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Knowledge as True Belief

  • Isaac LeviEmail author
Chapter
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Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 21)

Abstract

“Knowledge” is an honorific intended to distinguish sources of information that are approved from those that are not and also to distinguish full beliefs that are prized from full beliefs that are despised. These are two distinct functions. The function of sources of information is quite different from the function of states of full belief. We should not expect that the characterization of knowledge in the two cases should be the same or that conflict between the two can be settled by appeal to “our ordinary” concept of knowledge. (There is no such thing.)

Keywords

True Belief Potential State Belief State Propositional Attitude Credal Probability 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Columbia UniversityNew YorkUSA

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