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Why Abortion is Seriously Wrong: Two Views

  • Donald MarquisEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Philosophy and Medicine book series (PHME, volume 110)

Abstract

The purpose of this essay is to compare the substantial identity argument for the wrongness of abortion to the future of value argument for its wrongness. Both arguments take for granted the standard moral judgment that it is wrong intentionally to end the lives of innocent post-natal children and adults.

Keywords

Rational Agency Major Premise Substantial Identity Biological Life Minor Premise 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of KansasLawrenceUSA

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