Abductive Belief Revision in Science

  • Gerhard SchurzEmail author
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 21)


The chapter starts from the observation that neither belief revision in the AGM tradition nor belief base revision contain mechanisms for learning new hypotheses from new evidences. After a discussion of two approaches to implement such learning mechanisms into input-driven belief revision, and of alternative accounts in terms of deliberate belief revision, an account of input-driven abductive belief expansion and revision is develop which intends to be as close as possible to belief revision in science and in common sense cognition. For this purpose, the chapter draws on a theory of abduction developed elsewhere. Abductive expansion and revision functions, including induction as a special case, are described within three specific domains: inductive generalization, factual abduction, and theoretical model abduction. It turns out that abductive belief revision does not satisfy the Levi-identity.


Belief System Belief Revision Belief Base Epistemic Agent Inductive Generalization 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



For valuable help I am indebted to Hannes Leitgeb, Erik Olsson, Issac Levi and Hans Rott.


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of DuesseldorfDuesseldorfGermany

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