Rationality in Flux – Formal Representations of Methodological Change
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A central aim for philosophers of science has been to understand scientific theory change, or more specifically the rationality of theory change. Philosophers and historians of science have suggested that not only theories but also scientific methods and standards of rational inquiry have changed through the history of science. The topic here is methodological change, and what kind of theory of rational methodological change is appropriate. The modest ambition of this paper is to discuss in what ways results in formal theories of belief revision can throw light on the question of what an appropriate theory of methodological change would look like.
KeywordsRationality Standard Methodological State Belief Revision Belief Change Empirical Adequacy
The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Swedish Research Council (VR), the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study (SCAS) and Umeå University.
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