Abstract
Valuing is an important and ordinary endeavor, which pervades all our practices, activities, and institutions. The nature and criteria for valuing decisively depend on the alleged nature of values. First of all, are there values? If so, how to access them, and how do they inform our choices? Second, what kinds of value are there, and how do we identify them conceptually? Sections 1–2 identify these problems, which are the core of debates in meta-ethics and substantive theory, respectively. The criteria for judging the adequacy of a theory of value including the capacity for explaining phenomena, and the normative capacity to guide action, are highlighted in Sect. 3. Theories of values offer large varieties of answers to these questions, as we shall see in Sect. 4. Such theories are also supposed to account for phenomena such as the possibility of ineradicable disagreements of value , and explain their implications, which are addressed in Sect. 5. Some disagreements seem to depend on the incommensurability of value , which can be defined in different ways. The implications of such claim are examined in Sect. 6. In Sect. 7, we consider whether and how the incommensurability of values affects the rationality of choice. Section 8 deals with some crucial receptive modalities of relating to values: the emotions . Section 9 concerns persons as both bearers and sources of value. Finally, in Sect. 10, we consider various modes of valuing.
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Bagnoli, C. (2018). Values. In: Bongiovanni, G., Postema, G., Rotolo, A., Sartor, G., Valentini, C., Walton, D. (eds) Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9452-0_6
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