Abstract
The topic or theme of ‘idealism’ in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is commonly linked to well-known and much debated issues such as, first and foremost, Kant’s theory of the transcendental ideality of space and time, involving of course the crucial distinction between appearance and thing in itself; secondly, the issue of Kant’s occasional criticism of what he, at some point in the second edition, coins ‘material’ idealism, covering both Descartes’ ‘problematic’ idealism and Berkeley’s ‘dogmatic’ idealism,1 as opposed, thirdly, to the terms ‘formal’, ‘critical’, and “transcendental” that supposedly characterize Kant’s own idealism. In this article, I will only indirectly address some of these issues, focusing primarily on Kant’s less debated doctrine of the transcendental ideal, including his reading of the principle of thoroughgoing2 determination, for which this ideal is supposed to serve as the prototype, as discussed explicitly in section 2 of the third chapter of the second book of the Transcendental Dialectic, entitled ‘On the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon transcendentale)’.
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Notes
- 1.
Cf. B274–275.
- 2.
The German term ‘durchgängig’ can be translated into English by the terms ‘thoroughgoing’ and ‘complete’; in this paper, I will use both terms synonymously. Cf. also Longuenesse (2005: 215n.).
- 3.
Please allow me to quote, in German, the whole passage at A575–576=B603–604: “Wenn […] der durchgängigen Bestimmung in unserer Vernunft ein transscendentales Substratum zum Grunde gelegt wird, welches gleichsam den ganzen Vorrath des Stoffes, daher alle mögliche Prädicate der Dinge genommen werden können, enthält, so ist dieses Substratum nichts anders, als die Idee von einem All der Realität (omnitudo realitatis). Alle wahre Verneinungen sind alsdann nichts als Schranken, welches sie nicht genannt werden könnten, wenn nicht das Unbeschränkte (das All) zum Grunde läge.
Es ist aber auch durch diesen Allbesitz der Realität der Begriff eines Dinges an sich selbst als durchgängig bestimmt vorgestellt, und der Begriff eines entis realissimi ist der Begriff eines einzelnen Wesens, weil von allen möglichen entgegengesetzten Prädicaten eines, nämlich das, was zum Sein schlechthin gehört, in seiner Bestimmung angetroffen wird. Also ist es ein transscendentales Ideal, welches der durchgängigen Bestimmung, die nothwendig bei allem, was existirt, angetroffen wird, zum Grunde liegt und die oberste und vollständige materiale Bedingung seiner Möglichkeit ausmacht, auf welcher alles Denken der Gegenstände überhaupt ihrem Inhalte nach zurückgeführt werden muß. Es ist aber auch das einzige eigentliche Ideal, dessen die menschliche Vernunft fähig ist, weil nur in diesem einzigen Falle ein an sich allgemeiner Begriff von einem Dinge durch sich selbst durchgängig bestimmt und als die Vorstellung von einem Individuum erkannt wird.”—Note that, for Kant, the idea of an omnitudo realitatis is the one single genuine ideal of which reason is capable. According to Caimi (1995: 540), “[i]n the case of the omnitudo realitatis, and in no other case, the idea of reason, along with its regulative function, produces the complete determination of what is thought of in the idea.” (Cf. also Heimsoeth 1969, 442–443; and Ferrari 1998, 499–500).— English translations of the Critique of Pure Reason are from Guyer and Wood (Kant 1998).
- 4.
- 5.
Cf. e.g., B608=A580.
- 6.
Cf. Ferrari (1998: 497–498).
- 7.
Caimi (1995: 539ff.) distinguishes between the regulative and non-regulative function of the transcendental ideal in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. In fact, he claims that the non-regulative function is “perhaps the distinctive function of the ideal.” (539) On the one hand, “[w]e might seem to be faced with a threefold choice: (1) accepting a solely regulative function of the ideal; (2) regarding the ideal as an empty concept deprived of all meaning, or else (3) hypostatizing it in an illegitimate way.” (539) On the other hand, however, “there remains a fourth alternative that has been overlooked: according to it, the ideal of reason fills a function of its own.” (539) This fourth, non-regulative function of the transcendental ideal consists in the fact that “the prototypon transcendentalis shows that all other objects are conditioned” (541) and that “the empty ideal keeps the place of the absent God” (542). Klimek (2005: 163) seems to propose yet another non-regulative interpretation of the transcendental ideal, namely a critical-theological one: “Kant kritisiert […] nicht nur mögliche Beweise für das Dasein eines allerrealsten Wesens, eines unbewegten Bewegers oder eines Weltschöpfers, sonder zeigt auch, wie sich bereits in die Konstitution des Begriffs vom ens realissimum, der den übrigen rationalistischen Gottesbegriffen zugrunde liegt, Fehler einschleichen. Kant hat bekanntlich dennoch versucht, die aus der Rationaltheologie seiner Vorgänger vererbten Begriffe in eine Theologie des „Als-ob“ zu überführen. Da allerdings erstens die erkenntnistheoretisch bestimmte regulative Funktion der rationaltheologisch überlieferten Ideen alles andere als offensichtlich ist und sich zweitens jene traditierten Begriffe als erschlichen und nicht etwa als erschlossen herausstellen werden, scheint uns ein alternativer, kritischer „theologischer“ Grundbegriff eine angemessenere Konsequenz der kantischen Kritik zu sein als eine alternative Interpretation der tradierten Begriffe.”—I will not go into the details of Caimi’s and Klimek’s interesting arguments here; rather, I just want to underline that Kant needs to account for the transcendental ideal beyond its mere negative or polemic connotations with respect to rationalist metaphysics, especially of course rational theology.
- 8.
As to the complex relation between the first and the second Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic, see Theis (1985: 136–137).
- 9.
Cf. e.g., Ferrari (1998: 491–492).
- 10.
Sometimes confusingly, Kant uses the term ‘Verstand’ in a broad sense—i.e, “im alten übergreifenden Sinne (intellectus)”, according to Heimsoeth (1969: 456n. 78)—to signify reason and in a narrow sense to signify pure understanding. Cf. also Klimek (2005: 4ff.), who consistently talks about “Verstand im weiteren Sinne” and “Verstand im engeren Sinn”.
- 11.
Cf. e.g., A665=B693.
- 12.
Cf. e.g., A670–671=B698–699 and A697–698=B725–726 (“ein Wesen in der Idee”). And Caimi (1995: 540–541): “The ideal is an object, but only an object in the idea. Having this object in the idea does not mean that the idea must refer to an independent object; for the object in the idea has no actual reality (Wirklichkeit). […] The objective reality of the object in the idea is not its actual existence […]. The object in the idea is real insomuch as it is the content (or theme) of a concept of reason. […] The ideal is […] an object in the idea; it is an object without existence outside the concept of reason. Its being is that of a content of the idea. […] As an object in the idea, empty, though not devoid of meaning, the ideal has a function of its own. This function might be presented as the following: The ideal serves to keep empty the place of the Absolute; that is, it serves to represent precisely the absence of content in the concept: the absence of God.”
- 13.
Cf. e.g., A674=B702, A679=B707, A682–684=B710–712, A697=B725, and A699=B727. Cf. also Horstmann (1998: 535) and Caimi (1995: 539): “The ideal works as a scheme of the complete determination of empirical objects; this scheme is thought by means of the idea of the omnitudo realitatis. Every idea holds, within an accomplished and perfect unity, those synthetic actions necessary for the further, gradual production of the rational unity of empirical knowledge; in the particular case of the idea of the omnitudo realitatis the accomplished and perfect synthetic unity thought in it is the complete synthesis of all realities (that is, of all positive predicates).”
- 14.
Cf. e.g., A571=B599: “The aim of reason with its ideal is […] a thoroughgoing determination in accordance with a priori rules; hence it thinks for itself an object that is to be thoroughly determinable in accordance with principles, even though the sufficient conditions for this are absent from experience, and thus the concept itself is transcendent.”
- 15.
Cf. Theis (1985: 136): “Ce n’est que dans la mesure où Kant peut montrer qu’il appartient à l’essence même de la raison de donner lieu à l’illusion qu’il est légitime de critiquer les discourses métaphysiques traditionnels comme étant des discourses inévitablement dialectiques.”
- 16.
Cf. A306–307=B363.
- 17.
A307–308=B364.
- 18.
A308=B365.
- 19.
Cf. A305=B362 et passim.
- 20.
Cf. e.g., A309=B365–366 and A583=B611.
- 21.
Cf. Caimi (1995: 542–543): “Therefore, the ideal should be assumed not only as a regulative principle, but also as a metaphysical aim of knowledge. […] The ideal should be assumed as empty. […] On assuming the ideal, we assert the aim of reason. Yet, by assuming it as being an object in the idea, we acknowledge that we do not know that object and that, therefore, it is an empty object to our knowledge. The unconditioned itself (God) is posited (assumed) as unknowable, so that reason does not need to resign its own calling which compels it to seek the unconditioned. But any apparent success in this search is rejected in advance; thus the authenticity of metaphysical endeavour is safeguarded. Such an endeavour should be aimed at the unattainable as such, thereby excluding all alleged achievement.”
- 22.
A297=B353; translation slightly adjusted.
- 23.
Cf. A296=B352–353.
- 24.
Cf. A297–298=B354 and A339=B397; and Klimek (2005: 164).
- 25.
A297=B354; cf. also Grier (2001: 3–4, 127ff.).
- 26.
A498=B526; cf. also Klimek (2005: 34–35).
- 27.
A498=B526.
- 28.
Neiman (1995: 517–518).
- 29.
A581=B609; translation slightly modified.
- 30.
Cf. Klimek (2005: 1, quoting from AA 17: 242).
- 31.
Cf. again A297=B354 and A644=B672.
- 32.
As to the unity of theoretical and practical reason, resulting from Kant’s conception of pure reason itself see e.g. Neiman (1995, esp. 517–518, from which I have quoted above).
- 33.
As to the distinction between a regulative and a non-regulative function of the ideal of pure reason see footnote 7 above.
- 34.
Caimi (1995: 541).
- 35.
Longuenesse (2005: 211).
- 36.
Longueness (2005: 212). Cf. also Klimek (2005: 31–39).
- 37.
Longuenesse (2005: 212n.3); Longuenesse points to A568=B596, A569=B597, and A574=B602.
- 38.
Longuenesse (2005: 218).
- 39.
Heimsoeth (1969: 457n. 80) rightly suggests that the distinction between distributive and collective unity at A582=B610 should be linked to A643–644=B671–672, a passage at the beginning of the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic where Kant gives an account of this distinction in terms of the concepts ‘constitutive’ and ‘regulative’: “Reason never relates directly to an object, but solely to the understanding and by means of it to reason’s own empirical use, hence it does not create any concepts (of object) but only orders them and gives them that unity which they can have in their greatest possible extension, i.e., in relation to the totality of series; the understanding does not look to this totality at all, but only to the connection through which series of conditions always come about according to concepts. Thus reason really has as object only the understanding and its purposive application, and just as the understanding unites the manifold into an object through concepts, so reason on its side unites the manifold of concepts through ideas by positing a certain collective unity as the goal of the understanding’s actions, which are otherwise concerned only with distributive unity.” (B671–672)
- 40.
See notably Chapter 9 by Schulting, this volume.
- 41.
Cf. A642–643=B670–671 and footnote 39 above.
- 42.
Contrary, e.g., to Rohs (1978: 172–173): “Der Grundsatz betrifft […] nicht die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit überhaupt von Erfahrung, sondern die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit einer vollständigen Erfahrung. Der Grundsatz muß gelten, wenn es möglich sein soll, etwas vollständig zu erkennen. Man darf vielleicht im Sinne Kants sogar sagen, daß dieser Grundsatz das einzige synthetische Urteil a priori ist, das zu den anderen Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung noch hinzutreten muß, wenn nicht nur überhaupt objektive Erkenntnis, sondern sogar eine vollständige Erkenntnis von etwas möglich sein soll. Dies erklärt, warum der Grundsatz nicht in die Analytik gehört: er ist keine Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung als solcher. Objektive Erkenntnis wäre auch dann möglich, wenn dieser Grundsazt nicht gälte. Aber es gäbe dann keine vollständige Erkenntnis […]. Die vollständige Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes ist […] nach Kant eine Vernunftidee. […] Die Möglichkeit einer vollständigen Erkenntnis is nicht im „Verstand“ begründet, d.h. dort, wo überhaupt die Möglichkeit objektiver Erkenntnis begründet ist. Diese Idee trägt zur objektiven Gültigkeit unserer Erkenntnis nichts bei; dennoch wird durch sie dem Verstand eine Regel vorgeschrieben.”
References
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Acknowledgments
I thank Dennis Schulting for his valuable comments and our very pleasurable collaboration in preparing this volume.
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Verburgt, J. (2010). How to Account for Reason’s Interest in an Ultimate Prototype?. In: Schulting, D., Verburgt, J. (eds) Kant's Idealism. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 66. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9719-4_12
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