Rational Belief Changes for Collective Agents

  • David WestlundEmail author
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 21)


The possibility of ascribing rational changes of beliefs to collectives is discussed. Limits on what a collective can believe are inferred from the assumption that the collective should change its belief in α if all its members change their belief in α. It is also shown that some very reasonable assumptions about the collective beliefs results in an inconsistency.


Social Choice Majority Vote Epistemic State Belief Revision Belief Change 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.EslövSweden

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