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The Best of All PossibleWorlds: Where Interrogative Games Meet Research Agendas

  • Emmanuel GenotEmail author
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Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 21)

Abstract

Erik J. Olsson and David Westlund have recently argued that the standard belief revision representation of an epistemic state is defective.1 In order to adequately model an epistemic state one needs, in addition to a belief set (or corpus, or theory, i.e. a set closed under deduction) \(\underline{\textrm K}\) and (say) an entrenchment relation E, a research agenda \(\underline{\textrm A}\), i.e. a set of questions satisfying certain corpus-relative preconditions (hence called \(\underline{\textrm K}\)-questions) the agent would like to have answers to. Informally, the preconditions guarantee that the set of potential answers represent a partition of possible expansions of \(\underline{\textrm K}\), hence are equivalent to well-behaved sets of alternative hypotheses.

Keywords

Belief Revision Potential Answer Strategic Game Interrogative Model Epistemic Utility 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Lille 3LilleFrance

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