Abstract
This chapter examines coherentist approaches to the justification of normative judgments in law. First, it provides a survey of the main approaches to normative coherence defended in the literature on legal coherentism and discusses the principal objections that threaten to undermine the coherence theory of legal justification. One problem with coherentism, namely the problem of the coherence bias, has not, however, received enough attention in the literature. This chapter states this problem in detail and argues that a modified version of legal coherentism—namely virtue coherentism—has the resources to address this problem. The chapter then engages in a second-order debate about the relevance of coherence in justification by inquiring into the reasons why coherence is worth pursuing when reasoning in law. Finally, this chapter concludes by assessing the value and limits of coherentist reasoning in the legal domain.
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Notes
- 1.
See, among others, Dworkin (1986), MacCormick (1984, 2005), Alexy and Peczenik (1990), Peczenik (2009), Peczenik and Hage (2004), Günther (1989, 1993), Wintgens (1993, 2000), Hage (2004, 2013). For some earlier coherence theories of legal justification, see Sartorious (1968, 1971), and Hoffmaster (1980).
- 2.
A summary of the main coherence theories across a number of domains is provided in Amaya (2015, Chaps. 3 through 9).
- 3.
For analyses of coherence from a systemic perspective, see Alonso (2006), Pastore (1991), Pérez-Bermejo (2006, 2007), Ratti (2007), and Schröter (2006). On the distinction between systemic and argumentative coherence, see Moral (2003) and Bertea ‘The Argument from Coherence,’ IVR Encyclopaedia of Jurisprudence, Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law, available at http://www.ive-enc.
- 4.
A discussion of evidential reasoning in law is provided by Di Bello and Verheji, Chap. 1, part III, this volume, on ‘Evidential Reasoning.’
- 5.
The difference is not a sharp one, as principles and analogies are very much related; there is, nonetheless, a difference in emphasis that is worth noting and that makes this classification useful.
- 6.
- 7.
There is another objection that has been raised in the coherentist literature but that I shall not deal with here, to wit, ‘the retroactivity objection.’ The objection is that coherence theories are path-dependent and that this leads to retroactive application of the law. See Kress 1984, 377–388. For responses to Kress’s retroactivity objection, see Hurley (1990, 235–251) and Habermas (1996, 219–220).
- 8.
This contrasts with case-based approaches to coherence, which reduce normative coherence to analogical one.
- 9.
For a discussion of formal approaches to coherence that use belief revision formalisms, see Amaya (2007); for formal approaches to normative coherence within the field of A.I., see Bench-Capon and Sartor (2001a, b, 2003), Hage (2001), Joseph and Prakken (2009); for probabilistic analyses of coherence, see Shogenji (1999) and Olsson (2002, 2005).
- 10.
- 11.
Dworkin’s reply to the so-called objection from ‘theory-dependence,’ an objection which, at bottom, is a version of the problem of circularity, also appeals to the relevance of complexity. On the relation between the objection from circularity and the objection from theory-dependence, see Marmor (1991, 79). For a statement of the objection from theory-dependence, see Dworkin (1985, 169). For Dworkin’s response, see Dworkin (1983b, 293).
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
For a statement of this objection, see Williams (1980, 249).
- 16.
- 17.
The line of response I suggest is thus not available to weak coherence theories insofar as these theories take coherence with the settled law to be a necessary condition of justification.
- 18.
- 19.
In a similar vein, Alexy (1998, 46–48) claims that a coherence approach is based on a non-skeptical view about the possibility of weighing values and on some kind of commensurability among values.
- 20.
- 21.
In fact, Dworkin seems to be well aware of this problem. See Dworkin (1993, 144, and 1986, 245).
- 22.
The phrase is Plantinga’s. See Plantinga (1993, 112).
- 23.
The point is persuasively argued for by Schauer (1986–1987, 858).
- 24.
This is the problem of authority, which I have discussed above.
- 25.
- 26.
See Kress (1996, 539–546), for an analysis of the different ways in which coherence and unity relate to each other in various conceptions of coherence. Most versions of the coherence theory in law do not define coherence as unity. A notable exception is Weinrib’s theory. See Weinrib (1988, 1994). For a critique, see Kress (1994).
- 27.
For an extremely illuminating account of the relationship between coherence and conflict in moral deliberation, see Hurley (1989), part III, to whom this response to Raz’s critique owes much.
- 28.
It is crucial to note that by ‘realism’ about truth, I am referring to any theory of truth that claims that truth-makers are mind-independent facts. This is a kind of ‘metaphysical’ realism, importantly distinguished from ‘legal’ realism, as a theory of legal decision-making. In fact, legal realists typically reject realism about truth (at least in the normative domain).
- 29.
- 30.
For an analysis of the problems that arise from combining a coherence theory of legal justification with a realist view about legal facts, see Coleman and Leiter (1993, 612–616).
- 31.
- 32.
There are also important theories about the truth of empirical statements that define truth as coherence by resorting to some idealized perspective. See Putnam (1981) (defining truth as coherence with the system of beliefs that we would hold at the limit of inquiry) and Rescher (1985) (defining truth in terms of ideal coherence, i.e., coherence with a perfected database).
- 33.
- 34.
This problem is closely related to the ‘problem of access,’ as Coleman and Leiter (1993, 629) term it. The problem of access is as follows. If, according to views of legal truth as ‘ideal’ justification, true propositions about the law are those that one would justifiably hold under ideal conditions, and given that ideal conditions do not obtain (by definition), then it follows that legal truth would be inaccessible to real judges operating in less-than-ideal conditions. Such a theory fails to guide judges in their decision-making task, for it makes legal justification and legal truth unattainable by real judges.
- 35.
I have argued for this view in Amaya (2015, 49–50 and 69).
- 36.
On the confirmation bias, see Mercier and Sperber (2011, 63–66).
- 37.
This is the so-called ‘objection from the bad lot’ or ‘problem of underconsideration’ raised by Van Fraassen against models of inference to the best explanation in science. See Bas Van Fraassen (1989, 142–150).
- 38.
- 39.
It critical to note that the responsibilist account of legal justification proposed here is ‘counterfactual’ rather than ‘causal.’ A causal version would say that a legal decision is justified if and only if it is the outcome of epistemically responsible coherence-based reasoning. In contrast, the counterfactual version states that a decision is justified if and only if it could be the outcome of epistemically responsible coherence-based reasoning. Thus, the counterfactual version allows for the possibility that a legal decision be justified, provided that an epistemically responsible legal decision-maker could have accepted it as justified, even if it results from an epistemically irresponsible process of coherence maximization.
- 40.
- 41.
- 42.
For a lucid discussion of some advantages of virtue theories in both epistemology and ethics, see Zagzebski (1996, 15–29).
- 43.
Alternatively, one could endorse an irenic approach to the standards of epistemic responsibility, which combines deontic and aretaic elements. I have defended such a view before (Amaya 2011). Or one could also make virtues derivative of duties. One way this could be done is by appealing to a duty to ‘behave in ways that will maximize the person’s number of true beliefs and minimize that person’s number of false beliefs’ (Feldman 2002, 372), where these behaviors would include the cultivation and exercise of intellectual virtues.
- 44.
The acceptance of a virtue framework does not, however, imply that deontic notions are irrelevant for determining whether a legal decision-maker has behaved in an epistemically responsible way. A virtue account of the epistemic responsibility of legal decision-makers is compatible with assigning to notions of duty important roles within the theory (Amaya 2015, 523–524).
- 45.
Cf. Simon and Scurich (2011), showing that judicial decisions accompanied by monolithic reasoning—multiple one-sided reasoning—are judged as less acceptable than decisions accompanied by multiple two-sided reasoning. It is unclear, however, whether Simon and Scurich’s results cast doubt over the persuasive value of coherence. As argued, coherence reasoning—and theorizing—rather than explaining conflict away, provides a way to proceed in the way of conflict. Thus, coherence reasoning need not be monolithic, but it is compatible with admitting to good reasons on both sides.
- 46.
That coherence has a constitutive value in individual identity has been argued by Richardson (1994), Thagard and Millgram (1996), and, most extensively, by Hurley (1989). That coherence plays a constitutive role of political communities is argued in Dworkin (1986). See also Michelon (2011), arguing that the value of coherence may be grounded in a narrative conception of human life.
- 47.
The expression is Bender’s (1989, 1).
- 48.
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Amaya, A. (2018). Coherence and Systematization in Law. In: Bongiovanni, G., Postema, G., Rotolo, A., Sartor, G., Valentini, C., Walton, D. (eds) Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9452-0_22
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