Substantial Identity, Rational Nature, and the Right to Life

  • Patrick LeeEmail author
Part of the Philosophy and Medicine book series (PHME, volume 110)


In various places many natural law theorists, including Joseph Boyle, have defended the position that every human being is valuable as a subject of rights in virtue of the fundamental or substantial kind of being he or she is, rather than in virtue of additional, accidental attributes, that may be acquired (and then lost) later in life.


Brain Death Rational Nature Persistent Vegetative State Rational Animal Biological Life 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Franciscan University of SteubenvilleSteubenvilleUSA

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