–14. See Koutrakos 2006, 7–8.

  11. 11.

    Indeed, this is how Treaty on the European Union, Article 47 is commonly understood: see Cremona 2008, 38; Wessel 2008, 152; Papathanasiou 2009, 37.

  12. 12.

    ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) (1949) ICJ Rep. 174, 178–179. On the consequences of legal personality, see Rama-Montaldo 1970, 131–147.

  13. 13.

    Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 216.

  14. 14.

    Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 220.

  15. 15.

    Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 221.

  16. 16.

    Görlitz 2004, 376.

  17. 17.

    Treaty on the European Union, Article 21. This contrasts with the legal framework in place before Lisbon, where EC external relations and the CFSP pursued distinct, albeit in part overlapping, objectives. In the past, this has led to difficulties in the horizontal delimitation of competences, as seen in particular in ECJ, Case C-91/05, Commission v. Council (Small Arms) [2008] ECR I-3651. See Heliskoski 2008; van Vooren 2009.

  18. 18.

    As Pernice 2008–2009 points out, the overarching aim of the Lisbon Treaty in the field of external action was to ensure that ‘the Union shall be perceived as one unit, speak with one mouth, and implement consistent policies in external matters’ (398). Of course, the conferral of legal personality in itself guarantees neither consistency nor effectiveness. Appropriate decision-making processes, amongst other things, are equally important. See Afionis 2008–2009.

  19. 19.

    For some examples from the literature, see Krenzler and Schneider 1994; Schmalz 1998; Wessel 2000; Gauttier 2004; Blockmans and Wessel 2009.

  20. 20.

    CFI, Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649, para 120; ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, para 202. Not all commentators have accepted the notion that the CFSP and Community law constitute separate legal orders. See in particular von Bogdandy and Nettesheim 1996.

  21. 21.

    Gosalbo Bono 2006; Hermann 2008. On the legal character of Community law, see Denza 1999 and with reference to external relations, de Baere 2008, in particular 73–158. More recently, several commentators have detected signs of a gradual conversion between the CFSP and Community external relations: see Wessel 2009; de Baere 2008, 205–209.

  22. 22.

    See also Bribosia 2007, 203–204.

  23. 23.

    Support for this view may be derived from Treaty on the European Union, Article 1 which provides that the Treaties have the same legal value, and from a general presumption (cf. Amerasinghe 2005, 17) in favour of the coherence and integrity of the internal law of any international organisation. Cf. Curtin and Dekker 1999, 89–90; Amerasinghe 2005, 24–65.

  24. 24.

    Cf. Bast 2005, albeit in relation to the failed Constitutional Treaty. See also Trüe 2004, 410.

  25. 25.

    For a powerful argument to this effect, see Denza 2004.

  26. 26.

    Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 2.

  27. 27.

    Treaty on the European Union, Article 24(1).

  28. 28.

    Treaty on the European Union, Article 40.

  29. 29.

    Koutrakos 2008, 669. See also Streinz 2005, 116–117; Karolewski 2005, 1657; Thym 2009, 336. On the initial workings of the Member State Council Presidencies immediately after the entry into force of Lisbon, see Morillas (this volume).

  30. 30.

    For further on this point insofar as the new structure can be said to retain a system of ‘deliberative intergovernmentalism’, see Puetter (this volume).

  31. 31.

    Gosalbo Bono 2006, 393. This view is not an isolated one: see also Thym 2009, 337 and Görlitz 2004, who suggests that the EU enjoyed no competences in CFSP because of its lacking legal personality (369–370).

  32. 32.

    For example, Koutrakos 2001, 15.

  33. 33.

    See Smith 2001b and, more extensively, Smith 2004.

  34. 34.

    Smith 2004, 38–39.

  35. 35.

    See March and Olsen 1984; Hall and Taylor 1996 ; Lowndes 1996 for some general overviews of the field.

  36. 36.

    For realist responses to institutionalism, see Grieco 1988; Mearsheimer 1994.

  37. 37.

    Generally, see Keohane 1982.

  38. 38.

    On the conceptual affinities between institutionalism and international law, see Slaughter Burley 1993, especially 217–222.

  39. 39.

    Henkin 1979; Kennedy 1986–1987; Koskenniemi 2002.

  40. 40.

    Krasner 2009, 95–96.

  41. 41.

    For the purposes of this chapter, the term norm covers both legal and non-legal rules. The different schools of institutionalism do not adopt a single approach in this regard. In particular, rational choice institutionalism focuses on rules, whereas constructivism operates with a broader understanding of norms: see Duffield 2007, 4–7. On the related concept of international regimes, see Hasenclever et al. 1997, 8–22.

  42. 42.

    March and Olsen 1984, 249.

  43. 43.

    Meyer and Rowan 1977, 341. Cf. Young 1982, who defines the ‘conjunction of convergent expectations and patterns of behavior or practice’ as the distinguishing feature of all social institutions (278).

  44. 44.

    Simmons and Martin 2002, 194.

  45. 45.

    Keohane 1988, 383. Many similar definitions can be found in the literature. Young 1986, for example, defines institutions as ‘recognized practices consisting of easily identifiable roles, coupled with collections of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles’ (107).

  46. 46.

    For example, Abbott 2008, 6, describing international law as a ‘unique international institution’. In addition, legal concepts within a legal system may be conceived in institutional terms. See MacCormick and Weinberger 1985; Ruiter 1993.

  47. 47.

    Cf. Hart 1997, 79–99.

  48. 48.

    On the international level, one may point to the concept of customary international law as a pattern of State behaviour existing over a period of time and followed out of a sense of legal obligation. For a brief account of customary international law, see Müllerson 1997. For more detailed discussions, see Mendelson 1998; Roberts 2001; Kammerhofer 2004; Lepard 2010.

  49. 49.

    Susan Strange’s famous remark that the term regime ‘is yet one more woolly concept that is a fertile source of discussion simply because people mean different things when they use it’ also applies to the notion of international institutions; Strange 1982, 484–485.

  50. 50.

    Bull 1995, 71. Similarly, Young 1989 counts among his list of institutions war, the State system and the order of the oceans (33).

  51. 51.

    For example, Chimni 2004.

  52. 52.

    Cf. Onuf 2002, 224. See also Haggard and Simmons 1987, 493–496.

  53. 53.

    Setear 2003–2004, 743.

  54. 54.

    ICJ, Case concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (USA v. Iran), (1980) ICJ Rep. 41, para 86.

  55. 55.

    Yet institutionalism’s ability to account for change has not gone without criticism, e.g., Gorges 2001.

  56. 56.

    For example, Simpson 2004. Similarly, decision about the future development of the law must have recourse to extra-legal considerations, e.g., Higgins 1994, 2–12.

  57. 57.

    On other uses of international relations theory by international lawyers, see Abbott 1992; Slaughter et al. 1998, 373–378. For a word of caution on the limits of inter-disciplinary rapprochement, see Simmons 2001, 276–278.

  58. 58.

    Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891.

  59. 59.

    Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891. See also Duffield 2007, 6–7.

  60. 60.

    Hart 1997, 81.

  61. 61.

    See in particular Abbott et al. 2000. For an earlier account of the concept of legalisation, see Abbott 1998.

  62. 62.

    For alternative uses of the term legalisation, see Scott et al. 2002, 291–292.

  63. 63.

    Abbott et al. 2000, 401.

  64. 64.

    Cf. the criticism on this point by Finnemore and Toope 2001, 750–751.

  65. 65.

    Smith 2001b; Smith 2004, 117–144. Smith is not the first to study the evolution of international norms from an institutionalist perspective, see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 894–909.

  66. 66.

    Abbott 1998, 59; Smith 2001b, 82.

  67. 67.

    Cf. Setear 2003–2004, 742–747. This is so partly because legalisation is understood to encompass, at one end, the complete absence of law (Abbott 1998, 59). In other words, legalisation as a process may well start with the emergence of non-legal patterns of behaviour, just like institutionalisation.

  68. 68.

    Of course, this does not mean that the concept is of no interest at all to international lawyers: for instance, it may be usefully employed to identify and describe consistent patterns of practice which have not attained the status of a rule of customary international law and to distinguish the former from the latter.

  69. 69.

    For example, Wagner 2003, 37.

  70. 70.

    For examples of the use of the term in international law scholarship, see Barker 2007; Øhlenschlæger Buhl 2009.

  71. 71.

    Indeed, adopting such a comparative perspective provides the otherwise potentially abstract notion of precision with concrete meaning. Cf. the remarks by Friedrich Kratochwil in Scott et al. 2002, 297.

  72. 72.

    Abbott et al. 2000, 401.

  73. 73.

    As Hart 1997 has eloquently put it, legal rules limit the discretion of judges, although they do not exclude it altogether (147).

  74. 74.

    Thus, even Abbott and Snidal 2000 seem to imply that the main purpose of delegating authority to judicial bodies is to achieve greater precision (433).

  75. 75.

    This is not to deny the relevance of delegation in this context. Clearly, delegation of authority is involved in the creation of judicial organs and bodies, in particular where these constitute international organisations in their own right, such as the International Criminal Court. Rather, the point is that such delegation serves the purpose of determining the existence of legal obligations and increasing their precision.

  76. 76.

    The term is borrowed from Duffield 2007, 12–13.

  77. 77.

    For example, Lichtenstein’s conferral of powers onto Switzerland in relation to the policing of third country nationals: see EComHR, X and Y v. Switzerland, App. No. 7289/75 and 7349/76 (1977) 9 D.R. 57, 14 July 1977.

  78. 78.

    A fine example of such a norm is Treaty on the European Union, Article 1, which provides as follows: ‘By this Treaty, the HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES establish among themselves a EUROPEAN UNION, hereinafter called ‘the Union’, on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common.’ See Abbott and Snidal 1998.

  79. 79.

    Abbott et al. 2000, 415–418.

  80. 80.

    Care must be taken in choosing the level of analysis. In particular, difficulties arise where organisational development is not confined to a single institution. For example, treating the Coalition Provisional Authority created by the US and the UK in 2003 as the organisational dimension of belligerent occupation conceived as an institution may obscure the fact that the powers of the Authority were not solely derived from the law of armed conflict. See Kaikobad 2005.

  81. 81.

    Treaty on the European Union, Article 13.

  82. 82.

    For example, Wessel 1996 defines institutionalisation as a process of increasing collaboration leading to the creation of an international organisation (43). See also Bolleyer 2009, who uses institutionalisation as a descriptor for organisational autonomy (23–28). These terminological dilemmas are not new. The words international organisation and institution have been used more or less interchangeably for some time. See Potter 1945; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 754–763.

  83. 83.

    Rieber 1976 refers to the ‘institutionalization of policy formulation’ through the European Council (225); Philippart 2003 mentions the deliberate ‘non-institutionalization’ of political dialogue (202); Juncos and Reynolds 2007 suggest that the creation of the Political and Security Committee brought about ‘the greater institutionalization of European foreign and security policy’ (147); while Blockmans and Wessel 2009 describe permanent structured cooperation under Treaty on the European Union, Article 42(6) as a form of institutionalisation (303). See also Smith 2001a; Duke 2008.

  84. 84.

    Cf. Stone Sweet et al. 2001, 7.

  85. 85.

    Oran Young has thus distinguished sharply between institutions/regimes on the one hand and formal organisations on the other: see Young 1986, 108; Young 1989, 25–27.

  86. 86.

    Although it is not necessary to measure organisational development for the purposes of the present article, one convenient way of doing so would be to rely on the tripartite typology of conferrals of power by States onto international organisations developed by Sarooshi 2005.

  87. 87.

    For a brief overview of this chapter of European integration, see Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 35–64; Bindi 2010. For a more detailed narrative focusing on post-war European security cooperation, see Duke 2000.

  88. 88.

    On the background and institutional features of the EDC, see Fursdon 1980; Ruane 2000.

  89. 89.

    Griffiths 2000.

  90. 90.

    See Berthold 2003; Bindschedler 1954, 263–331.

  91. 91.

    For a detailed account of the domestic and international processes leading to the failure of the EDC and the EPC, see Lerner and Aron 1957; Noack 1977.

  92. 92.

    Silj 1967. See also Wood 1977–1978.

  93. 93.

    Among the extensive literature on the EPC, see Nuttall 1992; Gröne 1993.

  94. 94.

    Second Report of the Foreign Ministers to the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the European Community (The Copenhagen Report), Copenhagen, 23 July 1973. In Hill and Smith 2000, 88.

  95. 95.

    Stein 1983, 52.

  96. 96.

    Hurd 1981, 386.

  97. 97.

    See Ifestos 1987, 50.

  98. 98.

    Holland 1991. More generally, see Nuttall 1987.

  99. 99.

    Nuttall 1986.

  100. 100.

    Lak 1989, 287–293. The structure of the SEA thus foreshadowed the pillar structure of the TEU (cf., Nutall 1986, 289).

  101. 101.

    Single European Act, preamble paras 1 and 2 and Article 1.

  102. 102.

    Single European Act, Articles 30(3)(b) and 30(4).

  103. 103.

    Single European Act, Article 30(5).

  104. 104.

    Single European Act, Article 30(3)(a).

  105. 105.

    While some have questioned the legal quality of the Single European Act, Article 30, e.g., Ifestos 1987, 56–57, the limited nature of the commitments undertaken by the Member States should not detract from the fact that they were still legal commitments under international law. Cf. Dehousse and Weiler 1991.

  106. 106.

    Preamble para 2 (emphasis added).

  107. 107.

    Single European Act, Article 31. See Murphy 1989, 349–351.

  108. 108.

    In other words, the Single European Act, Article 3 recalled the principle of conferral (see Treaty on the European Union, Article 5) whereby the competences of the institutions are limited to those powers which have been conferred upon them.

  109. 109.

    de Costa Pereira 1988.

  110. 110.

    See also Gosalbo Bono 2006, 339–340.

  111. 111.

    On the legal framework of the CFSP under Maastricht, see Edwards 1993; Fink-Hooijer 1994; Jürgens 1994.

  112. 112.

    See Bonvicini 1988, 53–59.

  113. 113.

    Murphy 1998, 885–886.

  114. 114.

    Treaty on European Union (Maastricht) Articles J.2(2), J.3(1), J.8(2) and J.11(2).

  115. 115.

    Cf. Jürgens 1994, 353.

  116. 116.

    See supra note 31.

  117. 117.

    See Sereni 1940.

  118. 118.

    The appointment of arbitrators and expert committees provides one example; see for example, Exchange of Letters between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of France concerning the Implementation of the Ruling of 6 July 1986 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Pertaining to the Differences between the two Government Arising from the Rainbow Warrior Affair, 9 July 1986, (1990) XIX RIAA 216.

  119. 119.

    Maastricht-Urteil (1993) BVerfGE 89, 155, 195. See also Pechstein 1996.

  120. 120.

    Many of these legal acts imposed what were earlier termed regulatory norms. Other acts, in particular joint actions, provided a framework for collective action and played an enabling rather than constraining role. For more details on this function of joint actions, see Sari 2011.

  121. 121.

    Pescatore 1987 dismissed the commitments undertaken by the Member States in the Single European Act, Article 30 as pretentious and coming close to ridicule (16). Compared to the mainly hortatory language of the Single European Act, Article 30, the Maastricht provisions on CFSP imposed more tangible and more precisely formulated obligations on the Member States. See Denza 2002, 55.

  122. 122.

    Treaty on European Union (Maastricht) Articles J.2 and J.3.

  123. 123.

    Treaty on European Union (Maastricht) Article L.

  124. 124.

    Of course, this dualism did little to clarify the legal status of the EU: see Sari 2008, 71–73.

  125. 125.

    See Monar 1997; Dashwood 1998b; Langrish 1998 for analysis.

  126. 126.

    ‘Some small steps in the right direction’ was the verdict of Dehousse 1998, 530.

  127. 127.

    Treaty on European Union (post-Amsterdam) Articles 13(2) and 18(3).

  128. 128.

    Treaty on European Union (post-Amsterdam) Article 24.

  129. 129.

    See Sari 2008, 73–80, with further references.

  130. 130.

    Treaty on European Union (post-Amsterdam) Article 13(2).

  131. 131.

    Treaty on European Union (post-Amsterdam) Article 23.

  132. 132.

    Treaty on European Union (post-Amsterdam) Article 17. See Grassi 1998; Pagani 1998.

  133. 133.

    Amongst other things, the Treaty of Nice increased the scope of qualified majority voting (Treaty on European Union (post-Nice) Article 23), revised the procedure governing the conclusion of international agreements (Treaty on European Union (post-Nice) Article 24) and introduced enhanced cooperation into the CFSP (Treaty on European Union (post-Nice) Articles 27a–27e).

  134. 134.

    On the ESDP and its contribution to the EU’s international identity, see Salmon and Shepherd 2003; Anand 2009. The founding document of the ESDP, the Anglo-French Declaration of St. Malo, specifically notes that enabling the EU to play its full role on the international stage ‘means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union.’ See Rutten 2001, 8.

  135. 135.

    Treaty on European Union (post-Nice) Article 25.

  136. 136.

    In addition to the literature cited supra note 6, see Verwey 2004, 60–61; Sari 2008, 80–82.

  137. 137.

    Cf. Koskenniemi 1998, 28–29.

  138. 138.

    See Communiqué of the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the European Community (The Hague Summit Declaration), The Hague, 2 December 1969. In Hill and Smith 2000, 72.

  139. 139.

    The term sovereignty costs in this context refers to the loss of decision-making autonomy experienced by states as a result of institutionalisation, see Abbott and Snidal 2000, esp. 436–441.

  140. 140.

    In this respect, it is important to note that organs such as the High Representative exercise their functions under the authority, and thus control, of the Council. Cf. Craig 2005, 431–432.

  141. 141.

    Treaty on European Union (Maastricht) Article J.8(2); Treaty on European Union (post-Amsterdam) Article 23; Treaty on European Union (post-Nice) Article 23.

  142. 142.

    For example, on Yugoslavia, Salmon 1992; on the Leila/Perejil Island incident, Monar 2002; on Iraq, Roloff 2006.

  143. 143.

    On the jurisdiction of the ECJ after the Treaty of Lisbon, see Brkan (this volume). Although breaches by the Member States of their obligations under Title V may give rise to their international responsibility, it would be quite exceptional for another Member State to invoke that responsibility in the context of formal legal proceedings, whether before the Court of Justice or another judicial body.

  144. 144.

    For example, Gourlay and Remacle 1998, 60 et seq.

  145. 145.

    Declaration on the Future of the Union, Final Act, Treaty of Nice, OJ [2001] C80/85.

  146. 146.

    Cf. de Witte 2001.

  147. 147.

    This call for a better division of competences was taken up enthusiastically by key players. See Mayer 2001, 626–631.

  148. 148.

    Laeken Declaration on the Future of the Union, Annex I to Presidency conclusions, Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001, 4–5. See Götz 2002, 83–85.

  149. 149.

    Note on the plenary meeting—Brussels, 15 and 16 April 2002, 25 April 2002, CONV 40/02 5–6; Note on the plenary meeting—Brussels, 23 and 24 May 2002, 29 May 2002, CONV 60/02, para 7. See Ritzer 2006, 133 et seq.

  150. 150.

    Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, Annex I to the Presidency Conclusions, Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001. See Nettesheim 2004, 526.

  151. 151.

    Craig 2004, 325; Nettesheim 2004, 512–514. This partly explains why the delimitation of competences was not considered in a working group dedicated solely to this question.

  152. 152.

    Specifically, the Laeken Declaration asked three sets of questions: how the current division of competences could be made more transparent, whether the existing competences needed to be reorganised whilst respecting the acquis communautaire and how to ensure that a redefined division of competence did not lead to a creeping expansion of the Union’s powers.

  153. 153.

    Craig 2004; Nettesheim 2004, 514–525. On the question of Community competences and their reform more generally, see Dashwood 1996; von Bogdandy and Bast 2002; Trüe 2004.

  154. 154.

    Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, 5. In this respect, the European Council asked whether the Petersberg Tasks listed in Article 17 TEU-Nice should be updated. This was a peculiar question to ask in the context of a possible re-allocation of competences, given that the crisis management tasks listed in that provision were merely indicative of the type of operations the EU was competent to undertake within the scope of its common security and defence policy. As von Kielmansegg 2007 suggests, the original Petersberg Tasks offered an important insight into Union competence in this field, but they did not exhaustively define the material scope of that competence (647).

  155. 155.

    For instance, providing the EU with exclusive competence in the field of foreign policy could resolve most of the vertical and horizontal coherence problems experienced in the past. However, this solution is clearly not politically viable.

  156. 156.

    Cf. Götz 2002, who notes that this question expanded the scope of the previous competence debate (95).

  157. 157.

    Bearing in mind that the European Council did so whilst calling for greater clarity and transparency, some may sense a certain irony here.

  158. 158.

    The Working Group’s mandate was limited to considering questions related to the future of complementary competences. See Mandate of the working group on Complementary Competencies, 31 May 2002, CONV 75/02.

  159. 159.

    Final report of Working Group V, 4 November 2002, 2. CONV 375/1/02 REV 1.

  160. 160.

    The Working Group justified its reluctance by suggesting that ‘any such classification would greatly depend on a number of policy choices belonging to other fora of the Convention’, Final report of Working Group V, 4 November 2002, footnote 3, CONV 375/1/02 REV 1. This makes sense in so far as the Convention may have decided to revise the Union’s CFSP competences, yet this clearly is not a valid reason for refusing to consider the nature of those competences de lege lata.

  161. 161.

    Final report of Working Group III on Legal Personality, 1 October 2002, para 14, CONV 375/1/02 REV 1.

  162. 162.

    Simplification of the Treaties and drawing up of a constitutional treaty, 10 September 2002, CONV 375/1/02 REV 1, 15.

  163. 163.

    This was echoed in the work of the Convention: cf. Delimitation of competence between the European Union and the Member States—Existing system, problems and avenues to be explored, 15 May 2002, CONV 47/02, 3–4.

  164. 164.

    Description of the current system for the delimitation of competence between the European Union and the Member States, 28 March 2002, CONV 17/02, 2.

  165. 165.

    Description of the current system for the delimitation of competence between the European Union and the Member States, 28 March 2002, CONV 17/02, 4.

  166. 166.

    Description of the current system for the delimitation of competence between the European Union and the Member States, 28 March 2002, CONV 17/02, 3.

  167. 167.

    Delimitation of competence between the European Union and the Member States—Existing system, problems and avenues to be explored, 15 May 2002, CONV 47/02, 20.

  168. 168.

    On this line of cases, see Koutrakos 2006, 77–134. See also Nettesheim 2009, 423–434. For a critical analysis of the notion of concurrent competence employed in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Article I-12, see Trüe 2004, 415–418.

  169. 169.

    ECJ, Case 22-70, Commission v. Council (European Agreement on Road Transport) [1971] ECR 263, para 17.

  170. 170.

    ECJ, Opinion 2/91, Convention No 170 of the International Labour Organization concerning safety in the use of chemicals at work [1993] ECR I-1061, para 25.

  171. 171.

    ECJ, Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual property [1994] ECR I-5267, para 96.

  172. 172.

    EU External Action, 3 July 2002, CONV 161/02, 13.

  173. 173.

    See European Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs, A5-0133/2002, Report on the division of competences between the European Union and the Member States (2001/2024(INI)), 24 April 2002, 20; Contribution from Mr Alain Lamassoure, member of the Convention, 14 May 2002, CONV 46/02; WG V—WD 20, Note by Mr Peter Altmaier “The Division of Competencies between the Union and the Member States” (revised version), 4 September 2002, 14; WG VII—WD11, “Promoting the community method in the External actions of the EU”—Paper by Mr Adrian Severin, alternate member of the Convention, 28 October 2002.

  174. 174.

    Summary Report of the Plenary Session—Brussels, 11 and 12 July 2002, 16 July 2002, CONV 200/02.

  175. 175.

    Summary report on the plenary session—Brussels, 3 and 4 October 2002, 11 October 2002, CONV 331/02, 2. In its final report, the Working Group on Legal Personality argued that the pillar structure was not only outdated, but that retaining it was also unnecessary, since ‘all the institutional and procedural features specific to the two intergovernmental pillars (CFSP and cooperation in criminal matters) which the Convention considers appropriate to maintain could be preserved in the new constitutional treaty’; Final report of Working Group III on Legal Personality, 1 October 2002, CONV 305/02, 6.

  176. 176.

    Preliminary draft Constitutional Treaty, 28 October 2002, CONV 369/02, 3.

  177. 177.

    Draft of Articles 1–16 of the Constitutional Treaty, 6 February 2003, CONV 528/03, 16.

  178. 178.

    Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 18 July 2003, CONV 850/03.

  179. 179.

    Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ [2004] C310/1.

  180. 180.

    For a general assessment of the relevant provisions, see Mayer 2005.

  181. 181.

    The separate treatment of CFSP competence has not escaped criticism, e.g., Nettesheim 2004, 527–528.; Puetter (this volume) and, for an alternative analysis through the lens of ‘European Realism’, Bendiek (this volume).

  182. 182.

    For example, Cremona 2003, 1354.

  183. 183.

    Dashwood 1998a, 216.

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  1. School of Law, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK

    Aurel Sari

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  1. , School of Law, University of Sheffield, Bartolomé House, Winter Street, Sheffield, S3 7ND, United Kingdom

    Paul James Cardwell

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Sari, A. (2011). Between Legalisation and Organisational Development: Explaining the Evolution of EU Competence in the Field of Foreign Policy. In: Cardwell, P. (eds) EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era. T.M.C. Asser Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-823-1_4

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