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Multifaceted Ecology Between Organicism, Emergentism and Reductionism

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Ecology Revisited

Abstract

The classical holism-reductionism debate, which has been of major importance to the development of ecological theory and methodology, is an epistemological patchwork. At any moment, there is a risk of it slipping into an incoherent, chaotic Tower of Babel. Yet philosophy, like the sciences, requires that words and their correlative concepts be used rigorously and univocally. The prevalent use of everyday language in the holism-reductionism issue may give a false impression regarding its underlying clarity and coherence. In reality, the conceptual categories underlying the debate have yet to be accurately defined and consistently used. There is a need to map out a clear conceptual, logical and epistemological framework.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In this context the word ‘epistemology’ connotes the more limited and specific meaning of the research domain concerning the relationships among theories and laws that belong to different organisational levels. In other words, it is characterised by the epistemic challenge of “heterogeneous reduction”, or “theoretical reductionism” (Ruse 1988).

  2. 2.

    It is worth pointing out that, unlike the Quine thesis, the holistic reference of the Duhem thesis is the whole of physics. Its working has been described according to an organicist perspective: in physics, as in an organism, all the theories work together, even if they are not all called into play at the same level of intervention (1977, pp. 187–188).

  3. 3.

    To avoid any risk of misunderstanding, it would be more appropriate to use the term ‘holism’ to indicate specifically the relational view of reality according to which natural (or social) reality is constituted by spatio-temporal interdependent entities. Its logical opposite is the ontological atomistic view.

  4. 4.

    It is worth recalling that constructivism does not deny the existence of a reality (natural, social, and so on). Rather, this perspective foregrounds the idea that within this reality, thanks to our epistemic constructs, we identify or recognise certain characteristics, aspects and processes that are functional to our aims and objectives (scientific, social, and so forth).

  5. 5.

    This is an elliptic formulation; the correct one is the following: the laws concerning the emergent properties of a level of organisation cannot be predicted, even in principle, by the laws concerning the lower level relations between the constituent parts.

  6. 6.

    For instance, even the most radical reductionist could not explain biological evolution by referring only to the overall theoretical package of physics and chemistry; according to Williams: “at least the one additional postulate of natural selection and its consequence, adaptation, are needed” (Williams 1966, p. 5; see also 1985, p. 1).

  7. 7.

    The term “holism” was to appear from the third edition (1971) onwards, even if the corresponding worldview had already been outlined in previous works.

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Bergandi, D. (2011). Multifaceted Ecology Between Organicism, Emergentism and Reductionism. In: Schwarz, A., Jax, K. (eds) Ecology Revisited. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9744-6_4

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