Rationality in Flux – Formal Representations of Methodological Change

  • Jonas NilssonEmail author
  • Sten Lindström
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 21)


A central aim for philosophers of science has been to understand scientific theory change, or more specifically the rationality of theory change. Philosophers and historians of science have suggested that not only theories but also scientific methods and standards of rational inquiry have changed through the history of science. The topic here is methodological change, and what kind of theory of rational methodological change is appropriate. The modest ambition of this paper is to discuss in what ways results in formal theories of belief revision can throw light on the question of what an appropriate theory of methodological change would look like.


Rationality Standard Methodological State Belief Revision Belief Change Empirical Adequacy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Swedish Research Council (VR), the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study (SCAS) and Umeå University.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of HistoricalPhilosophical and Religious Studies, Umeå UniversityUmeåSweden

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