The Action-Omission and Double Effect Distinctions

  • Timothy ChappellEmail author
Part of the Philosophy and Medicine book series (PHME, volume 110)


One crucial question for the Natural Law Theory of ethics that has been advocated by Joseph Boyle over the course of his distinguished career is: Exactly what is to count as (minimal) respect for a good or value? Under what circumstances do we fail to reach the threshold even of respect for some good, and so count as violating it? I take this to be the hardest question of all for the New Natural Law Theory; it is obvious from Boyle’s writings that he takes it to be a crucial question too, and that he has done more than most to clarify it.


Transmission Model Causal Story Causal Responsibility Paradigm Action Counterfactual Account 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Ethics CenterThe Open UniversityMilton KeynesUK

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