Abstract
The purpose of this essay is to compare the substantial identity argument for the wrongness of abortion to the future of value argument for its wrongness. Both arguments take for granted the standard moral judgment that it is wrong intentionally to end the lives of innocent post-natal children and adults.
This essay was begun while I was Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Professor for Distinguished Teaching at Princeton University and was motivated by discussions with Robert George and Patrick Lee while I was there. I am deeply indebted to Princeton University for the opportunity provided by that appointment and to Pat and Robby for prodding me intellectually.
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Marquis, D. (2011). Why Abortion is Seriously Wrong: Two Views. In: Tollefsen, C. (eds) Bioethics with Liberty and Justice. Philosophy and Medicine(), vol 110. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9791-0_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9791-0_1
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