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The Latest Attempt at Institutional Engineering: The Treaty of Lisbon and Deliberative Intergovernmentalism in EU Foreign and Security Policy Coordination

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Abstract

The Treaty of Lisbon is the latest in a series of attempts at institutional engineering seeking to enhance the EU’s capability to act within a decentralised policy setting which is not governed through the classic Community method and in which Member States either cannot be at all formally sanctioned for non-compliance or only in very exceptional circumstances. More specifically, this chapter reviews the new role of the High Representative within the Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as the changed presidency regime of the European Council. It does so with a view to how these changes further consolidate a system of deliberative intergovernmentalism which is constituted by routinised and consensus-oriented policy dialogue and, thus, departs from previous notions of intergovernmentalism in EU policy-making. Similarly, the increased use of informal working methods as well as the repercussions of the creation of the European External Action Service for enhanced administrative cooperation between national administrations are discussed.

Uwe Puetter—Professor at the Department of Public Policy and Director of the Center for European Union Research at the Central European University in Budapest. Draft versions of this chapter have been presented at the UACES/Modern Law Review conference ‘EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era’, University of Sheffield, 13–14 January 2011 and the UACES conference ‘The Lisbon Treaty Evaluated’, 31 January 2011. This chapter also has benefited from collaborative research carried out and directed by the author and Antje Wiener, University of Hamburg, in the context of the Commission sponsored FP6 RECON project, WP6. The author is grateful to Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin for hosting him as a visiting fellow in the second half of 2009 when he undertook research on the changing role of the European Council and the Council in European Union governance. Finally, the author wishes to thank Paul James Cardwell for his very helpful comments and suggestions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Puetter 2012.

  2. 2.

    The term ‘Community method’ is used throughout this chapter in order to highlight the substantive meaning of what has become the key decision-making method in the process of European integration. Its centrality for EU decision-making is reflected in Articles 288–292 TFEU.

  3. 3.

    On the institutional-level questions see, for example, the contributions to this collection by Brkan, Sari and Schmidt.

  4. 4.

    Armstrong 2011.

  5. 5.

    See Majone 1997; Mancini 1998; Moravcsik 1998; Schmitter 2004.

  6. 6.

    See Héritier 2007; Tallberg 2006.

  7. 7.

    Christiansen and Reh 2009.

  8. 8.

    See e.g. Amstrong 2010; Trubek and Mosher 2003.

  9. 9.

    Policy coordination in the latter two policy fields was introduced as the main governance method by the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, respectively.

  10. 10.

    Moravcsik 1993.

  11. 11.

    Haltern 2003.

  12. 12.

    The concept of institutional engineering is borrowed from and used by analogy with Giovanni Sartori’s famous work on constitutional engineering and the context of comparative institutionalist scholarship on democratic institutions. See Sartori 1994.

  13. 13.

    Puetter 2012.

  14. 14.

    Puetter and Wiener 2009.

  15. 15.

    Puetter 2006.

  16. 16.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 21. For further exploration on the ‘values’ of EU foreign policy, see the chapter in this volume by Broberg.

  17. 17.

    This does not mean that there are no changes to the policy content dealt with in the CFSP arena. As CFSP practice shows an expansion of the scope of foreign and security policy activity this is certainly the case. However, this development is currently not determined by Treaty changes.

  18. 18.

    Puetter and Wiener 2007.

  19. 19.

    See, in particular, the chapters by Sari and Brkan who explore the limits of the legal enforceability of CFSP instruments, and that lack of jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

  20. 20.

    This is not to say that the EP cannot use competences it enjoys in other areas to exercise pressure on the Council and the European Council to recognise more explicitly the parliament’s point of view. The example of the discussion about the establishment of the EEAS was instructive in this regard.

  21. 21.

    See, further, Brkan (in this volume) who analyses the reasons for the lack of jurisdiction and also identifies the ways in which the ECJ enjoys some competence over CFSP-related areas.

  22. 22.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 24.3.

  23. 23.

    Treaty on European Union (pre-Lisbon) Article 11.2.

  24. 24.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 26.2.

  25. 25.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 26.3. See further, in this volume, Schmidt and her discussion of how this is likely to function insofar as crisis management operations are concerned.

  26. 26.

    Treaty on European Union (pre-Lisbon), Article 18.1.

  27. 27.

    Treaty on European Union (pre-Lisbon), Article 18.2.

  28. 28.

    Treaty on European Union (pre-Lisbon), Article 18.3.

  29. 29.

    Treaty on European Union (pre-Lisbon), Article 26.

  30. 30.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 27.

  31. 31.

    See Sect. 2.6.

  32. 32.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 27.1.

  33. 33.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 30.

  34. 34.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 31.2.

  35. 35.

    See, further, the chapter in this volume by Blockmans and Laatsit.

  36. 36.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 27.3.

  37. 37.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 27.3.

  38. 38.

    Puetter 2012.

  39. 39.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 26.

  40. 40.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 26.1.

  41. 41.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 26.2.

  42. 42.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 18.

  43. 43.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 18.

  44. 44.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 31.

  45. 45.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 15.5.

  46. 46.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 15.2.

  47. 47.

    The Lisbon Treaty does not foresee a similar arrangement for the President of the Eurogroup. However, the current President of the Eurogroup is Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker who is a member of the European Council. He has been chairing the Eurogroup since 2005 when the office of an elected president was created for the first time. His appointment became possible because he also acted as Luxembourg’s finance minister at the time.

  48. 48.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 15.6.

  49. 49.

    See Van Rompuy H (2010) The Challenges for Europe in a Changing World, European Council Press Release PCE 34/10.

  50. 50.

    European Council (2011) President of the European Council convenes an extraordinary European Council on Friday 11 March 2011. Press Release PCE 055/11.

  51. 51.

    European Council (2011) Declaration adopted by the extraordinary European Council, 11 March 2011. EUCO 7/11.

  52. 52.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 15.6.

  53. 53.

    See in particular Schmidt, who also notes the lack of clarity in dividing the tasks between the High Representative.

  54. 54.

    Treaty on European Union, Article 26.1.

  55. 55.

    On the working of the High Representative within the context of the Spanish EU Presidency in 2011, see the chapter in this volume by Pol Morillas.

  56. 56.

    See also Blockmans and Laatsit (this volume).

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Puetter, U. (2011). The Latest Attempt at Institutional Engineering: The Treaty of Lisbon and Deliberative Intergovernmentalism in EU Foreign and Security Policy Coordination. In: Cardwell, P. (eds) EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era. T.M.C. Asser Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-823-1_2

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