Abstract
In this paper we clarify how ‘epistemic’ (ESR) and ‘ontic’ structural realism (OSR) should be understood and reply to some important criticisms of the latter. We shall begin with an outline of the historical origins of what might broadly be called the ‘structuralist tendency’ within philosophy of science. This has come to be identified with a form of ‘structural realism’ but it should be noted that it also includes those who adopt an anti-realist or empiricist stance. Because of the width of its embrace and its complex history, defining what is meant by ‘structure’ and characterising the tendency in general, is problematic. However, we begin by pointing out that the structuralist tendency always involves a shift in focus away from objects – however they are metaphysically conceived – to the structures in which they are (supposedly) embedded (where the reason for the qualifier ‘supposedly’ will become clear shortly). This is vague but the tendency, both historically and in its current incarnation, is not monolithic but rather includes various overlapping subgroups of structuralists.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Krause and French op. cit., explain the history of the debate about identical particles in physical theories in detail. They defend the received view that quantum particles are not individuals, and develop a formal framework for non-individual objects. See Rickles et al (2006) for the context of quantum gravity. See also Ladyman and Ross (2007), Chapter 3.
- 3.
See Ladyman and Ross op. cit., Chapter 1.
- 4.
See French and Krause op. cit. pp. 16–18, and Ladyman (2007).
- 5.
For further discussion see French and Krause 2006, pp. 167–173.
- 6.
- 7.
This is the view taken by French, for example.
- 8.
See French and Krause 2006.
- 9.
This is the option advocated by Ladyman.
- 10.
This is defended in Leitgeb and Ladyman (2008).
- 11.
- 12.
This notion of lonely objects plays a crucial role in the scholastic distinction between individuality and distinguishability drawn on by French in his interminable discussions of quantum individuality. See Langton and Lewis (1998) and Weatherson (2002) on intrinsic properties.
- 13.
Of course, one has to be careful about what counts as ‘genuine’ here. Leibniz, for example, understood it as whatever conformed with his metaphysical principles, notably the Principles of Sufficient Reason and Identity of Indiscernibles, which would hardly be appropriate here.
- 14.
Further consideration of structuralist approaches in the context of space-time theory can be found in Rickles et al. op. cit.
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French, S., Ladyman, J. (2010). In Defence of Ontic Structural Realism. In: Bokulich, A., Bokulich, P. (eds) Scientific Structuralism. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 281. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9597-8_2
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